VOLUME 2



THE PRACTICE OF **CLOUD SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION** DESIGNING AND OPERATING LARGE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS



THOMAS A. LIMONCELLI • STRATA R. CHALUP • CHRISTINA J. HOGAN

FREE SAMPLE CHAPTER



The Practice of Cloud System Administration

Volume 2

This page intentionally left blank

The Practice of Cloud System Administration

Designing and Operating Large Distributed Systems

Volume 2

Thomas A. Limoncelli Strata R. Chalup Christina J. Hogan

★Addison-Wesley Upper Saddle River, NJ • Boston • Indianapolis • San Francisco New York • Toronto • Montreal • London • Munich • Paris • Madrid Capetown • Sydney • Tokyo • Singapore • Mexico City Many of the designations used by manufacturers and sellers to distinguish their products are claimed as trademarks. Where those designations appear in this book, and the publisher was aware of a trademark claim, the designations have been printed with initial capital letters or in all capitals.

The authors and publisher have taken care in the preparation of this book, but make no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of the use of the information or programs contained herein.

For information about buying this title in bulk quantities, or for special sales opportunities (which may include electronic versions; custom cover designs; and content particular to your business, training goals, marketing focus, or branding interests), please contact our corporate sales department at corp-sales@pearsoned.com or (800) 382-3419.

For government sales inquiries, please contact governmentsales@pearsoned.com.

For questions about sales outside the United States, please contact international@pearsoned.com.

Visit us on the Web: informit.com/aw

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Limoncelli, Tom.

The practice of cloud system administration : designing and operating large distributed systems / Thomas A. Limoncelli, Strata R. Chalup, Christina J. Hogan.

volumes cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-321-94318-7 (volume 2 : paperback)

ISBN-10: 0-321-94318-X (volume 2 : paperback)

1. Computer networks—Management. 2. Computer systems. 3. Cloud computing. 4. Electronic data processing—Distributed processing. I. Chalup, Strata R. II. Hogan, Christina J. III. Title.

TK5105.5.L529 2015 004.67′82068—dc23

2014024033

Copyright © 2015 Thomas A. Limoncelli, Virtual.NET Inc., Christina J. Lear née Hogan

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This publication is protected by copyright, and permission must be obtained from the publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise. To obtain permission to use material from this work, please submit a written request to Pearson Education, Inc., Permissions Department, One Lake Street, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, or you may fax your request to (201) 236-3290.

ISBN-13: 978-0-321-94318-7 ISBN-10: 0-321-94318-X Text printed in the United States on recycled paper at RR Donnelley in Crawfordsville, Indiana. First printing, September 2014

Contents at a Glance

Contents		vii
Preface	xxiii	
About the A	uthors	xxix
Introductio	n	1
Part I D	Design: Building It	7
Chapter 1	Designing in a Distributed World	9
Chapter 2	Designing for Operations	31
Chapter 3	Selecting a Service Platform	51
Chapter 4	Application Architectures	69
Chapter 5	Design Patterns for Scaling	95
Chapter 6	Design Patterns for Resiliency	119
Part II (Operations: Running It	145
Chapter 7	Operations in a Distributed World	147
Chapter 8	DevOps Culture	171
Chapter 9	Service Delivery: The Build Phase	195
Chapter 10	Service Delivery: The Deployment Phase	211
Chapter 11	Upgrading Live Services	225
Chapter 12	Automation	243
Chapter 13	Design Documents	275
Chapter 14	Oncall	285
Chapter 15	Disaster Preparedness	307
Chapter 16	Monitoring Fundamentals	331

Chapter 17 Monitoring Architecture and Practice	345
Chapter 18 Capacity Planning	365
Chapter 19 Creating KPIs	387
Chapter 20 Operational Excellence	401
Epilogue	417
Part III Appendices	419
Appendix A Assessments	421
Appendix B The Origins and Future of Distributed Computing	
and Clouds	451
Appendix C Scaling Terminology and Concepts	475
Appendix D Templates and Examples	481
Appendix E Recommended Reading	487
Bibliography	491
Index	499

Contents

Pre	eface			xxiii	
Ab	out th	e Authors		xxix	
Int	roduc	tion		1	
Pa	rt I	Design	a: Building It	7	
1	Des	igning in a	a Distributed World	9	
	1.1	Visibili	ity at Scale	10	
	1.2	The Im	portance of Simplicity	11	
	1.3 Composition			12	
		1.3.1	Load Balancer with Multiple Backend Replicas	12	
		1.3.2	Server with Multiple Backends	14	
		1.3.3	Server Tree	16	
	1.4	Distrib	uted State	17	
	1.5	The CA	AP Principle	21	
		1.5.1	Consistency	21	
		1.5.2	Availability	21	
		1.5.3	Partition Tolerance	22	
	1.6	Loosel	y Coupled Systems	24	
	1.7	Speed		26	
	1.8	Summa	ary	29	
	Exercises				

2	Desig	gning for	Operations	31
	2.1	Operat	ional Requirements	31
		2.1.1	Configuration	33
		2.1.2	Startup and Shutdown	34
		2.1.3	Queue Draining	35
		2.1.4	Software Upgrades	36
		2.1.5	Backups and Restores	36
		2.1.6	Redundancy	37
		2.1.7	Replicated Databases	37
		2.1.8	Hot Swaps	38
		2.1.9	Toggles for Individual Features	39
		2.1.10	Graceful Degradation	39
		2.1.11	Access Controls and Rate Limits	40
		2.1.12	Data Import Controls	41
		2.1.13	Monitoring	42
		2.1.14	Auditing	42
		2.1.15	Debug Instrumentation	43
		2.1.16	Exception Collection	43
		2.1.17	Documentation for Operations	44
	2.2	Implen	nenting Design for Operations	45
		2.2.1	Build Features in from the Beginning	45
		2.2.2	Request Features as They Are Identified	46
		2.2.3	Write the Features Yourself	47
		2.2.4	Work with a Third-Party Vendor	48
	2.3	Improv	ving the Model	48
	2.4	Summa	ary	49
	Exerc	cises		50
3	Selec	ting a Ser	rvice Platform	51
	3.1	Level o	of Service Abstraction	52
		3.1.1	Infrastructure as a Service	52
		3.1.2	Platform as a Service	54
		3.1.3	Software as a Service	55
	3.2	Type of	f Machine	56
		3.2.1	Physical Machines	57
		3.2.2	Virtual Machines	57
		3.2.3	Containers	60

3.3	Level o	of Resource Sharing	62
	3.3.1	Compliance	63
	3.3.2	Privacy	63
	3.3.3	Cost	63
	3.3.4	Control	64
3.4	Coloca	tion	65
3.5	Selecti	on Strategies	66
3.6	Summ	ary	68
Exerc	ises		68
Appl	ication A	rchitectures	69
4.1	Single-	Machine Web Server	70
4.2	Three-	Tier Web Service	71
	4.2.1	Load Balancer Types	72
	4.2.2	Load Balancing Methods	74
	4.2.3	Load Balancing with Shared State	75
	4.2.4	User Identity	76
	4.2.5	Scaling	76
4.3	Four-T	ïer Web Service	77
	4.3.1	Frontends	78
	4.3.2	Application Servers	79
	4.3.3	Configuration Options	80
4.4	Revers	e Proxy Service	80
4.5	Cloud	Scale Service	80
	4.5.1	Global Load Balancer	81
	4.5.2	Global Load Balancing Methods	82
	4.5.3	Global Load Balancing with User-Specific Data	82
	4.5.4	Internal Backbone	83
4.6	Messag	ge Bus Architectures	85
	4.6.1	Message Bus Designs	86
	4.6.2	Message Bus Reliability	87
	4.6.3	Example 1: Link-Shortening Site	87
	4.6.4	Example 2: Employee Human Resources Data Updates	89
4.7	Service	e-Oriented Architecture	90
	4.7.1	Flexibility	91
	4.7.2	Support	91
	4.7.3	Best Practices	91

4

x	Contents
~	contento

	4.8	Summ	ary	92	
	Exerc	ises		93	
5	Desig	Design Patterns for Scaling			
	5.1	Genera	al Strategy	96	
		5.1.1	Identify Bottlenecks	96	
		5.1.2	Reengineer Components	97	
		5.1.3	Measure Results	97	
		5.1.4	Be Proactive	97	
	5.2	Scaling	g Up	98	
	5.3	The A	KF Scaling Cube	99	
		5.3.1	x: Horizontal Duplication	99	
		5.3.2	y: Functional or Service Splits	101	
		5.3.3	z: Lookup-Oriented Split	102	
		5.3.4	Combinations	104	
	5.4	Cachir	ng	104	
		5.4.1	Cache Effectiveness	105	
		5.4.2	Cache Placement	106	
		5.4.3	Cache Persistence	106	
		5.4.4	Cache Replacement Algorithms	107	
		5.4.5	Cache Entry Invalidation	108	
		5.4.6	Cache Size	109	
	5.5	Data S	110		
	5.6	Thread	112		
	5.7	Queue	eing	113	
		5.7.1	Benefits	113	
		5.7.2	Variations	113	
	5.8	Conter	nt Delivery Networks	114	
	5.9	Summ	ary	116	
	Exerc	Exercises			
6	Desig	gn Patter	ns for Resiliency	119	
	6.1	Softwa	are Resiliency Beats Hardware Reliability	120	
	6.2	Everyt	thing Malfunctions Eventually	121	
		6.2.1	MTBF in Distributed Systems	121	
		6.2.2	The Traditional Approach	122	
		6.2.3	The Distributed Computing Approach	123	

6.3	Resilie	Resiliency through Spare Capacity			
	6.3.1	How Much Spare Capacity	125		
	6.3.2	Load Sharing versus Hot Spares	126		
6.4	Failure	e Domains	126		
6.5	Softwa	Software Failures			
	6.5.1	Software Crashes	128		
	6.5.2	Software Hangs	129		
	6.5.3	Query of Death	130		
6.6	Physic	cal Failures	131		
	6.6.1	Parts and Components	131		
	6.6.2	Machines	134		
	6.6.3	Load Balancers	134		
	6.6.4	Racks	136		
	6.6.5	Datacenters	137		
6.7	Overlo	oad Failures	138		
	6.7.1	Traffic Surges	138		
	6.7.2	DoS and DDoS Attacks	140		
	6.7.3	Scraping Attacks	140		
6.8	Huma	n Error	141		
6.9	Summ	ary	142		
Exerc	143				

Part IIOperations: Running It145

7	Opera	tions in	a Distributed World	147
	7.1	Distrib	outed Systems Operations	148
		7.1.1	SRE versus Traditional Enterprise IT	148
		7.1.2	Change versus Stability	149
		7.1.3	Defining SRE	151
		7.1.4	Operations at Scale	152
	7.2	Servic	e Life Cycle	155
		7.2.1	Service Launches	156
		7.2.2	Service Decommissioning	160
	7.3	Organ	izing Strategy for Operational Teams	160
		7.3.1	Team Member Day Types	162
		7.3.2	Other Strategies	165

7.4	Virtua	l Office	166
	7.4.1	Communication Mechanisms	166
	7.4.2	Communication Policies	167
7.5	5 Summ	ary	167
Ex	ercises		168
B De	evOps Cultu	ıre	171
8.1	What I	Is DevOps?	172
	8.1.1	The Traditional Approach	173
	8.1.2	The DevOps Approach	175
8.2	2. The Th	nree Ways of DevOps	176
	8.2.1	The First Way: Workflow	176
	8.2.2	The Second Way: Improve Feedback	177
	8.2.3	The Third Way: Continual Experimentation and	
		Learning	178
	8.2.4	Small Batches Are Better	178
	8.2.5	Adopting the Strategies	179
8.3	B Histor	y of DevOps	180
	8.3.1	Evolution	180
	8.3.2	Site Reliability Engineering	181
8.4	e DevOp	ps Values and Principles	181
	8.4.1	Relationships	182
	8.4.2	Integration	182
	8.4.3	Automation	182
	8.4.4	Continuous Improvement	183
	8.4.5	Common Nontechnical DevOps Practices	183
	8.4.6	Common Technical DevOps Practices	184
	8.4.7	Release Engineering DevOps Practices	186
8.5	5 Conve	erting to DevOps	186
	8.5.1	Getting Started	187
	8.5.2	DevOps at the Business Level	187
8.6	6 Agile a	and Continuous Delivery	188
	8.6.1	What Is Agile?	188
	8.6.2	What Is Continuous Delivery?	189
8.7	' Summ	ary	192
Ex	ercises		193

9	Servic	e Delive	ery: The Build Phase	195
	9.1	Service	e Delivery Strategies	197
		9.1.1	Pattern: Modern DevOps Methodology	197
		9.1.2	Anti-pattern: Waterfall Methodology	199
	9.2	The Vi	rtuous Cycle of Quality	200
	9.3	Build-I	Phase Steps	202
		9.3.1	Develop	202
		9.3.2	Commit	202
		9.3.3	Build	203
		9.3.4	Package	204
		9.3.5	Register	204
	9.4	Build C	Console	205
	9.5	Contin	uous Integration	205
	9.6	Packag	ges as Handoff Interface	207
	9.7	Summa	208	
	Exerci	ses		209
10	Servic	211		
	10.1	Deploy	vment-Phase Steps	211
		10.1.1	Promotion	212
		10.1.2	Installation	212
		10.1.3	Configuration	213
	10.2	Testing and Approval		214
		10.2.1	Testing	215
		10.2.2	Approval	216
	10.3	Operat	tions Console	217
	10.4	Infrast	ructure Automation Strategies	217
		10.4.1	Preparing Physical Machines	217
		10.4.2	Preparing Virtual Machines	218
		10.4.3	Installing OS and Services	219
	10.5	Contin	uous Delivery	221
	10.6	Infrast	ructure as Code	221
	10.7	Other 1	Platform Services	222
	10.8	Summa	ary	222
	Exercises			223

11	Upgra	ding Liv	e Services	225
	11.1	Taking	the Service Down for Upgrading	225
	11.2	Rolling	Upgrades	226
	11.3	Canary	,	227
	11.4	Phased	Roll-outs	229
	11.5	Proport	tional Shedding	230
	11.6	Blue-G	reen Deployment	230
	11.7	Togglin	ng Features	230
	11.8	Live Sc	hema Changes	234
	11.9	Live Co	ode Changes	236
	11.10	Continu	uous Deployment	236
	11.11	Dealing	g with Failed Code Pushes	239
	11.12	Release	e Atomicity	240
	11.13	Summa	ary	241
	Exercis	ses		241
12	Autom	Automation		
	12.1	Approa	aches to Automation	244
		12.1.1	The Left-Over Principle	245
		12.1.2	The Compensatory Principle	246
		12.1.3	The Complementarity Principle	247
		12.1.4	Automation for System Administration	248
		12.1.5	Lessons Learned	249
	12.2	Tool Bu	uilding versus Automation	250
		12.2.1	Example: Auto Manufacturing	251
		12.2.2	Example: Machine Configuration	251
		12.2.3	Example: Account Creation	251
		12.2.4	Tools Are Good, But Automation Is Better	252
	12.3	Goals o	of Automation	252
	12.4	Creatin	g Automation	255
		12.4.1	Making Time to Automate	256
		12.4.2	Reducing Toil	257
		12.4.3	Determining What to Automate First	257
	12.5	How to	Automate	258
	12.6	Langua	age Tools	258
		12.6.1	Shell Scripting Languages	259
		12.6.2	Scripting Languages	259

		12.6.3	Compiled Languages	260
		12.6.4	Configuration Management Languages	260
	12.7	Softwa	re Engineering Tools and Techniques	262
		12.7.1	Issue Tracking Systems	263
		12.7.2	Version Control Systems	265
		12.7.3	Software Packaging	266
		12.7.4	Style Guides	266
		12.7.5	Test-Driven Development	267
		12.7.6	Code Reviews	268
		12.7.7	Writing Just Enough Code	269
	12.8	Multite	enant Systems	270
	12.9	Summa	ary	271
	Exerci	ses		272
13	Desig	n Docum	nents	275
	13.1	Design	Documents Overview	275
		13.1.1	Documenting Changes and Rationale	276
		13.1.2	Documentation as a Repository of Past	
			Decisions	276
	13.2	Design	Document Anatomy	277
	13.3	Templa	ite	279
	13.4	Docum	ent Archive	279
	13.5	Review	v Workflows	280
		13.5.1	Reviewers and Approvers	281
		13.5.2	Achieving Sign-off	281
	13.6	Adopti	ng Design Documents	282
	13.7	Summa	ary	283
	Exercises			284
14	Oncal	1		285
	14.1	Design	ing Oncall	285
		14.1.1	Start with the SLA	286
		14.1.2	Oncall Roster	287
		14.1.3	Onduty	288
		14.1.4	Oncall Schedule Design	288
		14.1.5	The Oncall Calendar	290
		14.1.6	Oncall Frequency	291

		14.1.7	Types of Notifications	292
		14.1.8	After-Hours Maintenance Coordination	294
	14.2	Being C	294	
		14.2.1	Pre-shift Responsibilities	294
		14.2.2	Regular Oncall Responsibilities	294
		14.2.3	Alert Responsibilities	295
		14.2.4	Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA)	296
		14.2.5	Oncall Playbook	297
		14.2.6	Third-Party Escalation	298
		14.2.7	End-of-Shift Responsibilities	299
	14.3	Betwee	n Oncall Shifts	299
		14.3.1	Long-Term Fixes	299
		14.3.2	Postmortems	300
	14.4	Periodi	c Review of Alerts	302
	14.5	Being F	Paged Too Much	304
	14.6	Summa	ary	305
	Exercis	ses		306
15	Disaster Preparedness			307
10	Disust	ci i icpa	reuness	507
10	15.1	Mindse	et	308
10	15.1	Mindse 15.1.1	et Antifragile Systems	308 308
10	15.1	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk	308 308 309
10	15.1 15.2	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ	et Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk ual Training: Wheel of Misfortune	308 308 309 311
10	15.1 15.2 15.3	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T	et Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk ual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills	308 308 309 311 312
10	15.1 15.2 15.3	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1	et Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk Jual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing	308 308 309 311 312 313
10	15.1 15.2 15.3	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2	et Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk Jual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing	308 308 309 311 312 313 314
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk Jual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1	et Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk Jual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk Jual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317
15	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk ual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318
15	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.4	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk rual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics Experiencing a DiRT Test	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 320
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.4 Inciden	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk ual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics Experiencing a DiRT Test at Command System	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 320 323
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.3 15.4.4 Inciden 15.5.1	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk rual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics Experiencing a DiRT Test tt Command System How It Works: Public Safety Arena	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 320 323 325
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.4 Inciden 15.5.1 15.5.2	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk Jual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics Experiencing a DiRT Test It Command System How It Works: Public Safety Arena How It Works: IT Operations Arena	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 320 323 325 326
10	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.3 15.4.4 Inciden 15.5.1 15.5.2 15.5.3	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk rual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics Experiencing a DiRT Test tt Command System How It Works: Public Safety Arena How It Works: IT Operations Arena Incident Action Plan	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 320 323 325 326 326
	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4	Mindse 15.1.1 15.1.2 Individ Team T 15.3.1 15.3.2 Trainin 15.4.1 15.4.2 15.4.3 15.4.4 Inciden 15.5.1 15.5.2 15.5.3 15.5.4	Antifragile Systems Reducing Risk rual Training: Wheel of Misfortune raining: Fire Drills Service Testing Random Testing g for Organizations: Game Day/DiRT Getting Started Increasing Scope Implementation and Logistics Experiencing a DiRT Test t Command System How It Works: Public Safety Arena How It Works: IT Operations Arena Incident Action Plan Best Practices	308 308 309 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 320 323 325 326 326 327

	15.6	Summa	ary	329
	Exerci	ses		330
16	Moni	Monitoring Fundamentals		
	16.1	Overvi	ew	332
		16.1.1	Uses of Monitoring	333
		16.1.2	Service Management	334
	16.2	Consur	ners of Monitoring Information	334
	16.3	What to Monitor		
	16.4	Retention		338
	16.5	Meta-n	nonitoring	339
	16.6	Logs		340
		16.6.1	Approach	341
		16.6.2	Timestamps	341
	16.7	Summa	ary	342
	Exerci	ses		342
17	Monitoring Architecture and Practice			345
	17.1	Sensing	g and Measurement	346
		17.1.1	Blackbox versus Whitebox Monitoring	346
		17.1.2	Direct versus Synthesized Measurements	347
		17.1.3	Rate versus Capability Monitoring	348
		17.1.4	Gauges versus Counters	348
	17.2 Collection		ion	350
		17.2.1	Push versus Pull	350
		17.2.2	Protocol Selection	351
		17.2.3	Server Component versus Agent versus Poller	352
		17.2.4	Central versus Regional Collectors	352
	17.3	Analys	is and Computation	353
	17.4	Alertin	g and Escalation Manager	354
		17.4.1	Alerting, Escalation, and Acknowledgments	355
		17.4.2	Silence versus Inhibit	356
	17.5	Visuali	zation	358
		17.5.1	Percentiles	359
		17.5.2	Stack Ranking	360
		17.5.3	Histograms	361
	17.6	Storage		362

	17.7	Config	uration	362
	17.8	Summa	ary	363
	Exercis	ses		364
18	Capaci	itv Planr	ning	365
	18.1	Standa	rd Capacity Planning	366
		18.1.1	Current Usage	368
		18.1.2	Normal Growth	369
		18.1.3	Planned Growth	369
		18.1.4	Headroom	370
		18.1.5	Resiliency	370
		18.1.6	Timetable	371
	18.2	Advan	ced Capacity Planning	371
		18.2.1	Identifying Your Primary Resources	372
		18.2.2	Knowing Your Capacity Limits	372
		18.2.3	Identifying Your Core Drivers	373
		18.2.4	Measuring Engagement	374
		18.2.5	Analyzing the Data	375
		18.2.6	Monitoring the Key Indicators	380
		18.2.7	Delegating Capacity Planning	381
	18.3	Resour	ce Regression	381
	18.4	Launch	ning New Services	382
	18.5	Reduce	384	
	18.6	Summa	385	
	Exercis	ses		386
19	Creati	ng KPIs		387
	19.1	What Is	s a KPI?	388
	19.2	Creatin	ig KPIs	389
		19.2.1	Step 1: Envision the Ideal	390
		19.2.2	Step 2: Quantify Distance to the Ideal	390
		19.2.3	Step 3: Imagine How Behavior Will Change	390
		19.2.4	Step 4: Revise and Select	391
		19.2.5	Step 5: Deploy the KPI	392
	19.3	Examp	le KPI: Machine Allocation	393
		19.3.1	The First Pass	393

		19.3.2	The Second Pass	394
		19.3.3	Evaluating the KPI	396
	19.4	Case St	udy: Error Budget	396
		19.4.1	Conflicting Goals	396
		19.4.2	A Unified Goal	397
		19.4.3	Everyone Benefits	398
	19.5	Summa	ary	399
	Exercis	ses		399
20	Opera	tional Ex	ccellence	401
	20.1	What D	Ooes Operational Excellence Look Like?	401
	20.2	How to	Measure Greatness	402
	20.3	Assessr	nent Methodology	403
		20.3.1	Operational Responsibilities	403
		20.3.2	Assessment Levels	405
		20.3.3	Assessment Questions and Look-For's	407
	20.4	Service	Assessments	407
		20.4.1	Identifying What to Assess	408
		20.4.2	Assessing Each Service	408
		20.4.3	Comparing Results across Services	409
		20.4.4	Acting on the Results	410
		20.4.5	Assessment and Project Planning Frequencies	410
	20.5	Organiz	zational Assessments	411
	20.6	Levels	of Improvement	412
	20.7	Getting	; Started	413
	20.8	Summa	ary	414
	Exercis	ses		415
Epi	logue			416
Pa	rt III	Appe	ndices	419
A	Assess	ments		421
	A.1	Regular	r Tasks (RT)	423
	A.2	Emerge	ency Response (ER)	426
	A.3	Monito	ring and Metrics (MM)	428

	A.4	Capacity Planning (CP)	431
	A.5	Change Management (CM)	433
	A.6	New Product Introduction and Removal (NPI/NPR)	435
	A.7	Service Deployment and Decommissioning (SDD)	437
	A.8	Performance and Efficiency (PE)	439
	A.9	Service Delivery: The Build Phase	442
	A.10	Service Delivery: The Deployment Phase	444
	A.11	Toil Reduction	446
	A.12	Disaster Preparedness	448
В	The O	rigins and Future of Distributed Computing and Clouds	451
	B.1	The Pre-Web Era (1985–1994)	452
		Availability Requirements	452
		Technology	453
		Scaling	454
		High Availability	454
		Costs	454
	B.2	The First Web Era: The Bubble (1995–2000)	455
		Availability Requirements	455
		Technology	455
		Scaling	456
		High Availability	457
		Costs	459
	B.3	The Dot-Bomb Era (2000–2003)	459
		Availability Requirements	460
		Technology	460
		High Availability	461
		Scaling	462
		Costs	464
	B.4	The Second Web Era (2003–2010)	465
		Availability Requirements	465
		Technology	465
		High Availability	466
		Scaling	467
		Costs	468

	B.5	The Cloud Computing Era (2010–present)	469	
		Availability Requirements	469	
		Costs	469	
		Scaling and High Availability	471	
		Technology	472	
	B.6	Conclusion	472	
	Exerc	ises	473	
С	Scali	ng Terminology and Concepts	475	
	C.1	Constant, Linear, and Exponential Scaling	475	
	C.2	Big O Notation	476	
	C.3	Limitations of Big O Notation	478	
D	Temp	plates and Examples	481	
	D.1	Design Document Template	481	
	D.2	Design Document Example	482	
	D.3	Sample Postmortem Template	484	
E	Reco	mmended Reading	487	
Bił	oliograf	vhy	491	
Ind	Index			

This page intentionally left blank

Preface

Which of the following statements are true?

- 1. The most reliable systems are built using cheap, unreliable components.
- 2. The techniques that Google uses to scale to billions of users follow the same patterns you can use to scale a system that handles hundreds of users.
- 3. The more risky a procedure is, the more you should do it.
- 4. Some of the most important software features are the ones that users never see.
- 5. You should pick random machines and power them off.
- 6. The code for every feature Facebook will announce in the next six months is probably in your browser already.
- 7. Updating software multiple times a day requires little human effort.
- 8. Being oncall doesn't have to be a stressful, painful experience.
- 9. You shouldn't monitor whether machines are up.
- 10. Operations and management can be conducted using the scientific principles of experimentation and evidence.
- 11. Google has rehearsed what it would do in case of a zombie attack.

All of these statements are true. By the time you finish reading this book, you'll know why.

This is a book about building and running cloud-based services on a large scale: internet-based services for millions or billions of users. That said, every day more and more enterprises are adopting these techniques. Therefore, this is a book for everyone.

The intended audience is system administrators and their managers. We do not assume a background in computer science, but we do assume experience with UNIX/Linux system administration, networking, and operating system concepts.

Our focus is on building and operating the services that make up the cloud, not a guide to using cloud-based services.

Cloud services must be available, fast, and secure. At cloud scale, this is a unique engineering feat. Therefore cloud-scale services are engineered differently than your typical enterprise service. Being available is important because the Internet is open 24×7 and has users in every time zone. Being fast is important because users are frustrated by slow services, so slow services lose out to faster rivals. Being secure is important because, as caretakers of other people's data, we are duty-bound (and legally responsible) to protect people's data.

These requirements are intermixed. If a site is not secure, by definition, it cannot be made reliable. If a site is not fast, it is not sufficiently available. If a site is down, by definition, it is not fast.

The most visible cloud-scale services are web sites. However, there is a huge ecosystem of invisible internet-accessible services that are not accessed with a browser. For example, smartphone apps use API calls to access cloud-based services.

For the remainder of this book we will tend to use the term "distributed computing" rather than "cloud computing." *Cloud computing* is a marketing term that means different things to different people. *Distributed computing* describes an architecture where applications and services are provided using many machines rather than one.

This is a book of fundamental principles and practices that are timeless. Therefore we don't make recommendations about which specific products or technologies to use. We could provide a comparison of the top five most popular web servers or NoSQL databases or continuous build systems. If we did, then this book would be out of date the moment it is published. Instead, we discuss the qualities one should look for when selecting such things. We provide a model to work from. This approach is intended to prepare you for a long career where technology changes over time but you are always prepared. We will, of course, illustrate our points with specific technologies and products, but not as an endorsement of those products and services.

This book is, at times, idealistic. This is deliberate. We set out to give the reader a vision of how things can be, what to strive for. We are here to raise the bar.

About This Book

The book is structured in two parts, Design and Operations.

Part I captures our thinking on the design of large, complex, cloud-based distributed computing systems. After the Introduction, we tackle each element of design from the bottom layers to the top. We cover distributed systems from the point of view of a system administrator, not a computer scientist. To operate a system, one must be able to understand its internals. Part II describes how to run such systems. The first chapters cover the most fundamental issues. Later chapters delve into more esoteric technical activities, then high-level planning and strategy that tie together all of the above.

At the end is extra material including an assessment system for operations teams, a highly biased history of distributed computing, templates for forms mentioned in the text, recommended reading, and other reference material.

We're excited to present a new feature of our book series: our operational assessment system. This system consists of a series of assessments you can use to evaluate your operations and find areas of improvement. The assessment questions and "Look For" recommendations are found in Appendix A. Chapter 20 is the instruction manual.

Acknowledgments

This book wouldn't have been possible without the help and feedback we received from our community and people all over the world. The DevOps community was generous in its assistance.

First, we'd like to thank our spouses and families: Christine Polk, Mike Chalup, and Eliot and Joanna Lear. Your love and patience make all this possible.

If we have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. Certain chapters relied heavily on support and advice from particular people: John Looney and Cian Synnott (Chapter 1); Marty Abbott and Michael Fisher (Chapter 5); Damon Edwards, Alex Honor, and Jez Humble (Chapters 9 and 10); John Allspaw (Chapter 12); Brent Chapman (Chapter 15); Caskey Dickson and Theo Schlossnagle (Chapters 16 and 17); Arun Kejariwal and Bruce Yan (Chapter 18); Benjamin Treynor Sloss (Chapter 19); and Geoff Halprin (Chapter 20 and Appendix A).

Thanks to Gene Kim for the "strategic" inspiration and encouragement.

Dozens of people helped us—some by supplying anecdotes, some by reviewing parts of or the entire book. The only fair way to thank them all is alphabetically and to apologize in advance to anyone we left out: Thomas Baden, George Beech, Raymond Blum, Kyle Brandt, Mark Burgess, Nick Craver, Geoff Dalgas, Robert P. J. Day, Patrick Debois, Bill Duane, Paul Evans, David Fullerton, Tom Geller, Peter Grace, Elizabeth Hamon Reid, Jim Hickstein, Zachary Hueras, Matt Jones, Jennifer Joy, Jimmy Kaplowitz, Daniel V. Klein, Steven Levine, Cory Lueninghoener, Shane Madden, Jim Maurer, Stephen McHenry, Dinah McNutt, Scott Hazen Mueller, Steve Murawski, Mohit Muthanna, Lenny Rachitsky, Amy Rich, Adele Shakal, Bart Silverstrim, Josh Simon, Joel Spolsky, Desiree Sylvester, Win Treese, Todd Underwood, Nicole Forsgren Velasquez, and Dave Zwieback.

Last but not least, thanks to everyone from Addison-Wesley. In particular, thanks to Debra Williams Cauley, for guiding us to Addison-Wesley and steering

us the entire way; Michael Thurston, for editing our earliest drafts and reshaping them to be much, much better; Kim Boedigheimer, who coordinated and assisted us calmly even when we were panicking; Lori Hughes, our LaTeX wizard; Julie Nahil, our production manager; Jill Hobbs, our copyeditor; and John Fuller and Mark Taub, for putting up with all our special requests!

Part I Design: Building It

Chapter 1: Designing in a Distributed World
Overview of how distributed systems are designed.
Chapter 2: Designing for Operations
Features software should have to enable smooth operations.
Chapter 3: Selecting a Service Platform
Physical and virtual machines, private and public clouds.
Chapter 4: Application Architectures
Building blocks for creating web and other applications.
Chapter 5: Design Patterns for Scaling
Building blocks for growing a service.
Chapter 6: Design Patterns for Resiliency
Building blocks for creating systems that survive failure.
Part II Operations: Running It
Chapter 7: Operations in a Distributed World
Overview of how distributed systems are run.
Chapter 8: DevOps Culture
Introduction to DevOps culture, its history and practices.
Chapter 9: Service Delivery: The Build Phase
How a service gets built and prepared for production.
Chapter 10: Service Delivery: The Deployment Phase
How a service is tested, approved, and put into production.
Chapter 11: Upgrading Live Services
How to upgrade services without downtime.
Chapter 12: Automation
Creating tools and automating operational work.
Chapter 13: Design Documents
Communicating designs and intentions in writing.
Chapter 14: Oncall
Handling exceptions.
Chapter 15: Disaster Preparedness
Making systems stronger through planning and practice.

Chapter 16: Monitoring Fundamentals

Monitoring terminology and strategy.

Chapter 17: Monitoring Architecture and Practice

The components and practice of monitoring.

Chapter 18: Capacity Planning

Planning for and providing additional resources before we need them.

Chapter 19: Creating KPIs

Driving behavior scientifically through measurement and reflection.

Chapter 20: Operational Excellence

Strategies for constant improvement.

Epilogue

Some final thoughts.

Part III Appendices

Appendix A: Assessments

Appendix B: The Origins and Future of Distributed Computing and Clouds

Appendix C: Scaling Terminology and Concepts

Appendix D: Templates and Examples

Appendix E: Recommended Reading

Bibliography

Index

This page intentionally left blank

About the Authors

Thomas A. Limoncelli is an internationally recognized author, speaker, and system administrator. During his seven years at Google NYC, he was an SRE for projects such as Blog Search, Ganeti, and various internal enterprise IT services. He now works as an SRE at Stack Exchange, Inc., home of ServerFault.com and Stack-Overflow.com. His first paid system administration job was as a student at Drew University in 1987, and he has since worked at small and large companies, including AT&T/Lucent Bell Labs. His best-known books include *Time Management for System Administrators* (O'Reilly) and *The Practice of System and Network Administration, Second Edition* (Addison-Wesley). His hobbies include grassroots activism, for which his work has been recognized at state and national levels. He lives in New Jersey.

Strata R. Chalup has been leading and managing complex IT projects for many years, serving in roles ranging from project manager to director of operations. Strata has authored numerous articles on management and working with teams and has applied her management skills on various volunteer boards, including BayLISA and SAGE. She started administering VAX Ultrix and Unisys UNIX in 1983 at MIT in Boston, and spent the dot-com years in Silicon Valley building internet services for clients like iPlanet and Palm. In 2007, she joined Tom and Christina to create the second edition of *The Practice of System and Network Administration* (Addison-Wesley). Her hobbies include working with new technologies, including Arduino and various 2D CAD/CAM devices, as well as being a master gardener. She lives in Santa Clara County, California.

Christina J. Hogan has twenty years of experience in system administration and network engineering, from Silicon Valley to Italy and Switzerland. She has gained experience in small startups, mid-sized tech companies, and large global corporations. She worked as a security consultant for many years and her customers included eBay, Silicon Graphics, and SystemExperts. In 2005 she and Tom shared the SAGE Outstanding Achievement Award for their book *The Practice of System and Network Administration* (Addison-Wesley). She has a bachelor's degree in mathematics, a master's degree in computer science, a doctorate in aeronautical engineering, and a diploma in law. She also worked for six years as an aero-dynamicist in a Formula 1 racing team and represented Ireland in the 1988 Chess Olympiad. She lives in Switzerland.

Introduction

The goal of this book is to help you build and run the best cloud-scale service possible. What is the ideal environment that we seek to create?

Business Objectives

Simply stated, the end result of our ideal environment is that business objectives are met. That may sound a little boring but actually it is quite exciting to work where the entire company is focused and working together on the same goals.

To achieve this, we must understand the business objectives and work backward to arrive at the system we should build.

Meeting business objectives means knowing what those objectives are, having a plan to achieve them, and working through the roadblocks along the way.

Well-defined business objectives are measurable, and such measurements can be collected in an automated fashion. A dashboard is automatically generated so everyone is aware of progress. This transparency enhances trust.

Here are some sample business objectives:

- Sell our products via a web site
- Provide service 99.99 percent of the time
- Process *x* million purchases per month, growing 10 percent monthly
- Introduce new features twice a week
- Fix major bugs within 24 hours

In our ideal environment, business and technical teams meet their objectives and project goals predictably and reliably. Because of this, both types of teams trust that other teams will meet their future objectives. As a result, teams can plan better. They can make more aggressive plans because there is confidence that external dependencies will not fail. This permits even more aggressive planning. Such an approach creates an upward spiral that accelerates progress throughout the company, benefiting everyone.

Ideal System Architecture

The ideal service is built on a solid architecture. It meets the requirements of the service today and provides an obvious path for growth as the system becomes more popular and receives more traffic. The system is resilient to failure. Rather than being surprised by failures and treating them as exceptions, the architecture accepts that hardware and software failures are a part of the physics of information technology (IT). As a result, the architecture includes redundancy and resiliency features that work around failures. Components fail but the system survives.

Each subsystem that makes up our service is itself a service. All subsystems are programmable via an application programming interface (API). Thus, the entire system is an ecosystem of interconnected subservices. This is called a service-oriented architecture (SOA). Because all these systems communicate over the same underlying protocol, there is uniformity in how they are managed. Because each subservice is loosely coupled to the others, all of these services can be independently scaled, upgraded, or replaced.

The geometry of the infrastructure is described electronically. This electronic description is read by IT automation systems, which then build the production environment without human intervention. Because of this automation, the entire infrastructure can be re-created elsewhere. Software engineers use the automation to make micro-versions of the environment for their personal use. Quality and test engineers use the automation to create environments for system tests.

This "infrastructure as code" can be achieved whether we use physical machines or virtual machines, and whether they are in datacenters we run or are hosted by a cloud provider. With virtual machines there is an obvious API available for spinning up a new machine. However, even with physical machines, the entire flow from bare metal to working system can be automated. In our ideal world the automation makes it possible to create environments using combinations of physical and virtual machines. Developers may build the environment out of virtual machines. The production environment might consist of a mixture of physical and virtual machines. The temporary and unexpected need for additional capacity may require extending the production environment into one or more cloud providers for some period of time.

Ideal Release Process

Our ideal environment has a smooth flow of code from development to operations.

Traditionally (not in our ideal environment) the sequence looks like this:

- 1. Developers check code into a repository.
- 2. Test engineers put the code through a number of tests.

- 3. If all the tests pass, the a release engineer builds the packages that will be used to deploy the software. Most of the files come from the source code repository, but some files may be needed from other sources such as a graphics department or documentation writers.
- 4. A test environment is created; without an "infrastructure as code" model, this may take weeks.
- 5. The packages are deployed into a test environment.
- 6. Test engineers perform further tests, focusing on the interaction between subsystems.
- 7. If all these tests succeed, the code is put into production.
- 8. System administrators upgrade systems while looking for failures.
- 9. If there are failures, the software is rolled back.

Doing these steps manually incurs a lot of risk, owing to the assumptions that the right people are available, that the steps are done the same way every time, that nobody makes mistakes, and that all the tasks are completed in time.

Mistakes, bugs, and errors happen, of course—and as a result defects are passed down the line to the next stage. When a mistake is discovered the flow of progress is reversed as the team members who were responsible for the previous stage are told to fix their problem. This means progress is halted and time is lost.

A typical response to a risky process is to do it as rarely as possible. Thus there is a temptation to do as few releases as possible. The result is "mega-releases" launched only a few times a year.

However, by batching up so many changes at once, we actually create more risk. How can we be sure thousands of changes, released simultaneously, will all work on the first try? We can't. Therefore we become even more recalcitrant toward and fearful of making changes. Soon change becomes nearly impossible and innovation comes to a halt.

Not so in our ideal environment.

In our ideal environment, we find automation that eliminates all manual steps in the software build, test, release, and deployment processes. The automation accurately and consistently performs tests that prevent defects from being passed to the next step. As a consequence, the flow of progress is in one direction: forward.

Rather than mega-releases, our ideal environment creates micro-releases. We reduce risk by doing many deployments, each with a few small changes. In fact, we might do 100 deployments per day.

- 1. When the developers check in code, a system detects this fact and triggers a series of automated tests. These tests verify basic code functionality.
- 2. If these tests pass, the process of building the packages is kicked off and runs in a completely automated fashion.

- 3. The successful creation of new packages triggers the creation of a test environment. Building a test environment used to be a long week of connecting cables and installing machines. But with infrastructure as code, the entire environment is created quickly with no human intervention.
- 4. When the test environment is complete, a series of automated tests are run.
- 5. On successful completion the new packages are rolled out to production. The roll-out is also automated but orderly and cautious.
- 6. Certain systems are upgraded first and the system watches for failures. Since the test environment was built with the same automation that built the production environment, there should be very few differences.
- 7. Seeing no failures, the new packages are rolled out to more and more systems until the entire production environment is upgraded.

In our ideal environment all problems are caught before they reach production. That is, roll-out is not a form of testing. Failure during a roll-out to production is essentially eliminated. However, if a failure does happen, it would be considered a serious issue warranting pausing new releases from going into production until a root causes analysis is completed. Tests are added to detect and prevent future occurrences of this failure. Thus, the system gets stronger over time.

Because of this automation, the traditional roles of release engineering, quality assurance, and deployment are practically unrecognizable from their roles at a traditional company. Hours of laborious manual toil are eliminated, leaving more time for improving the packaging system, improving the software quality, and refining the deployment process. In other words, people spend more time making improvements in how work is done rather than doing work itself.

A similar process is used for third-party software. Not all systems are homegrown or come with source code. Deploying third-party services and products follows a similar pattern of release, testing, deployment. However, because these products and services are developed externally, they require a slightly different process. New releases are likely to occur less frequently and we have less control over what is in each new release. The kind of testing these components require is usually related to features, compatibility, and integration.

Ideal Operations

Once the code is in production, operational objectives take precedence. The software is instrumented so that it can be monitored. Data is collected about how long it takes to process transactions from external users as well as from internal APIs. Other indicators such as memory usage are also monitored. This data is collected so that operational decisions can be made based on data, not guesses, luck, or hope. The data is stored for many years so it may be used to predict the future capacity needs.

Measurements are used to detect internal problems while they are small, long before they result in a user-visible outage. We fix problems before they become outages. An actual outage is rare and would be investigated with great diligence. When problems are detected there is a process in place to make sure they are identified, worked on, and resolved quickly.

An automated system detects problems and alerts whoever is oncall. Our oncall schedule is a rotation constructed so that each shift typically receives a manageable number of alerts. At any given time one person is the primary oncall person and is first to receive any alerts. If that individual does not respond in time, a secondary person is alerted. The oncall schedule is prepared far enough in advance that people can plan vacations, recreational activities, and personal time.

There is a "playbook" of instructions on how to handle every alert that can be generated. Each type of alert is documented with a technical description of what is wrong, what the business impact is, and how to fix the issue. The playbook is continually improved. Whoever is oncall uses the playbook to fix the problem. If it proves insufficient, there is a well-defined escalation path, usually to the oncall person for the related subsystem. Developers also participate in the oncall rotation so they understand the operational pain points of the system they are building.

All failures have a corresponding countermeasure, whether it is manually or automatically activated. Countermeasures that are activated frequently are always automated. Our monitoring system detects overuse, as this may indicate a larger problem. The monitoring system collects internal indicator data used by engineers to reduce the failure rate as well as improve the countermeasure.

The less frequently a countermeasure is activated, the less confident we are that it will work the next time it is needed. Therefore infrequently activated countermeasures are periodically and automatically exercised by intentionally causing failures. Just as we require school children to practice fire drills so that everyone knows what to do in an emergency, so we practice fire drills with our operational practices. This way our team becomes experienced at implementing the countermeasures and is confident that they work. If a database failover process doesn't work due to an unexpected dependency, it is better to learn this during a live drill on Monday at 10 AM rather than during an outage at 4 AM on a Sunday morning. Again, we reduce risk by increasing repetition rather than shying away from it. The technical term for improving something through repetition is called "practice." We strongly believe that practice makes perfect.

Our ideal environment scales automatically. As more capacity is needed, additional capacity comes from internal or external cloud providers. Our dashboards indicate when re-architecting will be a better solution than simply allocating more RAM, disk, or CPU.
Scaling down is also automatic. When the system is overloaded or degraded, we never turn users away with a "503—Service Unavailable" error. Instead, the system automatically switches to algorithms that use less resources. Bandwidth fully utilized? Low-bandwidth versions of the service kick in, displaying fewer graphics or a more simplified user interface. Databases become corrupted? A read-only version of the service keeps most users satisfied.

Each feature of our service can be individually enabled or disabled. If a feature turns out to have negative consequences, such as security holes or unexpectedly bad performance, it can be disabled without deploying a different software release.

When a feature is revised, the new code does not eliminate the old functionality. The new behavior can be disabled to reveal the old behavior. This is particularly useful when rolling out a new user interface. If a release can produce both the old and new user interface, it can be enabled on a per-user basis. This enables us to get feedback from "early access" users. On the official release date, the new feature is enabled for successively larger and larger groups. If performance problems are found, the feature can easily be reverted or switched off entirely.

In our ideal environment there is excellent operational hygiene. Like brushing our teeth, we regularly do the things that preserve good operational health. We maintain clear and updated documentation for how to handle every countermeasure, process, and alert. Overactive alerts are fine-tuned, not ignored. Open bug counts are kept to a minimum. Outages are followed by the publication of a postmortem report with recommendations on how to improve the system in the future. Any "quick fix" is followed by a root causes analysis and the implementation of a long-term fix.

Most importantly, the developers and operations people do not think of themselves as two distinct teams. They are simply specializations within one large team. Some people write more code than others; some people do more operational projects than others. All share responsibility for maintaining high uptime. To that end, all members participate in the oncall (pager) rotation. Developers are most motivated to improve code that affects operations when they feel the pain of operations, too. Operations must understand the development process if they are to be able to constructively collaborate.

Now you know our vision of an ideal environment. The remainder of this book will explain how to create and run it.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 1

Designing in a Distributed World

There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies.

> -C.A.R. Hoare, The 1980 ACM Turing Award Lecture

How does Google Search work? How does your Facebook Timeline stay updated around the clock? How does Amazon scan an ever-growing catalog of items to tell you that people who bought this item also bought socks?

Is it magic? No, it's distributed computing.

This chapter is an overview of what is involved in designing services that use distributed computing techniques. These are the techniques all large web sites use to achieve their size, scale, speed, and reliability.

Distributed computing is the art of building large systems that divide the work over many machines. Contrast this with traditional computing systems where a single computer runs software that provides a service, or client–server computing where many machines remotely access a centralized service. In distributed computing there are typically hundreds or thousands of machines working together to provide a large service.

Distributed computing is different from traditional computing in many ways. Most of these differences are due to the sheer size of the system itself. Hundreds or thousands of computers may be involved. Millions of users may be served. Billions and sometimes trillions of queries may be processed.

Terms to Know

- **Server:** Software that provides a function or application program interface (API). (Not a piece of hardware.)
- Service: A user-visible system or product composed of many servers.
- Machine: A virtual or physical machine.
- **QPS:** Queries per second. Usually how many web hits or API calls received per second.
- **Traffic:** A generic term for queries, API calls, or other requests sent to a server.
- **Performant:** A system whose performance conforms to (meets or exceeds) the design requirements. A neologism from merging "performance" and "conformant."
- **Application Programming Interface (API):** A protocol that governs how one server talks to another.

Speed is important. It is a competitive advantage for a service to be fast and responsive. Users consider a web site sluggish if replies do not come back in 200 ms or less. Network latency eats up most of that time, leaving little time for the service to compose the page itself.

In distributed systems, failure is normal. Hardware failures that are rare, when multiplied by thousands of machines, become common. Therefore failures are assumed, designs work around them, and software anticipates them. Failure is an expected part of the landscape.

Due to the sheer size of distributed systems, operations must be automated. It is inconceivable to manually do tasks that involve hundreds or thousands of machines. Automation becomes critical for preparation and deployment of software, regular operations, and handling failures.

1.1 Visibility at Scale

To manage a large distributed system, one must have visibility into the system. The ability to examine internal state—called **introspection**—is required to operate, debug, tune, and repair large systems.

In a traditional system, one could imagine an engineer who knows enough about the system to keep an eye on all the critical components or "just knows" what is wrong based on experience. In a large system, that level of visibility must be actively created by designing systems that draw out the information and make it visible. No person or team can manually keep tabs on all the parts. Distributed systems, therefore, require components to generate copious logs that detail what happened in the system. These logs are then aggregated to a central location for collection, storage, and analysis. Systems may log information that is very high level, such as whenever a user makes a purchase, for each web query, or for every API call. Systems may log low-level information as well, such as the parameters of every function call in a critical piece of code.

Systems should export metrics. They should count interesting events, such as how many times a particular API was called, and make these counters accessible.

In many cases, special URLs can be used to view this internal state. For example, the Apache HTTP Web Server has a "server-status" page (http://www.example.com/server-status/).

In addition, components of distributed systems often appraise their own health and make this information visible. For example, a component may have a URL that outputs whether the system is ready (OK) to receive new requests. Receiving as output anything other than the byte "O" followed by the byte "K" (including no response at all) indicates that the system does not want to receive new requests. This information is used by load balancers to determine if the server is healthy and ready to receive traffic. The server sends negative replies when the server is starting up and is still initializing, and when it is shutting down and is no longer accepting new requests but is processing any requests that are still in flight.

1.2 The Importance of Simplicity

It is important that a design remain as simple as possible while still being able to meet the needs of the service. Systems grow and become more complex over time. Starting with a system that is already complex means starting at a disadvantage.

Providing competent operations requires holding a mental model of the system in one's head. As we work we imagine the system operating and use this mental model to track how it works and to debug it when it doesn't. The more complex the system, the more difficult it is to have an accurate mental model. An overly complex system results in a situation where no single person understands it all at any one time.

In The Elements of Programming Style, Kernighan and Plauger (1978) wrote:

Debugging is twice as hard as writing the code in the first place. Therefore, if you write the code as cleverly as possible, you are, by definition, not smart enough to debug it.

The same is true for distributed systems. Every minute spent simplifying a design pays off time and time again when the system is in operation.

1.3 Composition

Distributed systems are composed of many smaller systems. In this section, we explore three fundamental composition patterns in detail:

- Load balancer with multiple backend replicas
- Server with multiple backends
- Server tree

1.3.1 Load Balancer with Multiple Backend Replicas

The first composition pattern is the load balancer with multiple backend replicas. As depicted in Figure 1.1, requests are sent to the load balancer server. For each request, it selects one **backend** and forwards the request there. The response comes back to the load balancer server, which in turn relays it to the original requester.

The backends are called **replicas** because they are all clones or replications of each other. A request sent to any replica should produce the same response.

The load balancer must always know which backends are alive and ready to accept requests. Load balancers send **health check** queries dozens of times each second and stop sending traffic to that backend if the health check fails. A health check is a simple query that should execute quickly and return whether the system should receive traffic.

Picking which backend to send a query to can be simple or complex. A simple method would be to alternate among the backends in a loop—a practice called **round-robin**. Some backends may be more powerful than others, however,



Figure 1.1: A load balancer with many replicas

and may be selected more often using a proportional round-robin scheme. More complex solutions include the **least loaded** scheme. In this approach, a load balancer tracks how loaded each backend is and always selects the least loaded one.

Selecting the least loaded backend sounds reasonable but a naive implementation can be a disaster. A backend may not show signs of being overloaded until long after it has actually become overloaded. This problem arises because it can be difficult to accurately measure how loaded a system is. If the load is a measurement of the number of connections recently sent to the server, this definition is blind to the fact that some connections may be long lasting while others may be quick. If the measurement is based on CPU utilization, this definition is blind to input/output (I/O) overload. Often a trailing average of the last 5 minutes of load is used. Trailing averages have a problem in that, as an average, they reflect the past, not the present. As a consequence, a sharp, sudden increase in load will not be reflected in the average for a while.

Imagine a load balancer with 10 backends. Each one is running at 80 percent load. A new backend is added. Because it is new, it has no load and, therefore, is the least loaded backend. A naive least loaded algorithm would send all traffic to this new backend; no traffic would be sent to the other 10 backends. All too quickly, the new backend would become absolutely swamped. There is no way a single backend could process the traffic previously handled by 10 backends. The use of trailing averages would mean the older backends would continue reporting artificially high loads for a few minutes while the new backend would be reporting an artificially low load.

With this scheme, the load balancer will believe that the new machine is less loaded than all the other machines for quite some time. In such a situation the machine may become so overloaded that it would crash and reboot, or a system administrator trying to rectify the situation might reboot it. When it returns to service, the cycle would start over again.

Such situations make the round-robin approach look pretty good. A less naive least loaded implementation would have some kind of control in place that would never send more than a certain number of requests to the same machine in a row. This is called a **slow start** algorithm.

Trouble with a Naive Least Loaded Algorithm

Without slow start, load balancers have been known to cause many problems. One famous example is what happened to the CNN.com web site on the day of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. So many people tried to access CNN.com that the backends became overloaded. One crashed, and then crashed again after it came back up, because the naive least loaded algorithm sent all traffic to it. When it was down, the other backends became overloaded and crashed. One at a time, each backend would get overloaded, crash, and become overloaded from again receiving all the traffic and crash again.

As a result the service was essentially unavailable as the system administrators rushed to figure out what was going on. In their defense, the web was new enough that no one had experience with handling sudden traffic surges like the one encountered on September 11.

The solution CNN used was to halt all the backends and boot them at the same time so they would all show zero load and receive equal amounts of traffic.

The CNN team later discovered that a few days prior, a software upgrade for their load balancer had arrived but had not yet been installed. The upgrade added a slow start mechanism.

1.3.2 Server with Multiple Backends

The next composition pattern is a server with multiple backends. The server receives a request, sends queries to many backend servers, and composes the final reply by combining those answers. This approach is typically used when the original query can easily be deconstructed into a number of independent queries that can be combined to form the final answer.

Figure 1.2a illustrates how a simple search engine processes a query with the help of multiple backends. The frontend receives the request. It relays the query to many backend servers. The spell checker replies with information so the search engine may suggest alternate spellings. The web and image search backends reply with a list of web sites and images related to the query. The advertisement server



Figure 1.2: This service is composed of a server and many backends.

replies with advertisements relevant to the query. Once the replies are received, the frontend uses this information to construct the HTML that makes up the search results page for the user, which is then sent as the reply.

Figure 1.2b illustrates the same architecture with replicated, load-balanced, backends. The same principle applies but the system is able to scale and survive failures better.

This kind of composition has many advantages. The backends do their work in parallel. The reply does not have to wait for one backend process to complete before the next begins. The system is loosely coupled. One backend can fail and the page can still be constructed by filling in some default information or by leaving that area blank.

This pattern also permits some rather sophisticated latency management. Suppose this system is expected to return a result in 200 ms or less. If one of the backends is slow for some reason, the frontend doesn't have to wait for it. If it takes 10 ms to compose and send the resulting HTML, at 190 ms the frontend can give up on the slow backends and generate the page with the information it has. The ability to manage a latency time budget like that can be very powerful. For example, if the advertisement system is slow, search results can be displayed without any ads.

To be clear, the terms "frontend" and "backend" are a matter of perspective. The frontend sends requests to backends, which reply with a result. A server can be both a frontend and a backend. In the previous example, the server is the backend to the web browser but a frontend to the spell check server.

There are many variations on this pattern. Each backend can be replicated for increased capacity or resiliency. Caching may be done at various levels.

The term **fan out** refers to the fact that one query results in many new queries, one to each backend. The queries "fan out" to the individual backends and the replies **fan in** as they are set up to the frontend and combined into the final result.

Any fan in situation is at risk of having congestion problems. Often small queries may result in large responses. Therefore a small amount of bandwidth is used to fan out but there may not be enough bandwidth to sustain the fan in. This may result in congested network links and overloaded servers. It is easy to engineer the system to have the right amount of network and server capacity if the sizes of the queries and replies are consistent, or if there is an occasional large reply. The difficult situation is engineering the system when there are sudden, unpredictable bursts of large replies. Some network equipment is engineered specifically to deal with this situation by dynamically provisioning more buffer space to such bursts. Likewise, the backends can rate-limit themselves to avoid creating the situation in the first place. Lastly, the frontends can manage the congestion themselves by controlling the new queries they send out, by notifying the backends to slow down, or by implementing emergency measures to handle the flood better. The last option is discussed in Chapter 5.

1.3.3 Server Tree

The other fundamental composition pattern is the **server tree**. As Figure 1.3 illustrates, in this scheme a number of servers work cooperatively with one as the root of the tree, parent servers below it, and leaf servers at the bottom of the tree. (In computer science, trees are drawn upside-down.) Typically this pattern is used to access a large dataset or **corpus**. The corpus is larger than any one machine can hold; thus each leaf stores one fraction or **shard** of the whole.

To query the entire dataset, the root receives the original query and forwards it to the parents. The parents forward the query to the leaf servers, which search their parts of the corpus. Each leaf sends its findings to the parents, which sort and filter the results before forwarding them up to the root. The root then takes the response from all the parents, combines the results, and replies with the full answer.

Imagine you wanted to find out how many times George Washington was mentioned in an encyclopedia. You could read each volume in sequence and arrive at the answer. Alternatively, you could give each volume to a different person and have the various individuals search their volumes in parallel. The latter approach would complete the task much faster.



Figure 1.3: A server tree

The primary benefit of this pattern is that it permits parallel searching of a large corpus. Not only are the leaves searching their share of the corpus in parallel, but the sorting and ranking performed by the parents are also done in parallel.

For example, imagine a corpus of the text extracted from every book in the U.S. Library of Congress. This cannot fit in one computer, so instead the information is spread over hundreds or thousands of leaf machines. In addition to the leaf machines are the parents and the root. A search query would go to a root server, which in turn relays the query to all parents. Each parent repeats the query to all leaf nodes below it. Once the leaves have replied, the parent ranks and sorts the results by relevancy.

For example, a leaf may reply that all the words of the query exist in the same paragraph in one book, but for another book only some of the words exist (less relevant), or they exist but not in the same paragraph or page (even less relevant). If the query is for the best 50 answers, the parent can send the top 50 results to the root and drop the rest. The root then receives results from each parent and selects the best 50 of those to construct the reply.

This scheme also permits developers to work within a latency budget. If fast answers are more important than perfect answers, parents and roots do not have to wait for slow replies if the latency deadline is near.

Many variations of this pattern are possible. Redundant servers may exist with a load-balancing scheme to divide the work among them and route around failed servers. Expanding the number of leaf servers can give each leaf a smaller portion of the corpus to search, or each shard of corpus can be placed on multiple leaf servers to improve availability. Expanding the number of parents at each level increases the capacity to sort and rank results. There may be additional levels of parent servers, making the tree taller. The additional levels permit a wider fanout, which is important for an extremely large corpus. The parents may provide a caching function to relieve pressure on the leaf servers; in this case more levels of parents may improve cache effectiveness. These techniques can also help mitigate congestion problems related to fan-in, as discussed in the previous section.

1.4 Distributed State

Large systems often store or process large amounts of state. State consists of data, such as a database, that is frequently updated. Contrast this with a corpus, which is relatively static or is updated only periodically when a new edition is published. For example, a system that searches the U.S. Library of Congress may receive a new corpus each week. By comparison, an email system is in constant churn with new data arriving constantly, current data being updated (email messages being marked as "read" or moved between folders), and data being deleted.

Distributed computing systems have many ways to deal with state. However, they all involve some kind of replication and sharding, which brings about problems of consistency, availability, and partitioning.

The easiest way to store state is to put it on one machine, as depicted in Figure 1.4. Unfortunately, that method reaches its limit quite quickly: an individual machine can store only a limited amount of state and if the one machine dies we lose access to 100 percent of the state. The machine has only a certain amount of processing power, which means the number of simultaneous reads and writes it can process is limited.

In distributed computing we store state by storing fractions or shards of the whole on individual machines. This way the amount of state we can store is limited only by the number of machines we can acquire. In addition, each shard is stored on multiple machines; thus a single machine failure does not lose access to any state. Each replica can process a certain number of queries per second, so we can design the system to process any number of simultaneous read and write requests by increasing the number of replicas. This is illustrated in Figure 1.5, where *N* QPS are received and distributed among three shards, each replicated three ways. As a result, on average one ninth of all queries reach a particular replica server.

Writes or requests that update state require all replicas to be updated. While this update process is happening, it is possible that some clients will read from stale replicas that have not yet been updated. Figure 1.6 illustrates how a write can be confounded by reads to an out-of-date cache. This will be discussed further in the next section.

In the most simple pattern, a root server receives requests to store or retrieve state. It determines which shard contains that part of the state and forwards the request to the appropriate leaf server. The reply then flows up the tree. This looks similar to the server tree pattern described in the previous section but there are two



Figure 1.4: State kept in one location; not distributed computing



Figure 1.5: This distributed state is sharded and replicated.



Figure 1.6: State updates using cached data lead to an inconsistent view.

differences. First, queries go to a single leaf instead of all leaves. Second, requests can be update (write) requests, not just read requests. Updates are more complex when a shard is stored on many replicas. When one shard is updated, all of the replicas must be updated, too. This may be done by having the root update all leaves or by the leaves communicating updates among themselves.

A variation of that pattern is more appropriate when large amounts of data are being transferred. In this case, the root replies with instructions on how to get the data rather than the data itself. The requestor then requests the data from the source directly.

For example, imagine a distributed file system with petabytes of data spread out over thousands of machines. Each file is split into gigabyte-sized chunks. Each chunk is stored on multiple machines for redundancy. This scheme also permits the creation of files larger than those that would fit on one machine. A master server tracks the list of files and identifies where their chunks are. If you are familiar with the UNIX file system, the master can be thought of as storing the inodes, or per-file lists of data blocks, and the other machine as storing the actual blocks of data. File system operations go through a master server that uses the inode-like information to determine which machines to involve in the operation.

Imagine that a large read request comes in. The master determines that the file has a few terabytes stored on one machine and a few terabytes stored on another machine. It could request the data from each machine and relay it to the system that made the request, but the master would quickly become overloaded while receiving and relaying huge chunks of data. Instead, it replies with a list of which machines have the data, and the requestor contacts those machines directly for the data. This way the master is not the middle man for those large data transfers. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1.7.



Figure 1.7: This master server delegates replies to other servers.

1.5 The CAP Principle

CAP stands for consistency, availability, and partition resistance. The CAP Principle states that it is not possible to build a distributed system that guarantees consistency, availability, and resistance to partitioning. Any one or two can be achieved but not all three simultaneously. When using such systems you must be aware of which are guaranteed.

1.5.1 Consistency

Consistency means that all nodes see the same data at the same time. If there are multiple replicas and there is an update being processed, all users see the update go live at the same time even if they are reading from different replicas. Systems that do not guarantee consistency may provide **eventual consistency**. For example, they may guarantee that any update will propagate to all replicas in a certain amount of time. Until that deadline is reached, some queries may receive the new data while others will receive older, out-of-date answers.

Perfect consistency is not always important. Imagine a social network that awards reputation points to users for positive actions. Your reputation point total is displayed anywhere your name is shown. The reputation database is replicated in the United States, Europe, and Asia. A user in Europe is awarded points and that change might take minutes to propagate to the United States and Asia replicas. This may be sufficient for such a system because an absolutely accurate reputation score is not essential. If a user in the United States and one in Asia were talking on the phone as one was awarded points, the other user would see the update seconds later and that would be okay. If the update took minutes due to network congestion or hours due to a network outage, the delay would still not be a terrible thing.

Now imagine a banking application built on this system. A person in the United States and another in Europe could coordinate their actions to withdraw money from the same account at the same time. The ATM that each person uses would query its nearest database replica, which would claim the money is available and may be withdrawn. If the updates propagated slowly enough, both people would have the cash before the bank realized the money was already gone.¹

1.5.2 Availability

Availability is a guarantee that every request receives a response about whether it was successful or failed. In other words, it means that the system is up. For

^{1.} The truth is that the global ATM system does not require database consistency. It can be defeated by leveraging network delays and outages. It is less expensive for banks to give out a limited amount of money when the ATM network is down than to have an unhappy customer stranded without cash. Fraudulent transactions are dealt with after the fact. Daily withdrawal limits prevent major fraud. Assessing overage fees is easier than implementing a globally consistant database.

example, using many replicas to store data such that clients always have access to at least one working replica guarantees availability.

The CAP Principle states that availability also guarantees that the system is able to report failure. For example, a system may detect that it is overloaded and reply to requests with an error code that means "try again later." Being told this immediately is more favorable than having to wait minutes or hours before one gives up.

1.5.3 Partition Tolerance

Partition tolerance means the system continues to operate despite arbitrary message loss or failure of part of the system. The simplest example of partition tolerance is when the system continues to operate even if the machines involved in providing the service lose the ability to communicate with each other due to a network link going down (see Figure 1.8).

Returning to our example of replicas, if the system is read-only it is easy to make the system partition tolerant, as the replicas do not need to communicate with each other. But consider the example of replicas containing state that is updated on one replica first, then copied to other replicas. If the replicas are unable to communicate with each other, the system fails to be able to guarantee updates will propagate within a certain amount of time, thus becoming a failed system.

Now consider a situation where two servers cooperate in a master–slave relationship. Both maintain a complete copy of the state and the slave takes over the master's role if the master fails, which is determined by a loss of heartbeat—that is,



Figure 1.8: Nodes partitioned from each other

a periodic health check between two servers often done via a dedicated network. If the heartbeat network between the two is partitioned, the slave will promote itself to being the master, not knowing that the original master is up but unable to communicate on the heartbeat network. At this point there are two masters and the system breaks. This situation is called **split brain**.

Some special cases of partitioning exist. Packet loss is considered a temporary partitioning of the system as it applies to the CAP Principle. Another special case is the complete network outage. Even the most partition-tolerant system is unable to work in that situation.

The CAP Principle says that any one or two of the attributes are achievable in combination, but not all three. In 2002, Gilbert and Lynch published a formal proof of the original conjecture, rendering it a theorem. One can think of this as the third attribute being sacrificed to achieve the other two.

The CAP Principle is illustrated by the triangle in Figure 1.9. Traditional relational databases like Oracle, MySQL, and PostgreSQL are consistent and available (CA). They use transactions and other database techniques to assure that updates are atomic; they propagate completely or not at all. Thus they guarantee all users will see the same state at the same time. Newer storage systems such as Hbase,



Redis, and Bigtable focus on consistency and partition tolerance (CP). When partitioned, they become read-only or refuse to respond to any requests rather than be inconsistent and permit some users to see old data while others see fresh data. Finally, systems such as Cassandra, Risk, and Dynamo focus on availability and partition tolerance (AP). They emphasize always being able to serve requests even if it means some clients receive outdated results. Such systems are often used in globally distributed networks where each replica talks to the others by less reliable media such as the Internet.

SQL and other relational databases use the term **ACID** to describe their side of the CAP triangle. ACID stands for Atomicity (transactions are "all or nothing"), Consistency (after each transaction the database is in a valid state), Isolation (concurrent transactions give the same results as if they were executed serially), and Durability (a committed transaction's data will not be lost in the event of a crash or other problem). Databases that provide weaker consistency models often refer to themselves as NoSQL and describe themselves as **BASE**: Basically Available Soft-state services with Eventual consistency.

1.6 Loosely Coupled Systems

Distributed systems are expected to be highly available, to last a long time, and to evolve and change without disruption. Entire subsystems are often replaced while the system is up and running.

To achieve this a distributed system uses **abstraction** to build a loosely coupled system. Abstraction means that each component provides an interface that is defined in a way that hides the implementation details. The system is loosely coupled if each component has little or no knowledge of the internals of the other components. As a result a subsystem can be replaced by one that provides the same abstract interface even if its implementation is completely different.

Take, for example, a spell check service. A good level of abstraction would be to take in text and return a description of which words are misspelled and a list of possible corrections for each one. A bad level of abstraction would simply provide access to a lexicon of words that the frontends could query for similar words. The reason the latter is not a good abstraction is that if an entirely new way to check spelling was invented, every frontend using the spell check service would need to be rewritten. Suppose this new version does not rely on a lexicon but instead applies an artificial intelligence technique called machine learning. With the good abstraction, no frontend would need to change; it would simply send the same kind of request to the new server. Users of the bad abstraction would not be so lucky.

For this and many other reasons, loosely coupled systems are easier to evolve and change over time.

Continuing our example, in preparation for the launch of the new spell check service both versions could be run in parallel. The load balancer that sits in front of the spell check system could be programmed to send all requests to both the old and new systems. Results from the old system would be sent to the users, but results from the new system would be collected and compared for quality control. At first the new system might not produce results that were as good, but over time it would be enhanced until its results were quantifiably better. At that point the new system would be put into production. To be cautious, perhaps only 1 percent of all queries would come through the new system—if no users complained, the new system would take a larger fraction. Eventually all responses would come from the new system and the old system could be decommissioned.

Other systems require more precision and accuracy than a spell check system. For example, there may be requirements that the new system be bug-for-bug compatible with the old system before it can offer new functionality. That is, the new system must reproduce not only the features but also the bugs from the old system. In this case the ability to send requests to both systems and compare results becomes critical to the operational task of deploying it.

Case Study: Emulation before Improvements

When Tom was at Cibernet, he was involved in a project to replace an older system. Because it was a financial system, the new system had to prove it was bug-for-bug compatible before it could be deployed.

The old system was built on obsolete, pre-web technology and had become so complex and calcified that it was impossible to add new features. The new system was built on newer, better technology and, being a cleaner design, was more easily able to accommodate new functionality. The systems were run in parallel and results were compared.

At that point engineers found a bug in the old system. Currency conversion was being done in a way that was non-standard and the results were slightly off. To make the results between the two systems comparable, the developers reverse-engineered the bug and emulated it in the new system.

Now the results in the old and new systems matched down to the penny. With the company having gained confidence in the new system's ability to be bug-for-bug compatible, it was activated as the primary system and the old system was disabled.

At this point, new features and improvements could be made to the system. The first improvement, unsurprisingly, was to remove the code that emulated the currency conversion bug.

1.7 Speed

So far we have elaborated on many of the considerations involved in designing large distributed systems. For web and other interactive services, one item may be the most important: speed. It takes time to get information, store information, compute and transform information, and transmit information. Nothing happens instantly.

An interactive system requires fast response times. Users tend to perceive anything faster than 200 ms to be instant. They also prefer fast over slow. Studies have documented sharp drops in revenue when delays as little as 50 ms were artificially added to web sites. Time is also important in batch and non-interactive systems where the total throughput must meet or exceed the incoming flow of work.

The general strategy for designing a system that is performant is to design a system using our best estimates of how quickly it will be able to process a request and then to build prototypes to test our assumptions. If we are wrong, we go back to step one; at least the next iteration will be informed by what we have learned. As we build the system, we are able to remeasure and adjust the design if we discover our estimates and prototypes have not guided us as well as we had hoped.

At the start of the design process we often create many designs, estimate how fast each will be, and eliminate the ones that are not fast enough. We do not automatically select the fastest design. The fastest design may be considerably more expensive than one that is sufficient.

How do we determine if a design is worth pursuing? Building a prototype is very time consuming. Much can be deduced with some simple estimating exercises. Pick a few common transactions and break them down into smaller steps, and then estimate how long each step will take.

Two of the biggest consumers of time are disk access and network delays.

Disk accesses are slow because they involve mechanical operations. To read a block of data from a disk requires the read arm to move to the right track; the platter must then spin until the desired block is under the read head. This process typically takes 10 ms. Compare this to reading the same amount of information from RAM, which takes 0.002 ms, which is 5,000 times faster. The arm and platters (known as a **spindle**) can process only one request at a time. However, once the head is on the right track, it can read many sequential blocks. Therefore reading two blocks is often nearly as fast as reading one block if the two blocks are adjacent. Solid-state drives (SSDs) do not have mechanical spinning platters and are much faster, though more expensive.

Network access is slow because it is limited by the speed of light. It takes approximately 75 ms for a packet to get from California to the Netherlands. About half of that journey time is due to the speed of light. Additional delays may be attributable to processing time on each router, the electronics that convert from wired to fiber-optic communication and back, the time it takes to assemble and disassemble the packet on each end, and so on.

Two computers on the same network segment might seem as if they communicate instantly, but that is not really the case. Here the time scale is so small that other delays have a bigger factor. For example, when transmitting data over a local network, the first byte arrives quickly but the program receiving the data usually does not process it until the entire packet is received.

In many systems computation takes little time compared to the delays from network and disk operation. As a result you can often estimate how long a transaction will take if you simply know the distance from the user to the datacenter and the number of disk seeks required. Your estimate will often be good enough to throw away obviously bad designs.

To illustrate this, imagine you are building an email system that needs to be able to retrieve a message from the message storage system and display it within 300 ms. We will use the time approximations listed in Figure 1.10 to help us engineer the solution.

Jeff Dean, a Google Fellow, has popularized this chart of common numbers to aid in architectural and scaling decisions. As you can see, there are many orders of magnitude difference between certain options. These numbers improve every year. Updates can be found online.

Action	Typical Time	
L1 cache reference	0.5 ns	
Branch mispredict	5 ns	
L2 cache reference	7 ns	
Mutex lock/unlock	100 ns	
Main memory reference	100 ns	
Compress 1K bytes with Zippy	10,000 ns	(0.01 ms)
Send 2K bytes over 1 Gbps network	20,000 ns	(0.02 ms)
Read 1 MB sequentially from memory	250,000 ns	(0.25 ms)
Round trip within same datacenter	500,000 ns	(0.5 ms)
Read 1 MB from SSD	1,000,000 ns	(3 ms)
Disk seek	10,000,000 ns	(10 ms)
Read 1 MB sequentially from network	10,000,000 ns	(10 ms)
Read 1 MB sequentially from disk	30,000,000 ns	(30 ms)
Send packet from California to	150,000,000 ns	(150 ms)
Netherlands to California		

Figure 1.10: Numbers every engineer should know

First we follow the transaction from beginning to end. The request comes from a web browser that may be on another continent. The request must be authenticated, the database index is consulted to determine where to get the message text, the message text is retrieved, and finally the response is formatted and transmitted back to the user.

Now let's budget for the items we can't control. To send a packet between California and Europe typically takes 75 ms, and until physics lets us change the speed of light that won't change. Our 300 ms budget is reduced by 150 ms since we have to account for not only the time it takes for the request to be transmitted but also the reply. That's half our budget consumed by something we don't control.

We talk with the team that operates our authentication system and they recommend budgeting 3 ms for authentication.

Formatting the data takes very little time—less than the slop in our other estimates—so we can ignore it.

This leaves 147 ms for the message to be retrieved from storage. If a typical index lookup requires 3 disk seeks (10 ms each) and reads about 1 megabyte of information (30 ms), that is 60 ms. Reading the message itself might require 4 disk seeks and reading about 2 megabytes of information (100 ms). The total is 160 ms, which is more than our 147 ms remaining budget.

How Did We Know That?

How did we know that it will take 3 disk seeks to read the index? It requires knowledge of the inner workings of the UNIX file system: how files are looked up in a directory to find an inode and how inodes are used to look up the data blocks. This is why understanding the internals of the operating system you use is key to being able to design and operate distributed systems. The internals of UNIX and UNIX-like operating systems are well documented, thus giving them an advantage over other systems.

While disappointed that our design did not meet the design parameters, we are happy that disaster has been averted. Better to know now than to find out when it is too late.

It seems like 60 ms for an index lookup is a long time. We could improve that considerably. What if the index was held in RAM? Is this possible? Some quick calculations estimate that the lookup tree would have to be 3 levels deep to fan out to enough machines to span this much data. To go up and down the tree is 5 packets, or about 2.5 ms if they are all within the same datacenter. The new total (150 ms+3 ms+2.5 ms+100 ms = 255.5 ms) is less than our total 300 ms budget.

We would repeat this process for other requests that are time sensitive. For example, we send email messages less frequently than we read them, so the time to send an email message may not be considered time critical. In contrast, deleting a message happens almost as often reading messages. We might repeat this calculation for a few deletion methods to compare their efficiency.

One design might contact the server and delete the message from the storage system and the index. Another design might have the storage system simply mark the message as deleted in the index. This would be considerably faster but would require a new element that would reap messages marked for deletion and occasionally compact the index, removing any items marked as deleted.

Even faster response time can be achieved with an asynchronous design. That means the client sends requests to the server and quickly returns control to the user without waiting for the request to complete. The user perceives this system as faster even though the actual work is lagging. Asynchronous designs are more complex to implement. The server might queue the request rather than actually performing the action. Another process reads requests from the queue and performs them in the background. Alternatively, the client could simply send the request and check for the reply later, or allocate a thread or subprocess to wait for the reply.

All of these designs are viable but each offers different speed and complexity of implementation. With speed and cost estimates, backed by prototypes, the business decision of which to implement can be made.

1.8 Summary

Distributed computing is different from traditional computing in many ways. The scale is larger; there are many machines, each doing specialized tasks. Services are replicated to increase capacity. Hardware failure is not treated as an emergency or exception but as an expected part of the system. Thus the system works around failure.

Large systems are built through composition of smaller parts. We discussed three ways this composition is typically done: load balancer for many backend replicas, frontend with many different backends, and a server tree.

The load balancer divides traffic among many duplicate systems. The frontend with many different backends uses different backends in parallel, with each performing different processes. The server tree uses a tree configuration, with each tree level serving a different purpose.

Maintaining state in a distributed system is complex, whether it is a large database of constantly updated information or a few key bits to which many systems need constant access. The CAP Principle states that it is not possible to build a distributed system that guarantees consistency, availability, and resistance to partitioning simultaneously. At most two of the three can be achieved.

Systems are expected to evolve over time. To make this easier, the components are loosely coupled. Each embodies an abstraction of the service it provides, such that the internals can be replaced or improved without changing the abstraction. Thus, dependencies on the service do not need to change other than to benefit from new features.

Designing distributed systems requires an understanding of the time it takes various operations to run so that time-sensitive processes can be designed to meet their latency budget.

Exercises

- 1. What is distributed computing?
- 2. Describe the three major composition patterns in distributed computing.
- 3. What are the three patterns discussed for storing state?
- 4. Sometimes a master server does not reply with an answer but instead replies with where the answer can be found. What are the benefits of this method?
- 5. Section 1.4 describes a distributed file system, including an example of how reading terabytes of data would work. How would writing terabytes of data work?
- 6. Explain the CAP Principle. (If you think the CAP Principle is awesome, read "The Part-Time Parliament" (Lamport & Marzullo 1998) and "Paxos Made Simple" (Lamport 2001).)
- 7. What does it mean when a system is loosely coupled? What is the advantage of these systems?
- 8. Give examples of loosely and tightly coupled systems you have experience with. What makes them loosely or tightly coupled?
- 9. How do we estimate how fast a system will be able to process a request such as retrieving an email message?
- 10. In Section 1.7 three design ideas are presented for how to process email deletion requests. Estimate how long the request will take for deleting an email message for each of the three designs. First outline the steps each would take, then break each one into individual operations until estimates can be created.

This page intentionally left blank

Operations in a Distributed World

The rate at which organizations learn may soon become the only sustainable source of competitive advantage.

-Peter Senge

Part I of this book discussed how to build distributed systems. Now we discuss how to run such systems.

The work done to keep a system running is called **operations**. More specifically, operations is the work done to keep a system running in a way that meets or exceeds operating parameters specified by a service level agreement (SLA). Operations includes all aspects of a service's life cycle: from initial launch to the final decommissioning and everything in between.

Operational work tends to focus on availability, speed and performance, security, capacity planning, and software/hardware upgrades. The failure to do any of these well results in a system that is unreliable. If a service is slow, users will assume it is broken. If a system is insecure, outsiders can take it down. Without proper capacity planning, it will become overloaded and fail. Upgrades, done badly, result in downtime. If upgrades aren't done at all, bugs will go unfixed. Because all of these activities ultimately affect the reliability of the system, Google calls its operations team Site Reliability Engineering (SRE). Many companies have followed suit.

Operations is a team sport. Operations is not done by a single person but rather by a team of people working together. For that reason much of what we describe will be processes and policies that help you work as a team, not as a group of individuals. In some companies, processes seem to be bureaucratic mazes that slow things down. As we describe here—and more important, in our professional experience—good processes are exactly what makes it possible to run very large

Terms to Know	
Innovate: Doing (good) things we haven't done before.	
Machine: A virtual or physical machine.	
Oncall: Being available as first responder to an outage or alert.	
Server: Software that provides a function or API. (Not a piece of hardware.)	
Service: A user-visible system or product composed of one or more servers.	
Soft launch: Launching a new service without publicly announcing it. This	
way traffic grows slowly as word of mouth spreads, which gives opera-	
tions some cushion to fix problems or scale the system before too many	
people have seen it.	
SRE: Site Reliability Engineer, the Google term for systems administrators	
who maintain live services.	
Stakeholders: People and organizations that are seen as having an interest	
in a project's success.	

computing systems. In other words, process is what makes it possible for teams to do the right thing, again and again.

This chapter starts with some operations management background, then discusses the operations service life cycle, and ends with a discussion of typical operations work strategies. All of these topics will be expanded upon in the chapters that follow.

7.1 Distributed Systems Operations

To understand distributed systems operations, one must first understand how it is different from typical enterprise IT. One must also understand the source of tension between operations and developers, and basic techniques for scaling operations.

7.1.1 SRE versus Traditional Enterprise IT

System administration is a continuum. On one end is a typical IT department, responsible for traditional desktop and client–server computing infrastructure, often called enterprise IT. On the other end is an SRE or similar team responsible for a distributed computing environment, often associated with web sites and other services. While this may be a broad generalization, it serves to illustrate some important differences.

SRE is different from an enterprise IT department because SREs tend to be focused on providing a single service or a well-defined set of services. A traditional enterprise IT department tends to have broad responsibility for desktop services, back-office services, and everything in between ("everything with a power plug"). SRE's customers tend to be the product management of the service while IT customers are the end users themselves. This means SRE efforts are focused on a few select business metrics rather than being pulled in many directions by users, each of whom has his or her own priorities.

Another difference is in the attitude toward uptime. SREs maintain services that have demanding, 24×7 uptime requirements. This creates a focus on preventing problems rather than reacting to outages, and on performing complex but non-intrusive maintenance procedures. IT tends to be granted flexibility with respect to scheduling downtime and has SLAs that focus on how quickly service can be restored in the event of an outage. In the SRE view, downtime is something to be avoided and service should not stop while services are undergoing maintenance.

SREs tend to manage services that are constantly changing due to new software releases and additions to capacity. IT tends to run services that are upgraded rarely. Often IT services are built by external contractors who go away once the system is stable.

SREs maintain systems that are constantly being scaled to handle more traffic and larger workloads. Latency, or how fast a particular request takes to process, is managed as well as overall throughput. Efficiency becomes a concern because a little waste per machine becomes a big waste when there are hundreds or thousands of machines. In IT, systems are often built for environments that expect a modest increase in workload per year. In this case a workable strategy is to build the system large enough to handle the projected workload for the next few years, when the system is expected to be replaced.

As a result of these requirements, systems in SRE tend to be bespoke systems, built on platforms that are home-grown or integrated from open source or other third-party components. They are not "off the shelf" or turn key systems. They are actively managed, while IT systems may be unchanged from their initial delivery state. Because of these differences, distributed computing services are best managed by a separate team, with separate management, with bespoke operational and management practices.

While there are many such differences, recently IT departments have begun to see a demand for uptime and scalability similar to that seen in SRE environments. Therefore the management techniques from distributed computing are rapidly being adopted in the enterprise.

7.1.2 Change versus Stability

There is a tension between the desire for stability and the desire for change. Operations teams tend to favor stability; developers desire change. Consider how each group is evaluated during end-of-the-year performance reviews. A developer is praised for writing code that makes it into production. Changes that result in a tangible difference to the service are rewarded above any other accomplishment. Therefore, developers want new releases pushed into production often. Operations, in contrast, is rewarded for achieving compliance with SLAs, most of which relate to uptime. Therefore stability is the priority.

A system starts at a baseline of stability. A change is then made. All changes have some kind of a destabilizing effect. Eventually the system becomes stable again, usually through some kind of intervention. This is called the **change-instability cycle**.

All software roll-outs affect stability. A change may introduce bugs, which are fixed through workarounds and new software releases. A release that introduces no new bugs still creates a destabilizing effect due to the process of shifting workloads away from machines about to be upgraded. Non-software changes also have a destabilizing effect. A network change may make the local network less stable while the change propagates throughout the network.

Because of the tension between the operational desire for stability and the developer desire for change, there must be mechanisms to reach a balance.

One strategy is to prioritize work that improves stability over work that adds new features. For example, bug fixes would have a higher priority than feature requests. With this approach, a major release introduces many new features, the next few releases focus on fixing bugs, and then a new major release starts the cycle over again. If engineering management is pressured to focus on new features and neglect bug fixes, the result is a system that slowly destabilizes until it spins out of control.

Another strategy is to align the goals of developers and operational staff. Both parties become responsible for SLA compliance as well as the velocity (rate of change) of the system. Both have a component of their annual review that is tied to SLA compliance and both have a portion tied to the on-time delivery of new features.

Organizations that have been the most successful at aligning goals like this have restructured themselves so that developers and operations work as one team. This is the premise of the DevOps movement, which will be described in Chapter 8.

Another strategy is to budget time for stability improvements and time for new features. Software engineering organizations usually have a way to estimate the size of a software request or the amount of time it is expected to take to complete. Each new release has a certain size or time budget; within that budget a certain amount of stability-improvement work is allocated. The case study at the end of Section 2.2.2 is an example of this approach. Similarly, this allocation can be achieved by assigning dedicated people to stability-related code changes.

The budget can also be based on an SLA. A certain amount of instability is expected each month, which is considered a budget. Each roll-out uses some of the budget, as do instability-related bugs. Developers can maximize the number of roll-outs that can be done each month by dedicating effort to improve the code that causes this instability. This creates a positive feedback loop. An example of this is Google's Error Budgets, which are more fully explained in Section 19.4.

7.1.3 Defining SRE

The core practices of SRE were refined for more than 10 years at Google before being enumerated in public. In his keynote address at the first USENIX SREcon, Benjamin Treynor Sloss (2014), Vice President of Site Reliability Engineering at Google, listed them as follows:

Site Reliability Practices

- 1. Hire only coders.
- 2. Have an SLA for your service.
- 3. Measure and report performance against the SLA.
- 4. Use Error Budgets and gate launches on them.
- 5. Have a common staffing pool for SRE and Developers.
- 6. Have excess Ops work overflow to the Dev team.
- 7. Cap SRE operational load at 50 percent.
- 8. Share 5 percent of Ops work with the Dev team.
- 9. Oncall teams should have at least eight people at one location, or six people at each of multiple locations.
- 10. Aim for a maximum of two events per oncall shift.
- 11. Do a postmortem for every event.
- 12. Postmortems are blameless and focus on process and technology, not people.

The first principle for site reliability engineering is that SREs must be able to code. An SRE might not be a full-time software developer, but he or she should be able to solve nontrivial problems by writing code. When asked to do 30 iterations of a task, an SRE should do the first two, get bored, and automate the rest. An SRE must have enough software development experience to be able to communicate with developers on their level and have an appreciation for what developers do, and for what computers can and can't do.

When SREs and developers come from a common staffing pool, that means that projects are allocated a certain number of engineers; these engineers may be developers or SREs. The end result is that each SRE needed means one fewer developer in the team. Contrast this to the case at most companies where system administrators and developers are allocated from teams with separate budgets. Rationally a project wants to maximize the number of developers, since they write new features. The common staffing pool encourages the developers to create systems that can be operated efficiently so as to minimize the number of SREs needed. Another way to encourage developers to write code that minimizes operational load is to require that excess operational work overflows to the developers. This practice discourages developers from taking shortcuts that create undue operational load. The developers would share any such burden. Likewise, by requiring developers to perform 5 percent of operational work, developers stay in tune with operational realities.

Within the SRE team, capping the operational load at 50 percent limits the amount of manual labor done. Manual labor has a lower return on investment than, for example, writing code to replace the need for such labor. This is discussed in Section 12.4.2, "Reducing Toil."

Many SRE practices relate to finding balance between the desire for change and the need for stability. The most important of these is the Google SRE practice called Error Budgets, explained in detail in Section 19.4.

Central to the Error Budget is the SLA. All services must have an SLA, which specifies how reliable the system is going to be. The SLA becomes the standard by which all work is ultimately measured. SLAs are discussed in Chapter 16.

Any outage or other major SLA-related event should be followed by the creation of a written postmortem that includes details of what happened, along with analysis and suggestions for how to prevent such a situation in the future. This report is shared within the company so that the entire organization can learn from the experience. Postmortems focus on the process and the technology, not finding who to blame. Postmortems are the topic of Section 14.3.2. The person who is oncall is responsible for responding to any SLA-related events and producing the postmortem report.

Oncall is not just a way to react to problems, but rather a way to reduce future problems. It must be done in a way that is not unsustainably stressful for those oncall, and it drives behaviors that encourage long-term fixes and problem prevention. Oncall teams are made up of at least eight members at one location, or six members at two locations. Teams of this size will be oncall often enough that their skills do not get stale, and their shifts can be short enough that each catches no more than two outage events. As a result, each member has enough time to follow through on each event, performing the required long-term solution. Managing oncall this way is the topic of Chapter 14.

Other companies have adopted the SRE job title for their system administrators who maintain live production services. Each company applies a different set of practices to the role. These are the practices that define SRE at Google and are core to its success.

7.1.4 Operations at Scale

Operations in distributed computing is operations at a large scale. Distributed computing involves hundreds and often thousands of computers working together. As a result, operations is different than traditional computing administration. Manual processes do not scale. When tasks are manual, if there are twice as many tasks, there is twice as much human effort required. A system that is scaling to thousands of machines, servers, or processes, therefore, becomes untenable if a process involves manually manipulating things. In contrast, automation does scale. Code written once can be used thousands of times. Processes that involve many machines, processes, servers, or services should be automated. This idea applies to allocating machines, configuring operating systems, installing software, and watching for trouble. Automation is not a "nice to have" but a "must have." (Automation is the subject of Chapter 12.)

When operations is automated, system administration is more like an assembly line than a craft. The job of the system administrator changes from being the person who does the work to the person who maintains the robotics of an assembly line. Mass production techniques become viable and we can borrow operational practices from manufacturing. For example, by collecting measurements from every stage of production, we can apply statistical analysis that helps us improve system throughput. Manufacturing techniques such as **continuous improvement** are the basis for the Three Ways of DevOps. (See Section 8.2.)

Three categories of things are not automated: things that should be automated but have not been yet, things that are not worth automating, and human processes that can't be automated.

Tasks That Are Not Yet Automated

It takes time to create, test, and deploy automation, so there will always be things that are waiting to be automated. There is never enough time to automate every-thing, so we must prioritize and choose our methods wisely. (See Section 2.2.2 and Section 12.1.1.)

For processes that are not, or have not yet been, automated, creating procedural documentation, called a **playbook**, helps make the process repeatable and consistent. A good playbook makes it easier to automate the process in the future. Often the most difficult part of automating something is simply describing the process accurately. If a playbook does that, the actual coding is relatively easy.

Tasks That Are Not Worth Automating

Some things are not worth automating because they happen infrequently, they are too difficult to automate, or the process changes so often that automation is not possible. Automation is an investment in time and effort and the return on investment (ROI) does not always make automation viable.

Nevertheless, there are some common cases that are worth automating. Often when those are automated, the more rare cases (**edge cases**) can be consolidated or eliminated. In many situations, the newly automated common case provides such superior service that the edge-case customers will suddenly lose their need to be so unique.

Benefits of Automating the Common Case

At one company there were three ways that virtual machines were being provisioned. All three were manual processes, and customers often waited days until a system administrator was available to do the task. A project to automate provisioning was stalled because of the complexity of handling all three variations. Users of the two less common cases demanded that their provisioning process be different because they were (in their own eyes) unique and beautiful snowflakes. They had very serious justifications based on very serious (anecdotal) evidence and waved their hands vigorously to prove their point. To get the project moving, it was decided to automate just the most common case and promise the two edge cases would be added later.

This was much easier to implement than the original all-singing, alldancing, provisioning system. With the initial automation, provisioning time was reduced to a few minutes and could happen without system administrator involvement. Provisioning could even happen at night and on weekends. At that point an amazing thing happened. The other two cases suddenly discovered that their uniqueness had vanished! They adopted the automated method. The system administrators never automated the two edge cases and the provisioning system remained uncomplicated and easy to maintain.

Tasks That Cannot Be Automated

Some tasks cannot be automated because they are human processes: maintaining your relationship with a stakeholder, managing the bidding process to make a large purchase, evaluating new technology, or negotiating within a team to assemble an oncall schedule. While they cannot be eliminated through automation, they can be streamlined:

- Many interactions with stakeholders can be eliminated through better documentation. Stakeholders can be more self-sufficient if provided with introductory documentation, user documentation, best practices recommendations, a style guide, and so on. If your service will be used by many other services or service teams, it becomes more important to have good documentation. Video instruction is also useful and does not require much effort if you simply make a video recording of presentations you already give.
- Some interactions with stakeholders can be eliminated by making common requests self-service. Rather than meeting individually with customers to understand future capacity requirements, their forecasts can be collected via a web user interface or an API. For example, if you provide a service to hundreds

of other teams, forecasting can be become a full-time job for a project manager; alternatively, it can be very little work with proper automation that integrates with the company's supply-chain management system.

- Evaluating new technology can be labor intensive, but if a common case is identified, the end-to-end process can be turned into an assembly-line process and optimized. For example, if hard drives are purchased by the thousand, it is wise to add a new model to the mix only periodically and only after a thorough evaluation. The evaluation process should be standardized and automated, and results stored automatically for analysis.
- Automation can replace or accelerate team processes. Creating the oncall schedule can evolve into a chaotic mess of negotiations between team members battling to take time off during an important holiday. Automation turns this into a self-service system that permits people to list their availability and that churns out an optimal schedule for the next few months. Thus, it solves the problem better and reduces stress.
- Meta-processes such as communication, status, and process tracking can be facilitated through online systems. As teams grow, just tracking the interaction and communication among all parties can become a burden. Automating that can eliminate hours of manual work for each person. For example, a webbased system that lets people see the status of their order as it works its way through approval processes eliminates the need for status reports, leaving people to deal with just exceptions and problems. If a process has many complex handoffs between teams, a system that provides a status dashboard and automatically notifies teams when hand-offs happen can reduce the need for legions of project managers.
- The best process optimization is elimination. A task that is eliminated does not need to be performed or maintained, nor will it have bugs or security flaws. For example, if production machines run three different operating systems, narrowing that number down to two eliminates a lot of work. If you provide a service to other service teams and require a lengthy approval process for each new team, it may be better to streamline the approval process by automatically approving certain kinds of users.

7.2 Service Life Cycle

Operations is responsible for the entire **service life cycle**: launch, maintenance (both regular and emergency), upgrades, and decommissioning. Each phase has unique requirements, so you'll need a strategy for managing each phase differently.

The stages of the life cycle are:

- **Service Launch:** Launching a service the first time. The service is brought to life, initial customers use it, and problems that were not discovered prior to the launch are discovered and remedied. (Section 7.2.1)
- **Emergency Tasks:** Handling exceptional or unexpected events. This includes handling outages and, more importantly, detecting and fixing conditions that precipitate outages. (Chapter 14)
- Nonemergency Tasks: Performing all manual work required as part of the normally functioning system. This may include periodic (weekly or monthly) maintenance tasks (for example, preparation for monthly billing events) as well as processing requests from users (for example, requests to enable the service for use by another internal service or team). (Section 7.3)
- Upgrades: Deploying new software releases and hardware platforms. The better we can do this, the more aggressively the company can try new things and innovate. Each new software release is built and tested before deployment. Tests include system tests, done by developers, as well as user acceptance tests (UAT), done by operations. UAT might include tests to verify there are no **performance regressions** (unexpected declines in performance). Vulnerability assessments are done to detect security issues. New hardware must go through a **hardware qualification** to test for compatibility, performance regressions, and any changes in operational processes. (Section 10.2)
- **Decommissioning:** Turning off a service. It is the opposite of a service launch: removing the remaining users, turning off the service, removing references to the service from any related service configurations, giving back any resources, archiving old data, and erasing or scrubbing data from any hardware before it is repurposed, sold, or disposed. (Section 7.2.2)
- **Project Work:** Performing tasks large enough to require the allocation of dedicated resources and planning. While not directly part of the service life cycle, along the way tasks will arise that are larger than others. Examples include fixing a repeating but intermittent failure, working with stakeholders on roadmaps and plans for the product's future, moving the service to a new datacenter, and scaling the service in new ways. (Section 7.3)

Most of the life-cycle stages listed here are covered in detail elsewhere in this book. Service launches and decommissioning are covered in detail next.

7.2.1 Service Launches

Nothing is more embarrassing than the failed public launch of a new service. Often we see a new service launch that is so successful that it receives too much traffic, becomes overloaded, and goes down. This is ironic but not funny. Each time we launch a new service, we learn something new. If we launch new services rarely, then remembering those lessons until the next launch is difficult. Therefore, if launches are rare, we should maintain a checklist of things to do and record the things you should remember to do next time. As the checklist grows with each launch, we become better at launching services.

If we launch new services frequently, then there are probably many people doing the launches. Some will be less experienced than others. In this case we should maintain a checklist to share our experience. Every addition increases our **organizational memory**, the collection of knowledge within our organization, thereby making the organization smarter.

A common problem is that other teams may not realize that planning a launch requires effort. They may not allocate time for this effort and surprise operations teams at or near the launch date. These teams are unaware of all the potential pitfalls and problems that the checklist is intended to prevent. For this reason the launch checklist should be something mentioned frequently in documentation, socialized among product managers, and made easy to access. The best-case scenario occurs when a service team comes to operations wishing to launch something and has been using the checklist as a guide throughout development. Such a team has "done their homework"; they have been working on the items in the checklist in parallel as the product was being developed. This does not happen by accident; the checklist must be available, be advertised, and become part of the company culture.

A simple strategy is to create a checklist of actions that need to be completed prior to launch. A more sophisticated strategy is for the checklist to be a series of questions that are audited by a Launch Readiness Engineer (LRE) or a Launch Committee.

Here is a sample launch readiness review checklist:

Sample Launch Readiness Review Survey

The purpose of this document is to gather information to be evaluated by a Launch Readiness Engineer (LRE) when approving the launch of a new service. Please complete the survey prior to meeting with your LRE.

- General Launch Information:
 - What is the service name?
 - When is the launch date/time?
 - Is this a soft or hard launch?
- Architecture:
 - Describe the system architecture. Link to architecture documents if possible.
 - How does the failover work in the event of single-machine, rack, and datacenter failure?
 - How is the system designed to scale under normal conditions?
- Capacity:
 - What is the expected initial volume of users and QPS?
 - How was this number arrived at? (Link to load tests and reports.)
 - What is expected to happen if the initial volume is 2× expected? 5×? (Link to emergency capacity documents.)
 - What is the expected external (internet) bandwidth usage?
 - What are the requirements for network and storage after 1, 3, and 12 months? (Link to confirmation documents from the network and storage teams capacity planner.)
- Dependencies:
 - Which systems does this depend on? (Link to dependency/data flow diagram.)
 - Which RPC limits are in place with these dependencies? (Link to limits and confirmation from external groups they can handle the traffic.)
 - What will happen if these RPC limits are exceeded ?
 - For each dependency, list the ticket number where this new service's use of the dependency (and QPS rate) was requested and positively acknowledged.
- Monitoring:
 - Are all subsystems monitored? Describe the monitoring strategy and document what is monitored.
 - Does a dashboard exist for all major subsystems?
 - Do metrics dashboards exist? Are they in business, not technical, terms?
 - Was the number of "false alarm" alerts in the last month less than *x*?
 - Is the number of alerts received in a typical week less than *x*?
- Documentation:
 - Does a playbook exist and include entries for all operational tasks and alerts?
 - Have an LRE review each entry for accuracy and completeness.
 - Is the number of open documentation-related bugs less than *x*?
- Oncall:
 - Is the oncall schedule complete for the next *n* months?
 - Is the oncall schedule arranged such that each shift is likely to get fewer than *x* alerts?
- Disaster Preparedness:
 - What is the plan in case first-day usage is 10 times greater than expected?
 - Do backups work and have restores been tested?
- Operational Hygiene:
 - Are "spammy alerts" adjusted or corrected in a timely manner?

- Are bugs filed to raise visibility of issues—even minor annoyances or issues with commonly known workarounds?
- Do stability-related bugs take priority over new features?
- Is a system in place to assure that the number of open bugs is kept low?
- Approvals:
 - Has marketing approved all logos, verbiage, and URL formats?
 - Has the security team audited and approved the service?
 - Has a privacy audit been completed and all issues remediated?

Because a launch is complex, with many moving parts, we recommend that a single person (the **launch lead**) take a leadership or coordinator role. If the developer and operations teams are very separate, one person from each might be selected to represent each team.

The launch lead then works through the checklist, delegating work, filing bugs for any omissions, and tracking all issues until launch is approved and executed. The launch lead may also be responsible for coordinating post-launch problem resolution.

Case Study: Self-Service Launches at Google

Google launches so many services that it needed a way to make the launch process streamlined and able to be initiated independently by a team. In addition to providing APIs and portals for the technical parts, the Launch Readiness Review (LRR) made the launch process itself self-service.

The LRR included a checklist and instructions on how to achieve each item. An SRE engineer was assigned to shepherd the team through the process and hold them to some very high standards.

Some checklist items were technical—for example, making sure that the Google load balancing system was used properly. Other items were cautionary, to prevent a launch team from repeating other teams' past mistakes. For example, one team had a failed launch because it received 10 times more users than expected. There was no plan for how to handle this situation. The LRR checklist required teams to create a plan to handle this situation and demonstrate that it had been tested ahead of time.

Other checklist items were business related. Marketing, legal, and other departments were required to sign off on the launch. Each department had its own checklist. The SRE team made the service visible externally only after verifying that all of those sign-offs were complete.

7.2.2 Service Decommissioning

Decommissioning (or just "decomm"), or turning off a service, involves three major phases: removal of users, deallocation of resources, and disposal of resources.

Removing users is often a product management task. Usually it involves making the users aware that they must move. Sometimes it is a technical issue of moving them to another service. User data may need to be moved or archived.

Resource deallocation can cover many aspects. There may be DNS entries to be removed, machines to power off, database connections to be disabled, and so on. Usually there are complex dependencies involved. Often nothing can begin until the last user is off the service; certain resources cannot be deallocated before others, and so on. For example, typically a DNS entry is not removed until the machine is no longer in use. Network connections must remain in place if deallocating other services depends on network connectivity.

Resource disposal includes securely erasing disks and other media and disposing of all hardware. The hardware may be repurposed, sold, or scrapped.

If decommissioning is done incorrectly or items are missed, resources will remain allocated. A checklist, that is added to over time, will help assure decommissioning is done completely and the tasks are done in the right order.

7.3 Organizing Strategy for Operational Teams

An operational team needs to get work done. Therefore teams need a strategy that assures that all incoming work is received, scheduled, and completed. Broadly speaking, there are three sources of operational work and these work items fall into three categories. To understand how to best organize a team, first you must understand these sources and categories.

The three sources of work are life-cycle management, interacting with stakeholders, and process improvement and automation. Life-cycle management is the operational work involved in running the service. Interacting with stakeholders refers to both maintaining the relationship with people who use and depend on the service, and prioritizing and fulfilling their requests. Process improvement and automation is work inspired by the business desire for continuous improvement.

No matter the source, this work tends to fall into one of these three broad categories:

• Emergency Issues: Outages, and issues that indicate a pending outage that can be prevented, and emergency requests from other teams. Usually initiated by an alert sent by the monitoring system via SMS or pager. (Chapter 14)

- Normal Requests: Process work (repeatable processes that have not yet been automated), non-urgent trouble reports, informational questions, and initial consulting that results in larger projects. Usually initiated by a request ticket system. (Section 14.1.3)
- **Project Work:** Small and large projects that evolve the system. Managed with whatever project management style the team selects. (Section 12.4.2)

To assure that all sources and categories of work receive attention, we recommend this simple organizing principle: people should always be working on projects, with exceptions made to assure that emergency issues receive immediate attention and non-project customer requests are triaged and worked in a timely manner.

More specifically, at any given moment, the highest priority for one person on the team should be responding to emergencies, the highest priority for one other person on the team should be responding to normal requests, and the rest of the team should be focused on project work.

This is counter to the way operations teams often work: everyone running from emergency to emergency with no time for project work. If there is no effort dedicated to improving the situation, the team will simply run from emergency to emergency until they are burned out.

Major improvements come from project work. Project work requires concentration and focus. If you are constantly being interrupted with emergency issues and requests, you will not be able to get projects done. If an entire team is focused on emergencies and requests, nobody is working on projects.

It can be tempting to organize an operations team into three subteams, each focusing on one source of work or one category of work. Either of these approaches will create silos of responsibility. Process improvement is best done by the people involved in the process, not by observers.

To implement our recommended strategy, all members of the team focus on project work as their main priority. However, team members take turns being responsible for emergency issues as they arise. This responsibility is called **oncall**. Likewise, team members take turns being responsible for normal requests from other teams. This responsibility is called **ticket duty**.

It is common that oncall duty and ticket duty are scheduled in a rotation. For example, a team of eight people may use an eight-week cycle. Each person is assigned a week where he or she is on call: expected to respond to alerts, spending any remaining time on projects. Each person is also assigned a different week where he or she is on ticket duty: expected to focus on triaging and responding to request tickets first, working on other projects only if there is remaining time. This gives team members six weeks out of the cycle that can be focused on project work. Limiting each rotation to a specific person makes for smoother handoffs to the next shift. In such a case, there are two people doing the handoff rather than a large operations team meeting. If more than 25 percent of a team needs to be dedicated to ticket duty and oncall, there is a serious problem with firefighting and a lack of automation.

The team manager should be part of the operational rotation. This practice ensures the manager is aware of the operational load and firefighting that goes on. It also ensures that nontechnical managers don't accidentally get hired into the operations organization.

Teams may combine oncall and ticket duty into one position if the amount of work in those categories is sufficiently small. Some teams may need to designate multiple people to fill each role.

Project work is best done in small teams. Solo projects can damage a team by making members feel disconnected or by permitting individuals to work without constructive feedback. Designs are better with at least some peer review. Without feedback, members may end up working on projects they feel are important but have marginal benefit. Conversely, large teams often get stalled by lack of consensus. In their case, focusing on shipping quickly overcomes many of these problems. It helps by making progress visible to the project members, the wider team, and management. Course corrections are easier to make when feedback is frequent.

The Agile methodology, discussed in Section 8.6, is an effective way to organize project work.

Meta-work

There is also meta-work: meetings, status reports, company functions. These generally eat into project time and should be minimized. For advice, see Chapter 11, "Eliminating Time Wasters," in the book *Time Management for System Administrators* by Limoncelli (2005).

7.3.1 Team Member Day Types

Now that we have established an organizing principle for the team's work, each team member can organize his or her work based on what kind of day it is: a project-focused day, an oncall day, or a ticket duty day.

Project-Focused Days

Most days should be project days for operational staff. Specifically, most days should be spent developing software that automates or optimizes aspects of the team's responsibilities. Non-software projects include shepherding a new launch or working with stakeholders on requirements for future releases.

Organizing the work of a team through a single bug tracking system has the benefit of reducing time spent checking different systems for status. Bug tracking systems provide an easy way for people to prioritize and track their work. On a typical project day the staff member starts by checking the bug tracking system to review the bugs assigned to him or her, or possibly to review unassigned issues of higher priority the team member might need to take on.

Software development in operations tends to mirror the Agile methodology: rather than making large, sudden changes, many small projects evolve the system over time. Chapter 12 will discuss automation and software engineering topics in more detail.

Projects that do not involve software development may involve technical work. Moving a service to a new datacenter is highly technical work that cannot be automated because it happens infrequently.

Operations staff tend not to physically touch hardware not just because of the heavy use of virtual machines, but also because even physical machines are located in datacenters that are located far away. Datacenter technicians act as **remote hands**, applying physical changes when needed.

Oncall Days

Oncall days are spent working on projects until an alert is received, usually by SMS, text message, or pager.

Once an alert is received, the issue is worked until it is resolved. Often there are multiple solutions to a problem, usually including one that will fix the problem quickly but temporarily and others that are long-term fixes. Generally the quick fix is employed because returning the service to normal operating parameters is paramount.

Once the alert is resolved, a number of other tasks should always be done. The alert should be categorized and annotated in some form of electronic alert journal so that trends may be discovered. If a quick fix was employed, a bug should be filed requesting a longer-term fix. The oncall person may take some time to update the playbook entry for this alert, thereby building organizational memory. If there was a user-visible outage or an SLA violation, a postmortem report should be written. An investigation should be conducted to ascertain the root cause of the problem. Writing a postmortem report, filing bugs, and root causes identification are all ways that we raise the visibility of issues so that they get attention. Otherwise, we will continually muddle through ad hoc workarounds and nothing will ever get better. Postmortem reports (possibly redacted for technical content) can be shared with the user community to build confidence in the service.

The benefit of having a specific person assigned to oncall duty at any given time is that it enables the rest of the team to remain focused on project work. Studies have found that the key to software developer productivity is to have long periods of uninterrupted time. That said, if a major crisis appears, the oncall person will pull people away from their projects to assist.

If oncall shifts are too long, the oncall person will be overloaded with followup work. If the shifts are too close together, there will not be time to complete the follow-up work. Many great ideas for new projects and improvements are first imagined while servicing alerts. Between oncall shifts people should have enough time to pursue such projects.

Chapter 14 will discuss oncall in greater detail.

Ticket Duty Days

Ticket duty days are spent working on requests from customers. Here the customers are the internal users of the service, such as other service teams that use your service's API. These are not tickets from external users. Those items should be handled by customer support representatives.

While oncall is expected to have very fast reaction time, tickets generally have an expected response time measured in days.

Typical tickets may consist of questions about the service, which can lead to some consulting on how to use the service. They may also be requests for activation of a service, reports of problems or difficulties people are experiencing, and so forth. Sometimes tickets are created by automated systems. For example, a monitoring system may detect a situation that is not so urgent that it needs immediate response and may open a ticket instead.

Some long-running tickets left from the previous shift may need follow-up. Often there is a policy that if we are waiting for a reply from the customer, every three days the customer will be politely "poked" to make sure the issue is not forgotten. If the customer is waiting for follow-up from us, there may be a policy that urgent tickets will have a status update posted daily, with longer stretches of time for other priorities.

If a ticket will not be completed by the end of a shift, its status should be included in the shift report so that the next person can pick up where the previous person left off.

By dedicating a person to ticket duty, that individual can be more focused while responding to tickets. All tickets can be triaged and prioritized. There is more time to categorize tickets so that trends can be spotted. Efficiencies can be realized by batching up similar tickets to be done in a row. More importantly, by dedicating a person to tickets, that individual should have time to go deeper into each ticket: to update documentation and playbooks along the way, to deep-dive into bugs rather than find superficial workarounds, to fix complex broken processes. Ticket duty should not be a chore, but rather should be part of the strategy to reduce the overall work faced by the team.

Every operations team should have a goal of eliminating the need for people to open tickets with them, similar to how there should always be a goal to automate

manual processes. A ticket requesting information is an indication that documentation should be improved. It is best to respond to the question by adding the requested information to the service's FAQ or other user documentation and then directing the user to that document. Requests for service activation, allocations, or configuration changes indicate an opportunity to create a web-based portal or API to make such requests obsolete. Any ticket created by an automated system should have a corresponding playbook entry that explains how to process it, with a link to the bug ID requesting that the automation be improved to eliminate the need to open such tickets.

At the end of oncall and ticket duty shifts, it is common for the person to email out a shift report to the entire team. This report should mention any trends noticed and any advice or status information to be passed on to the next person. The oncall end-of-shift report should also include a log of which alerts were received and what was done in response.

When you are oncall or doing ticket duty, that is your main project. Other project work that is accomplished, if any, is a bonus. Management should not expect other projects to get done, nor should people be penalized for having the proper focus. When people end their oncall or ticket duty time, they should not complain that they weren't able to get any project work done; their project, so to speak, was ticket duty.

7.3.2 Other Strategies

There are many other ways to organize the work of a team. The team can rotate though projects focused on a particular goal or subsystem, it can focus on reducing toil, or special days can be set aside for reducing technical debt.

Focus or Theme

One can pick a category of issues to focus on for a month or two, changing themes periodically or when the current theme is complete. For example, at the start of a theme, a number of security-related issues can be selected and everyone commit to focusing on them until they are complete. Once these items are complete, the next theme begins. Some common themes include monitoring, a particular service or subservice, or automating a particular task.

If the team cohesion was low, this can help everyone feel as if they are working as a team again. It can also enhance productivity: if everyone has familiarized themselves with the same part of the code base, everyone can do a better job of helping each other.

Introducing a theme can also provide a certain amount of motivation. If the team is looking forward to the next theme (because it is more interesting, novel, or fun), they will be motivated to meet the goals of the current theme so they can start the next one.

Toil Reduction

Toil is manual work that is particularly exhausting. If a team calculates the number of hours spent on toil versus normal project work, that ratio should be as low as possible. Management may set a threshold such that if it goes above 50 percent, the team pauses all new features and works to solve the big problems that are the source of so much toil. (See Section 12.4.2.)

Fix-It Days

A day (or series of days) can be set aside to reduce technical debt. **Technical debt** is the accumulation of small unfinished amounts of work. By themselves, these bits and pieces are not urgent, but the accumulation of them starts to become a problem. For example, a Documentation Fix-It Day would involve everyone stopping all other work to focus on bugs related to documentation that needs to be improved. Alternatively, a Fix-It Week might be declared to focus on bringing all monitoring configurations up to a particular standard.

Often teams turn fix-its into a game. For example, at the start a list of tasks (or bugs) is published. Prizes are given out to the people who resolve the most bugs. If done company-wide, teams may receive T-shirts for participating and/or prizes for completing the most tasks.

7.4 Virtual Office

Many operations teams work from home rather than an office. Since work is virtual, with remote hands touching hardware when needed, we can work from anywhere. Therefore, it is common to work from anywhere. When necessary, the team meets in chat rooms or other virtual meeting spaces rather than physical meeting rooms. When teams work this way, communication must be more intentional because you don't just happen to see each other in the office.

It is good to have a policy that anyone who is not working from the office takes responsibility for staying in touch with the team. They should clearly and periodically communicate their status. In turn, the entire team should take responsibility for making sure remote workers do not feel isolated. Everyone should know what their team members are working on and take the time to include everyone in discussions. There are many tools that can help achieve this.

7.4.1 Communication Mechanisms

Chat rooms are commonly used for staying in touch throughout the day. Chat room transcripts should be stored and accessible so people can read what they may have missed. There are many chat room "bots" (software robots that join the chat room and provide services) that can provide transcription services, pass messages to offline members, announce when oncall shifts change, and broadcast any alerts generated by the monitoring system. Some bots provide entertainment: At Google, a bot keeps track of who has received the most virtual high-fives. At Stack Exchange, a bot notices if anyone types the phrase "not my fault" and responds by selecting a random person from the room and announcing this person has been randomly designated to be blamed.

Higher-bandwidth communication systems include voice and video systems as well as screen sharing applications. The higher the bandwidth, the better the fidelity of communication that can be achieved. Text-chat is not good at conveying emotions, while voice and video can. Always switch to higher-fidelity communication systems when conveying emotions is more important, especially when an intense or heated debate starts.

The communication medium with the highest fidelity is the in-person meeting. Virtual teams greatly benefit from periodic in-person meetings. Everyone travels to the same place for a few days of meetings that focus on long-term planning, team building, and other issues that cannot be solved online.

7.4.2 Communication Policies

Many teams establish a communication agreement that clarifies which methods will be used in which situations. For example, a common agreement is that chat rooms will be the primary communication channel but only for ephemeral discussions. If a decision is made in the chat room or an announcement needs to be made, it will be broadcast via email. Email is for information that needs to carry across oncall shifts or day boundaries. Announcements with lasting effects, such as major policies or design decisions, need to be recorded in the team wiki or other document system (and the creation of said document needs to be announced via email). Establishing this chat–email–document paradigm can go a long way in reducing communication problems.

7.5 Summary

Operations is different from typical enterprise IT because it is focused on a particular service or group of services and because it has more demanding uptime requirements.

There is a tension between the operations team's desire for stability and the developers' desire to get new code into production. There are many ways to reach a balance. Most ways involve aligning goals by sharing responsibility for both uptime and velocity of new features.

Operations in distributed computing is done at a large scale. Processes that have to be done manually do not scale. Constant process improvement and automation are essential.

Operations is responsible for the life cycle of a service: launch, maintenance, upgrades, and decommissioning. Maintenance tasks include emergency and nonemergency response. In addition, related projects maintain and evolve the service.

Launches, decommissioning of services, and other tasks that are done infrequently require an attention to detail that is best assured by use of checklists. Checklists ensure that lessons learned in the past are carried forward.

The most productive use of time for operational staff is time spent automating and optimizing processes. This should be their primary responsibility. In addition, two other kinds of work require attention. Emergency tasks need fast response. Nonemergency requests need to be managed such that they are prioritized and worked in a timely manner. To make sure all these things happen, at any given time one person on the operations team should be focused on responding to emergencies; another should be assigned to prioritizing and working on nonemergency requests. When team members take turns addressing these responsibilities, they receive the dedicated resources required to assure they happen correctly by sharing the responsibility across the team. People also avoid burning out.

Operations teams generally work far from the actual machines that run their services. Since they operate the service remotely, they can work from anywhere there is a network connection. Therefore teams often work from different places, collaborating and communicating in a chat room or other virtual office. Many tools are available to enable this type of organizational structure. In such an environment, it becomes important to change the communication medium based on the type of communication required. Chat rooms are sufficient for general communication but voice and video are more appropriate for more intense discussions. Email is more appropriate when a record of the communication is required, or if it is important to reach people who are not currently online.

Exercises

- 1. What is operations? What are its major areas of responsibilities?
- 2. How does operations in distributed computing differ from traditional desktop support or enterprise client–server support?
- 3. Describe the service life cycle as it relates to a service you have experience with.
- 4. Section 7.1.2 discusses the change-instability cycle. Draw a series of graphs where the *x*-axis is time and the *y*-axis is the measure of stability. Each graph should represent two months of project time.

Each Monday, a major software release that introduces instability (9 bugs) is rolled out. On Tuesday through Friday, the team has an opportunity to roll out a "bug-fix" release, each of which fixes three bugs. Graph these scenarios:

- (a) No bug-fix releases
- (b) Two bug-fix releases after every major release
- (c) Three bug-fix releases after every major release
- (d) Four bug-fix releases after every major release
- (e) No bug-fix release after odd releases, five bug-fix releases after even releases
- 5. What do you observe about the graphs from Exercise 4?
- 6. For a service you provide or have experience with, who are the stakeholders? Which interactions did you or your team have with them?
- 7. What are some of the ways operations work can be organized? How does this compare to how your current team is organized?
- 8. For a service you are involved with, give examples of work whose source is life-cycle management, interacting with stakeholders, and process improvement and automation.
- 9. For a service you are involved with, give examples of emergency issues, normal requests, and project work.

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank

Index

A-B testing, 232–233 AAA (authentication, authorization, and accounting), 222 Abbott, M., 99-100 Abstracted administration in DevOps, 185 Abstraction in loosely coupled systems, 24 Abts, D., 137 Access Control List (ACL) mechanisms description, 40 Google, 41 Access controls in design for operations, 40 - 41Account creation automation example, 251 - 252Accuracy, automation for, 253 ACID databases, 24 Acknowledgments for alert messages, 355-356 ACL (Access Control List) mechanisms description, 40 Google, 41 Active-active pairs, 126 Active users, 366 Adaptive Replacement Cache (ARC) algorithm, 107 Adopting design documents, 282-283 Advertising systems in second web era, 465 After-hours oncall maintenance coordination, 294 Agents in collections, 352 Aggregators, 352 Agile Alliance, 189

Agile Manifesto, 189 Agile techniques, 180 continuous delivery, 188-189 feature requests, 264 AKF Scaling Cube, 99 combinations, 104 functional and service splits, 101 - 102horizontal duplication, 99-101 lookup-oriented splits, 102-104 Alerts, 163, 285 alerting and escalation systems, 345, 354-357 monitoring, 333 oncall for. See Oncall rules, 353 thresholds, 49 Alexander, Christopher, 69 Allen, Woody, 285 Allspaw, John automation, 249 disaster preparedness tests, 318-320 outage factors, 302 postmortems, 301 Alternatives in design documents, 278 Amazon design process, 276 Game Day, 318 Simple Queue Service, 85 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), 472 Amazon Web Services (AWS), 59 Analysis in capacity planning, 375-376 causal, 301-302

Analysis (continued) crash reports, 129 in monitoring, 345, 353-354 Ancillary resources in capacity planning, 372 Andreessen, Marc, 181 Anomaly detection, 354 "Antifragile Organization" article, 315, 320 Antifragile systems, 308–310 Apache systems Hadoop, 132, 467 Mesos, 34 web server forking, 114 Zookeeper, 231, 363 API (Application Programming Interface) defined, 10 logs, 340 Applicability in dot-bomb era, 463-464 Application architectures, 69 cloud-scale service, 80-85 exercises, 93 four-tier web service, 77-80 message bus, 85-90 reverse proxy service, 80 service-oriented, 90-92 single-machine web servers, 70–71 summary, 92-93 three-tier web service, 71-77 Application debug logs, 340 Application logs, 340 Application Programming Interface (API) defined, 10 logs, 340 Application servers in four-tier web service, 79 Approvals code, 47–48 deployment phase, 214, 216-217 design documents, 277, 281 service launches, 159 Arbitrary groups, segmentation by, 104 ARC (Adaptive Replacement Cache) algorithm, 107 Architecture factors in service launches, 157

Archives design documents, 279-280 email, 277 Art of Scalability, Scalable Web Architecture, Processes, and Organizations for the Modern Enterprise, 100 Artifacts artifact-scripted database changes, 185 defined, 196 Assessments, 421-422 Capacity Planning, 431–432 Change Management, 433–434 Disaster Preparedness, 448–450 Emergency Response, 426–428 levels, 405-407 methodology, 403-407 Monitoring and Metrics, 428-430 New Product Introduction and Removal, 435-436 operational excellence, 405–407 organizational, 411-412 Performance and Efficiency, 439–441 questions, 407 Regular Tasks, 423–425 Service Delivery: The Build Phase, 442-443 Service Delivery: The Deployment Phase, 444-445 Service Deployment and Decommissioning, 437–438 services, 407-410 Toil Reduction, 446–447 Asynchronous design, 29 Atlassian Bamboo tool, 205 Atomicity ACID term, 24 release, 240-241 Attack surface area, 79 Auditing operations design, 42-43 Augmentation files, 41-42 Authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA), 222 Authentication in deployment phase, 222 Authors in design documents, 277, 282 Auto manufacturing automation example, 251

Automation, 243–244 approaches, 244-245 baking, 219 benefits, 154 code amount, 269-270 code reviews, 268-269 compensatory principle, 246–247 complementarity principle, 247-248 continuous delivery, 190 crash data collection and analysis, 129 creating, 255-258 DevOps, 182, 185-186 exercises, 272-273 goals, 252-254 hidden costs, 250 infrastructure strategies, 217-220 issue tracking systems, 263-265 language tools, 258–262 left-over principle, 245–246 lessons learned, 249-250 multitenant systems, 270–271 prioritizing, 257–258 repair life cycle, 254–255 software engineering tools and techniques, 262-270 software packaging, 266 software restarts and escalation, 128 - 129steps, 258 style guides, 266–267, 270 summary, 271–272 system administration, 248-249 tasks, 153-155 test-driven development, 267-268 toil reduction, 257 vs. tool building, 250–252 version control systems, 265-266 Availability CAP Principle, 21–22 monitoring, 336 Availability and partition tolerance (AP), 24 Availability requirements cloud computing era, 469 dot-bomb era, 460 first web era, 455 pre-web era, 452-453 second web era, 465

Averages in monitoring, 358 AWS (Amazon Web Services), 59 Backend replicas, load balancers with, 12 - 13Backends multiple, 14-15 server stability, 336 Background in design documents, 277 - 278Background processes for containers, 61 Backups in design for operations, 36 Baked images for OS installation, 219-220 Banned query lists, 130 Bare metal clouds, 68 Barroso, L. A. canary requests, 131 cost comparisons, 464 disk drive failures, 133, 338 BASE (Basically Available Soft-state services) databases, 24 Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), 218 Basecamp application, 55 bash (Bourne Again Shell), 259 Batch size in DevOps, 178–179 Bathtub failure curve, 133 Beck, K., 189 Behaviors in KPIs, 390-391 Behr, K., 172 Bellovin, S. M., 79 Benchmarks in service platform selection, 53 Bernstein, Leonard, 487 Berra, Yogi, 331 Bibliography, 491–497 Bidirectional learning in code review systems, 269 Big O notation, 476–479 Bigtable storage system, 24 Bimodal patterns in histograms, 361 BIOS settings in deployment phase, 218Blackbox monitoring, 346–347 Blacklists, 40-42 Blade servers, 217-218 "Blameless Postmortems and a Just Culture" article, 301

Blog Search, upgrading, 226 Blue-green deployment, 230 BMC (Baseboard Management Controller), 218 Botnets, 140 Bots in virtual offices, 166–167 Bottlenecks automation for, 257 DevOps, 179 identifying, 96 Bourne Again Shell (bash), 259 Bowen, H. K., 172 Boyd, John, 296 **BSD UNIX**, 460 Buckets in histograms, 361 Buffer thrashing, 71 Bugs code review systems, 269 vs. feature requests, 263 flag flips for, 232 lead time, 201 monitoring, 336 new releases, 178 priority for, 150 unused code, 270 Builds assessments, 442-443 build console, 205 build step, 203-204 commit step, 202-203 continuous deployment, 237 continuous integration, 205-207 develop step, 202 DevOps, 185-186 exercises, 209 overview, 195–196 package step, 204 packages as handoff interface, 207–208 register step, 204 service delivery strategies, 197-200 steps overview, 202-204 summary, 208-209 version-controlled, 191 virtuous cycle of quality, 200–201 waterfall methodology, 199 "Built to Win: Deep Inside Obama's Campaign Tech" article, 307 Business impact in alert messages, 355 Business listings in Google Maps, 42

c-SOX requirements, 43 Cache hit ratio, 105, 109 Cache hits, 104 Cache misses, 104 Caches, 104–105 effectiveness, 105 persistence, 106 placement, 106 replacement algorithms, 107 size, 108-110 Calendar documents for oncall schedules, 290-291 Canary process for upgrading services, 227-228 Canary requests, 131 Candea, G., 35 CAP Principle, 21-24 Capability Maturity Model (CMM), 405 - 407Capability monitoring, 348 Capacity factors in service launches, 158 Capacity models, 374 Capacity planning (CP), 365 advanced, 371-381 assessments, 431-432 capacity limits, 366, 372-373 core drivers, 373-374 current usage, 368-369 data analysis, 375–380 delegating, 381 engagement measuring, 374-375 exercises, 386 headroom, 370 key indicators, 380-381 launching new services, 382-384 monitoring, 335 normal growth, 369 operational responsibility, 404 planned growth, 369-370 primary resources, 372 provisioning time, 384–385 resiliency, 370-371 resource regression, 381–382 standard, 366-371 summary, 385–386 timetables, 371 Cart size monitoring, 336 Cascade load balancing, 74 Cassandra system, 24

Causal analysis, 301–302 CCA (contributing conditions analysis), CDNs (content delivery networks), 114-116 Central collectors, 352-353 Certificate management, 79 CFEngine system configuration management, 261 deployment phase, 213 Chalup, S. R., 204 Change documenting, 276 limits, 41 vs. stability, 149–151 success rate, 201 version control systems, 265 Change-instability cycles, 150 Change Management (CM) assessments, 433-434 operational responsibility, 404 Channels in message bus architectures, 86 Chaos Gorilla, 315 Chaos Monkey, 315 Chapman, Brent, 323 Chat room bots for alerts, 293 Chat rooms for virtual offices, 166–167 Checklists oncall pre-shift responsibilities, 294 service launches, 157, 159 Chef software framework, 213 Cheswick, W. R., 79 "Choose Your Own Adventure" talk, 173 Chubby system, 231, 314 Churchill, Winston, 119 Classification systems for oncall, 292 Clos networking, 137 Cloud computing era (2010-present), 469-472 Cloud-scale service, 80-81 global load balancing methods, 82, 83-85 internal backbones, 83-84 points of presence, 83-85 CM (configuration management) languages, 260-262 CMDB (Configuration Management Database), 222

CMM (Capability Maturity Model), 405 - 407CNN.com web site, 13-14 Code approval process, 47–48 automated reviews, 268-269 lead time, 201 live changes, 236 sufficient amount, 269-270 Code latency in DevOps, 178–179 Code pushes description, 225, 226 failed, 239-240 Code review system (CRS), 268-269 Cognitive systems engineering (CSE) approach, 248 Cold caches, 106 Cold storage factor in service platform selection, 54 Collaboration in DevOps, 183 Collection systems, 345 central vs. regional collectors, 352-353 monitoring, 349-353 protocol selection, 351 push and pull, 350–351 server component vs. agents vs. pollers, 352 Colocation CDNs, 114 service platform selection, 65-66 Command-line flags, 231 Comments in style guides, 267 Commit step in build phase, 202–203 Commodity servers, 463 Communication emergency plans, 317–318 postmortems, 302 virtual offices, 166-167 Compensation in oncall schedules, 290 Compensatory automation principle, 244, 246-247 Compiled languages, 260 Complementarity principle, 244, 247–248 Compliance in platform selection, 63 Comprehensiveness in continuous deployment, 237 Computation, monitoring, 353-354 Confidence in service delivery, 200

Configuration automating, 254 deployment phase, 213-214 in designing for operations, 33-34 DevOps, 185 four-tier web service, 80 monitoring, 345-346, 362-363 Configuration management (CM) languages, 260–262 **Configuration Management Database** (CMDB), 222 Configuration management strategy in OS installation, 219 Configuration packages, 220 Conflicting goals, 396–397 Congestion problems, 15 Consistency ACID term, 24 CAP Principle, 21 Consistency and partition tolerance (CP), 24 Constant scaling, 475–476 Containers, 60-62 Content delivery networks (CDNs), 114-116 Content distribution servers, 83 Continuous builds in DevOps, 186 Continuous Delivery, 223 Continuous delivery (CD) deployment phase, 221 DevOps, 189-192 practices, 191 principles, 190-191 Continuous deployment DevOps, 186 upgrading live services, 236-239 Continuous improvement technique DevOps, 153, 183 service delivery, 201 Continuous integration (CI) in build phase, 205-207 Continuous tests, 186 Contract questions for hosting providers, 64-65 Contributing conditions analysis (CCA), 301 Control in platform selection, 64 Convergent orchestration, 213-214 Cookies, 76–78

Coordination for oncall schedules, 290 Core drivers capacity planning, 373-374 defined, 366 Coredumps, 129 Corporate emergency communications plans, 317–318 Corpus, 16–17 Correlation coefficient, 367 Correlation in capacity planning, 375-378 Costs caches, 105 cloud computing era, 469-470 dot-bomb era, 464-465 first web era, 459 platform selection, 63-64 pre-web era, 454 second web era, 468-469 service platform selection, 66-67 TCO, 172 Counters in monitoring, 348–350, 358 CPU core sharing, 59 Crash-only software, 35 Crashes automated data collection and analysis, 129 software, 128-129 Craver, Nick, 430 CRS (code review system), 268-269 CSE (cognitive systems engineering) approach, 248 Current usage in capacity planning, 368-369 Customer functionality, segmentation by, 103 Customers in DevOps, 177 Cycle time, 196 Daemons for containers, 61 Daily oncall schedules, 289 Dark launches, 233, 383–384 Dashboards for alerts, 293 Data analysis in capacity planning, 375-380 Data import controls, 41–42 Data scaling in dot-bomb era, 463

Data sharding, 110–112

Database-driven dynamic content, 70

Database views in live schema changes, 234 Datacenter failures, 137–138 Dates in design documents, 277, 282 Dawkins, Richard, 475 DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks, 140 Deallocation of resources, 160 Dean, Jeff canary requests, 131 scaling information, 27 Debois, Patrick, 180 Debug instrumentation, 43 Decommissioning services, 404 assessments, 437-438 description, 156 overview, 160 Dedicated wide area network connections, 83 Default policies, 40 Defense in depth, 119 Defined level in CMM, 406–407 Degradation, graceful, 39-40, 119 Delays in continuous deployment, 238 Delegating capacity planning, 381 Delegations of authority in Incident Command System, 324 Deming, W. Edwards, 172 Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, 140 Dependencies containers, 60-61 service launches, 158 Deployment and deployment phase, 195, 197, 211 approvals, 216–217 assessments, 444-445 configuration step, 213-214 continuous delivery, 221 defined, 196 DevOps, 185 exercises, 223 frequency in service delivery, 201 infrastructure as code, 221-222 infrastructure automation strategies, 217 - 220installation step, 212–213 installing OS and services, 219-220 KPIs, 392-393

operations console, 217 physical machines, 217-218 platform services, 222 promotion step, 212 summary, 222-223 testing, 215-216 virtual machines, 218 Descriptions of outages, 301 Descriptive failure domains, 127 Design documents, 275 adopting, 282-283 anatomy, 277-278 archive, 279-280 changes and rationale, 276 exercises, 284 overview, 275-276 past decisions, 276-277 review workflows, 280-282 summary, 283 templates, 279, 282, 481-484 Design for operations, 31 access controls and rate limits, 40 - 41auditing, 42-43 backups and restores, 36 configuration, 33–34 data import controls, 41-42 debug instrumentation, 43 documentation, 43-44 exception collection, 43-44 exercises, 50 features, 45-48 graceful degradation, 39-40 hot swaps, 38-39 implementing, 45-48 improving models, 48–49 monitoring, 42 operational requirements, 31–32 queue draining, 35-36 redundancy, 37 replicated databases, 37-38 software upgrades, 36 startup and shutdown, 34–35 summary, 49-50 third-party vendors, 48 toggles for features, 39 Design patterns for resiliency. See Resiliency Design patterns for scaling. See Scaling Details design documents, 278 postmortems, 302 Develop step in build phase, 202 Developers for oncall, 287 DevOps, 171–172 Agile, 188–189 approach, 175-176 automation, 182, 185-186 batch size, 178-179 build phase, 197-198 business level, 187-188 continuous delivery, 189-192 continuous improvement, 183 converting to, 186–188 description, 172-173 exercises, 193 experimentation and learning, 178 feedback, 177-178 history, 180–181 integration, 182 nontechnical practices, 183–184 recommended reading, 487 relationships, 182 release engineering practices, 186 SRE, 181 starting, 187 strategy adoption, 179-180 summary, 192 vs. traditional approach, 173-175 values and principles, 181–186 workflow, 176-177 DevOps Cafe Podcast, 180, 200 DevOps culture, 171 "DevOps Days" conferences, 180 Diagnostics, monitoring, 337 Dickson, C., 345 Dickson model, 334 diff tool, 33 Differentiated services, 233 Direct measurements, 347-348 Direct orchestration, 213–214 DiRT (Disaster Recovery Testing), 316, 318, 320-323 Disaster preparedness, 307, 448-450 antifragile systems, 308-309 DiRT tests, 320-323 exercises, 330

fire drills, 312–313 implementation and logistics, 318-320 incident Command System, 323-329 mindset, 308–310 random testing, 314–315 risk reduction, 309–311 scope, 317-318 service launches, 158 service testing, 313-314 starting, 316-317 summary, 329-330 training for individuals, 311-312 training for organizations, 315-317 Disaster Recovery Testing (DiRT), 316, 318, 320–323 Disks access time, 26 caches, 106-107 failures, 132–133 Distributed computing and clouds cloud computing era, 469–472 conclusion, 472-473 dot-bomb era, 459–465 exercises, 473 first web era, 455–459 origins overview, 451-452 pre-web era, 452-455 second web era, 465-469 Distributed computing overview, 9–10 CAP Principle, 21–24 distributed state, 17-20 exercises, 30 load balancer with multiple backend replicas, 12–13 loosely coupled systems, 24-25 server trees, 16–17 servers with multiple backends, 14–15 simplicity importance, 11 speed issues, 26–29 summary, 29-30 visibility at scale, 10–11 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, 140 Distributed state, 17-20 Distributed version control systems (DVCSs), 265 Diurnal cycles, 332 Diurnal usage patterns, 359 Diversity, monitoring, 334

DNS deployment phase, 222 round robin, 72-73 Docker system, 61, 219 Documentation design documents. See Design documents design for operations, 43-44 service launches, 158 stakeholder interactions, 154 Doerr, John, 389 Domains, failure, 126–128 Domain-specific languages (DSLs), 244 DoS (denial-of-service) attacks, 140 Dot-bomb era (2000–2003), 459–465 Downsampling, monitoring, 339 Downtime containers, 61 pre-web era, 453 in upgrading live services, 225 Drain tool, 254 Draining process, 112 Drains, queue, 35–36 "DRAM Errors in the Wild: A Large-Scale Field Study" article, 134 DSLs (domain-specific languages), 244 Dual load balancers, 76 Durability in ACID term, 24 DVCSs (distributed version control systems), 265 Dynamic content with web servers, 70 Dynamic resource allocation, 138 Dynamic roll backs, 232 Dynamo system, 24 "Each Necessary, But Only Jointly Sufficient" article, 302 ECC (error-correcting code) memory, 131-132 Edge cases, 153 Edwards, Damon DevOps benefits, 172-173 DevOps Cafe podcast, 180, 188, 200 Effectiveness of caches, 105 80/20 rule for operational features, 47 Elements of Programming Style, 11 Eliminating tasks, 155 EMA (exponential moving average), 367, 379

Email alerts, 292-293 archives, 277 Embedded knowledge in DevOps, 177-178, 187 Emergency hotfixes, 240 Emergency issues, 160 Emergency Response (ER), 403, 426–428 Emergency tasks, 156 Employee human resources data updates example, 89-90 Empowering users, automation for, 253 Emptying queues, 35 Encryption in four-tier web service, 79 End-of-shift oncall responsibilities, 299 End-to-end process in service delivery, 200 Engagement defined, 366 measuring, 374–375 Enterprise Integration Practices: Designing, Building, and Deploying Messaging Solutions, 87 Environment-related files, 220 Ephemeral computing, 67 Ephemeral machines, 58 Erlang language, 236 Error Budgets, 152 case study, 396-399 DevOps, 184 Error-correcting code (ECC) memory, 131 - 132Escalation alert messages, 345, 354-357 automated, 128-129 monitoring, 333 third-party, 298 Etsy blog, 256 EU Data Protection Directive platform selection factor, 63 requirements, 43 Eventual consistency, 21 Exception collection, 43–44 Exceptional situations. See Oncall Execution in service delivery, 201 Executive summaries in design documents, 277, 282 Expand/contract technique, 234-235 Experimentation in DevOps, 178

Expertise of cloud providers factor in service platform selection, 66 Explicit oncall handoffs, 299 Exponential moving average (EMA), 367, 379 Exponential scaling, 476 Face-to-face discussions in DevOps, 187 Facebook chat dark launch, 384 recommended reading, 488 Factorial scaling, 477 Fail closed actions, 40 Fail open actions, 40 Failed code pushes, 239–240 Failed RAM chips, 123 Failure condition in alert messages, 354 "Failure Trends in a Large Disk Drive Population," 133, 338 Failures, 10, 120. See also Resiliency overload, 138-141 physical. See Physical failures Fair queueing, 113 Fan in, 15 Fan out, 15 Farley, D., 190, 223 "Fault Injection in Production," 320 Feature requests vs. bugs, 263 Features in design for operations, 46 building, 45 toggles, 39, 230–232 writing, 47-48 Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) web site, 324 Feedback design for operations, 47–48 DevOps, 177-178, 186-187 Feeding from queues, 113 Felderman, B., 137 FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Administration) web site, 324 Files, environment-related, 220 Finance monitoring, 336 Fire drills, 312–313 First web era: bubble (1995-2000), 455-459 Fisher, M., 99–100 Fitts, P., 246

Fitts's list, 246 Fix-it days, 166 FIXME comments in style guides, 267 Flag flipping, 39, 230–232 Flexibility in service-oriented architectures, 91 Flows build phase, 197 defined, 196 Focus in operational teams, 165–166 Follow-up oncall work, 296 Forecasting in capacity planning, 378-380 Formal workflows, 280 Four-tier web service, 77-78 application servers, 79 configuration options, 80 encryption and certificate management, 79 frontends, 78-79 security, 79 Fox, A., 35 FreeBSD containers, 60 Frequency deployment, 201 measurement, 333 oncall, 291-292 Frontends in four-tier web service, 78-79 Frying images, 219–220 Fulghum, P., 188, 215 Functional splits in AKF Scaling Cube, 101 - 102Future capacity planning, 49 Gallagher, S., 307 Game Day exercises Amazon, 318 DevOps, 184 disaster preparedness, 315, 318–320 "Gamedays on the Obama Campaign" article, 320 Ganapathi, A., 141 Ganeti system, 240, 254 Gatekeeper tool, 233 Gates, 196 Gauges in monitoring, 348–350 Geographic diversity factor in service

platform selection, 54 Geolocation in cloud-scale service, 81 GFS (Google File System), 466 Gibson, William, 402 Gilbert, S., 23 Global load balancing (GLB), 82-83, 83-85 Go Continuous Delivery tool, 205 Goals automation, 252-254 conflicting, 396–397 design documents, 277, 282 unified, 397-398 Google ACLs, 41 AdSense, 465 AppEngine, 54 Blog Search upgrading, 226 bots, 167 Chubby system, 231, 314 Disaster Recovery Testing, 316, 318 graceful degradation of apps, 40 message bus architectures, 86 oncall, 291 outages, 119 postmortem reports, 301 recommended reading, 488 self-service launches at, 159 SRE model, 181 timestamps, 341-342 "Google DiRT: The View from Someone Being Tested" article, 320–323 Google Error Budget KPI, 396–399 Google File System (GFS), 466 Google Maps load balancing, 83-84 local business listings, 42 Google Omega system, 34 "Google Throws Open Doors to Its Top-Secret Data Center" article, 320 Graceful degradation, 39–40, 119 Graphical user interfaces (GUIs) for configuration, 34 Graphs, monitoring, 358 Greatness, measuring, 402-403 Gruver, G., 188, 215 "Guided Tour through Data-center Networking" article, 137 "Guideline for Postmortem Communication" blog post, 302 GUIs (graphical user interfaces) for configuration, 34

Hadoop system, 132, 467 Handoff interface, packages as, 207-208 Handoffs, oncall, 299 Hangs, software, 129–130 Hardware components dot-bomb era, 460 load balancers, 136 resiliency, 120-121 Hardware output factor in service platform selection, 67-68 Hardware qualification, 156 Hardware virtual machines (HVMs), 58 Hash functions, 110 Hash prefix, segmentation by, 103 Hbase storage system, 23–24 Head of line blocking, 112 Headroom in capacity planning, 370 Health checks deployment phase, 213 queries, 12 Heartbeat requests, 129 Help oncall. See Oncall scaling, 252 Hidden costs of automation, 250 Hierarchy, segmentation by, 104 High availability cloud computing era, 471 dot-bomb era, 461-462 first web era, 457–458 pre-web era, 454 second web era, 466–467 High-level design, 278 High-speed network counters, 349 Histograms, 361–362 "Hit" logs, 340 Hits, cache, 104 Hoare, C. A. R., 9 Hogan, C., 204 Hohpe, G., 87 Home computers in dot-bomb era, 460 Horizontal duplication in AKF Scaling Cube, 99–101 Hosting providers, contract questions for, 64–65 Hot-pluggable devices, 38–39 Hot spares vs. load sharing, 126 Hot-swappable devices, 38-39 Hotfixes, 240

"How Google Sets Goals: OKRs" video, 389 HTTP (Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol) load balancing, 75 overview, 69 Hudson tool, 205 Human error, 141–142 Human processes, automating, 154 Human resources data updates example, 89-90 Humble, J. continuous delivery, 190, 223 DevOps Cafe Podcast, 188, 200 HVMs (hardware virtual machines), 58 Hybrid load balancing strategy, 75 Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) load balancing, 75 overview, 69 IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), 51–54 IAPs (Incident Action Plans), 326-327 Ideals for KPIs, 390 Image method of OS installation, 219-220 Impact focus for feature requests, 46 Implementation of disaster preparedness, 318-320 Import controls, 41-42 Improvement levels in operational excellence, 412-413 Improving models in design for operations, 48-49 In-house service provider factor in service platform selection, 67 Incident Action Plans (IAPs), 326-327 "Incident Command for IT: What We Can Learn from the Fire Department" talk, 323 Incident Command System, 323–324 best practices, 327-328 example use, 328-329 Incident Action Plan, 326–327 IT operations arena, 326 public safety arena, 325 Incident Commanders, 324-325, 328 Index lookup speed, 28 Individual training for disaster preparedness, 311-312 Informal review workflows, 280

Infrastructure automation strategies, 217-220 DevOps, 185 service platform selection, 67 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 51–54 Infrastructure as code, 221–222 Inhibiting alert messages, 356–357 Initial level in CMM, 405 Innovating, 148 Input/output (I/O) overload, 13 virtual environments, 58-59 Installation in deployment phase, 212-213 OS and services, 219-220 Integration in DevOps, 182 Intel OKR system, 389 Intentional delays in continuous deployment, 238 Intermodal shipping, 62 Internal backbones in cloud-scale service, 83-85 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses deployment phase, 222 load balancers, 72-73 restrictions on, 40 Introducing new features, flag flips for, 232 Introspection, 10 Invalidation of cache entry, 108 Involvement in DevOps, 183 IP (Internet Protocol) addresses deployment phase, 222 load balancers, 72–73 restrictions on, 40 Isolation in ACID term, 24 ISPs for cloud-scale service, 83 Issues naming standards, 264 tracking systems, 263-265 IT operations arena in Incident Command System, 326 ITIL recommended reading, 488 j-SOX requirements, 43 Jacob, Adam, 173 Jails containers, 60 processes, 55

Java counters, 350 JCS (joint cognitive system), 248 Jenkins CI tool, 205 Job satisfaction in service delivery, 201 Joint cognitive system (JCS), 248 JSON transmitted over HTTP, 351 Kamp, P.-H., 478–479 Kartar, J., 183 Keeven, T., 99 Kejariwal, A., 371 Kernighan, B., 11 Key indicators in capacity planning, 380-381 Key performance indicators (KPIs), 387-388 creating, 389–390 Error Budget case study, 396–399 evaluating, 396 exercises, 399-400 machine allocation example, 393-396 monitoring example, 336–337 overview, 388-389 summary, 399 Keywords in alerts, 304 Kim, Gene, 171-172 Klau, Rick, 389 Kotler, Philip, 365 KPIs. See Key performance indicators (KPIs) Krishnan, Kripa, 319–320 Labor laws, 43 Lame-duck mode, 35 "LAMP" acronym, 461 Language tools for automation, 258–262 Latency cloud computing era, 471 cloud-scale service, 81-82 code, 178-179 monitoring, 334, 336 service platform selection, 54 SRE vs. traditional enterprise IT, 149 Latency load balancing, 74 Latency Monkey, 315 Launch leads, 159 Launch Readiness Engineers (LREs), 157 - 158

Launch Readiness Reviews (LRRs), 159 Launches dark, 233 services, 156-160, 382-384 Layer 3 and 4 load balancers, 73 Layer 7 load balancers, 73 Lead times in service delivery, 201 Leaf servers, 17 "Lean Manufacturing," 172 Learning DevOps, 178 Least Frequently Used (LFU) algorithm, 107 Least Loaded (LL) algorithm, 13 load balancing, 74 problems, 13-14 Least Loaded with Slow Start load balancing, 74 Least Recently Used (LRU) algorithm, 107Lee, J. D., 249 Left-over automation principle, 244-246 Legacy system backups and restores, 36 Lessons learned in automation, 249–250 Level of service abstraction in service platform selection, 52-56 Levels of improvement in operational excellence, 412-413 Levy, Steven, 320 LFU (Least Frequently Used) algorithm, 107Limoncelli, T. A. DiRT tests, 320 meta-work, 162 packages, 204 test event planning, 319 time management, 256 Linear scaling, 476-477 Link-shortening site example, 87–89 Linking tickets to subsystems, 263-264 Linux in dot-bomb era, 460-461 Live code changes, 236 Live restores, 36 Live schema changes, 234–236 Live service upgrades. See Upgrading live services Load balancers failures, 134-136 first web era, 456 with multiple backend replicas, 12-13 Load balancers (continued) with shared state, 75 three-tier web service, 72-74 Load sharing vs. hot spares, 126 Load shedding, 139 Load testing, 215 Local business listings in Google Maps, Local labor laws, 43 Logarithmic scaling, 476 Logistics in disaster preparedness, 318-320 Logistics team in Incident Command System, 326 Loglinear scaling, 476–477 Logs, 11, 340 approach, 341 design documents, 282 timestamps, 341-342 Long-term analysis, 354 Long-term fixes oncall, 299–300 vs. quick, 295–296 Longitudinal hardware failure study, 133 - 134Look-for's, 407 Lookup-oriented splits in AKF Scaling Cube, 102–104 Loosely coupled systems, 24-25 Lower-latency services in cloud computing era, 469 LREs (Launch Readiness Engineers), 157 - 158LRRs (Launch Readiness Reviews), 159 LRU (Least Recently Used) algorithm, 107 Lynch, N., 23 MACD (moving average convergence/divergence) metric, 367, 378–379 MACD signal line, 367 Machine Learning service, 55 Machines automated configuration example, 251 defined, 10 failures, 134 KPI example, 393–396 Madrigal, A. C., 316 Main threads, 112

Maintenance alert messages, 356 Major bug resolution monitoring, 336 Major outages, 307 Malfunctions, 121 defined, 120 distributed computing approach, 123 MTBF, 121–122 traditional approach, 122-123 Managed level in CMM, 406-407 Management support in design documents, 282 Manual scaling, 153 Manual stop lists, 238 Many-to-many communication in message bus architectures, 85-86 Many-to-one communication in message bus architectures, 85-86 MapReduce system, 466–467 Master-master pairs, 126 Master of Disaster (MoD) in Wheel of Misfortune game, 311–312 Master servers, 20 Master-slave split-brain relationship, 22 Math terms, 367 "Mature Role for Automation" blog post, 249 MAUs (monthly active users), 366, 373 McHenry, Stephen, 234 McHenry Technique, 234–235 McKinley, D., 256 McLean, Malcom, 62 MCollective service, 86 MD5 algorithm, 110 Mean time between failures (MTBF), 120-122, 125 Mean time to repair (MTTR), 125 Mean time to restore service in service delivery, 201 Measurements, 332 engagement, 374-375 frequency, 333 greatness, 402-403 monitoring. See Monitoring scaling, 97 Medians, monitoring, 359 Memory caches, 104-106 ECC, 131–132 failures, 123, 131–132

virtual machines, 59 web servers, 71 Mesos system, 34 Message bus architectures, 85-86 designs, 86 employee human resources data updates example, 89–90 link-shortening site example, 87-89 reliability, 87 Messages, alert. See Alerts Meta-monitoring, 339-340 Meta-processes, automating, 155 Meta-work, 162 Metrics, 11, 332 Mindset in disaster preparedness, 308-310 Minimum monitor problem, 337-338 Misses, cache, 104 "Model for Types and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation" article, 248 Monitoring, 331-332 alerting and escalation management, 354-357 analysis and computation, 353-354 assessments, 428-430 blackbox vs. whitebox, 346-347 collections, 350-353 components, 345-346 configuration, 362-363 consumers, 334–336 design for operations, 42 exercises, 342-343, 364 histograms, 361–362 key indicators, 336–337, 380–381 logs, 340-342 meta-monitoring, 339-340 overview, 332-333 percentiles, 359 protocol selection, 351 push vs. pull, 350-351 retention, 338-339 sensing and measurement, 345-350 service launches, 158 stack ranking, 360 storage, 362 summary, 342, 363-364 system integration, 250

uses, 333 visualization, 358-362 Monitoring and Metrics (MM), 404, 428-430 Monthly active users (MAUs), 366, 373 Moving average convergence/divergence (MACD) metric, 367, 378-379 Moving averages capacity planning, 377 defined, 367 MTBF (mean time between failures), 120-122, 125 MTTR (mean time to repair), 125 Multiple backend replicas, load balancers with, 12-13 Multiple backends, servers with, 14-15 Multiple data stores in three-tier web service, 77 Multitenant systems, automation, 270-271 Multithreaded code, 112 N + 1 configurations, 458 N + 2 configurations, 458–459 N + M redundancy, 124–125 "NAK" (negatively acknowledge) alerts, 355 Naming standards, 264 Native URLs, 115 Natural disasters factor in service platform selection, 53 Nearest load balancing, 81 Nearest by other metric load balancing, 81 Nearest with limits load balancing, 81 Negatively acknowledge ("NAK") alerts, 355 Netflix disaster preparedness, 315 virtual machines, 59 Netflix Aminator framework, 219 Netflix Simian Army, 315 Networks access speed, 26-27 counters, 349 interface failures, 133 protocols, 489 New feature reviews in DevOps, 183

New Product Introduction and Removal (NPI/NPR) assessments, 435-436 operational responsibility, 404 New services, launching, 382–384 Nielsen, Jerri, 225 Non-blocking bandwidth, 137 Non-functional requirements term, 32 Non-goals in design documents, 277 Nonemergency tasks, 156 Nontechnical DevOps practices, 183–184 Normal growth in capacity planning, 369 Normal requests, 161 NoSQL databases, 24 Notification types in oncall, 292–293 Objectives in Incident Command System, 324 Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop, 296-297 O'Dell's Axiom, 95 OKR system, 389 On-premises, externally run services factor in service platform selection, 67 Oncall, 285 after-hours maintenance coordination, 294 alert responsibilities, 295-296 alert reviews, 302–304 benefits, 152 calendar, 290–291, 355 continuous deployment, 238 defined, 148 designing, 285-286 DevOps, 183 end-of-shift responsibilities, 299 excessive paging, 304-305 exercises, 306 frequency, 291–292 long-term fixes, 299-300 notification types, 292–293 onduty, 288 OODA, 296–297 operational rotation, 161–162 overview, 163-164 playbooks, 297–298 postmortems, 300-302 pre-shift responsibilities, 294

regular responsibilities, 294–295 rosters, 287 schedule design, 288-290 service launches, 158 SLAs, 286–287 summary, 305–306 third-party escalation, 298 Onduty, 288 One percent testing, 233 One-to-many communication in message bus architectures, 85–86 One-way pagers, 293 OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop, 296-297 Open source projects in dot-bomb era, 460OpenStack system, 240 Operating system installation, 219–220 Operational excellence, 401 assessment levels, 405-407 assessment methodology, 403–407 assessment questions and look-for's, 407exercises, 415 greatness measurement, 402–403 improvement levels, 412–413 organizational assessments, 411–412 overview, 401-402 service assessments, 407–410 starting, 413-414 summary, 414 Operational Health, monitoring, 335 Operational hygiene in service launches, 158 - 159Operational requirements in designing for operations, 31–32 Operational responsibilities (OR), 403-404 Operational teams, 160–162 fix-it days, 166 focus, 165-166 in Incident Command System, 326 oncall days, 163–164 organizing strategies, 160–166 project-focused days, 162-163 ticket duty days, 164-165 toil reduction, 166 Operations, 147-148 change vs. stability, 149–151

design for. See Design for operations exercises, 168-169 organizing strategies for operational teams, 160–166 at scale, 152-155 service life cycle, 155–160 SRE overview, 151–152 SRE vs. traditional enterprise IT, 148 - 149summary, 167–168 virtual offices, 166–167 Operations console in deployment phase, 217 Operator errors, 171 Oppenheimer, D. L., 141, 171 Opportunity costs in service platform selection, 66-67 Optimizing level in CMM, 406 Orders of magnitude, 478 Organizational assessments in operational excellence, 411–412 Organizational divisions, segmentation by, 103 Organizational memory, 157 Organizational training for disaster preparedness, 315-317 OS installation, 219-220 Outages code review systems, 269 defined, 120 disasters. See Disaster preparedness Overflow capacity factor in service platform selection, 67 Overload failures DoS and DDoS attacks, 139 load shedding, 139 scraping attacks, 140–141 traffic surges, 138–139 Oversubscribed systems defined, 53 spare capacity, 125 PaaS (Platform as a Service), 51, 54–55 Packages

build phase, 204 configuration, 220 continuous delivery, 190 deployment phase, 213 distributing, 266

as handoff interface, 207–208 pinning, 212 registering, 206 Pager storms, 356 Pagers for alerts, 293, 304–305 Panics, 128 Parasuraman, R., 248 Paravirtualization (PV), 58-59 Parity bits, 131–132 Partition tolerance in CAP Principle, 22 - 24Parts and components failures, 131–134 Past decisions, documenting, 276-277 Patch lead time in service delivery, 201 Patterson, D. A., 141 PCI DSS requirements, 43 Percentiles in monitoring, 359 Performance caches, 105 testing, 215 Performance and Efficiency (PE) assessments, 439-441 operational responsibility, 404 Performance regressions, 156, 215 Performant systems, 10 Perl language, 259–260, 262 Persistence in caches, 106 Perspective in monitoring, 333 Phased roll-outs, 229 Phoenix Project, 172 Physical failures, 131 datacenters, 137-138 load balancers, 134–136 machines, 134 parts and components, 131-134 racks, 136-137 Physical machines deployment phase, 217-218 failures, 134 service platform selection, 57 Pie charts, 358 Pinheiro, E. drive failures, 133, 338 memory errors, 134 Pinning packages, 212 PKI (public key infrastructure), 40 Planned growth in capacity planning, 369–370 Planning in disaster preparedness, 318-319

Planning team in Incident Command System, 326 Platform as a Service (PaaS), 51, 54-55 Platform selection. See Service platform selection Plauger, P., 11 Playbooks oncall, 297-298 process, 153 Pods, 137 Points of presence (POPs), 83-85 Pollers, 352 Post-crash recovery, 35 Postmortems, 152 communication, 302 DevOps, 184 oncall, 291, 300-302 purpose, 300-301 reports, 301-302 templates, 484-485 Power failures, 34, 133 Power of 2 mapping process, 110–111 Practical Approach to Large-Scale Agile Development: How HP Transformed HP LaserJet FutureSmart Firmware, 188 Practice of System and Network Administration, 132, 204 Pre-checks, 141 Pre-shift oncall responsibilities, 294 Pre-submit checks in build phase, 202 - 203Pre-submit tests, 267 Pre-web era (1985-1994), 452-455 Prefork processing module, 114 Premature optimization, 96 Prescriptive failure domains, 127 Primary resources capacity planning, 372 defined, 366 Prioritizing automation, 257-258 feature requests, 46 for stability, 150 Privacy in platform selection, 63 Private cloud factor in platform selection, 62 Private sandbox environments, 197 Proactive scaling solutions, 97–98

Problems to solve in DevOps, 187 Process watchers, 128 Processes automation benefits, 253 containers, 60 instead of threads, 114 Proctors for Game Day, 318 Product Management (PM) monitoring, 336 Production candidates, 216 Production health in continuous deployment, 237 Project-focused days, 162-163 Project planning frequencies, 410 Project work, 161-162 Promotion step in deployment phase, 212 Propellerheads, 451 Proportional shedding, 230 Protocols collections, 351 network, 489 Prototyping, 258 Provider comparisons in service platform selection, 53 Provisional end-of-shift reports, 299 Provisioning in capacity planning, 384–385 in DevOps, 185-186 Proxies monitoring, 352 reverse proxy service, 80 Public cloud factor in platform selection, 62 Public Information Officers in Incident Command System, 325–326 Public key infrastructure (PKI), 40 Public safety arena in Incident Command System, 325 Publishers in message bus architectures, 85 Publishing postmortems, 302 PubSub2 system, 86 Pull monitoring, 350–351 Puppet systems configuration management, 261 deployment phase, 213 multitenant, 271 Push conflicts in continuous deployment, 238

Push monitoring, 350–351 "Pushing Millions of Lines of Code Five Days a Week" presentation, 233 PV (paravirtualization), 58-59 Python language libraries, 55 overview, 259-261 QPS (queries per second) defined, 10 limiting, 40-41 Quadratic scaling, 476 Quality Assurance monitoring, 335 Quality assurance (QA) engineers, 199 Quality measurements, 402 Queries in HTTP, 69 Queries of death, 130–131 Queries per second (QPS) defined, 10 limiting, 40-41 Queues, 113 benefits, 113 draining, 35-36 issue tracking systems, 263 messages, 86 variations, 113-114 Quick fixes vs. long-term, 295-296 RabbitMQ service, 86 Rachitsky, L., 302 Rack diversity, 136 Racks failures, 136 locality, 137 RAID systems, 132 RAM for caching, 104–106 failures, 123, 131-132 Random testing for disaster preparedness, 314-315 Rapid development, 231-232 Rate limits in design for operations, 40 - 41Rate monitoring, 348 Rationale, documenting, 276 Re-assimilate tool, 255 Read-only replica support, 37 Real-time analysis, 353 Real user monitoring (RUM), 333

Reboots, 34 Recommendations in postmortem reports, 301 Recommended reading, 487-489 Recovery-Oriented Computing (ROC), 461 Recovery tool, 255 Redis storage system, 24, 106 Reduced risk factor in service delivery, 200 Reducing risk, 309–311 Reducing toil, automation for, 257 Redundancy design for operations, 37 file chunks, 20 for resiliency, 124-125 servers, 17 Reengineering components, 97 Refactoring, 97 Regional collectors, 352-353 Registering packages, 204, 206 Regression analysis, 375–376 Regression lines, 376 Regression tests for performance, 156, 215Regular meetings in DevOps, 187 Regular oncall responsibilities, 294-295 Regular software crashes, 128 Regular Tasks (RT) assessments, 423-425 operational responsibility, 403 Regulating system integration, 250 Relationships in DevOps, 182 Release atomicity, 240-241 Release candidates, 197 Release engineering practice in DevOps, 186 Release vehicle packaging in DevOps, 185 Releases defined, 196 DevOps, 185 Reliability automation for, 253 message bus architectures, 87 Reliability zones in service platform selection, 53-54 Remote hands, 163 Remote monitoring stations, 352

Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocol, 41 Repair life cycle, 254–255 Repeatability automation for, 253 continuous delivery, 190 Repeatable level in CMM, 405 Replacement algorithms for caches, 107 Replicas, 124 in design for operations, 37-38 load balancers with, 12-13 three-tier web service, 76 updating, 18 Reports for postmortems, 301–302 Repositories in build phase, 197 Reproducibility in continuous deployment, 237 Requests in updating state, 18 "Resilience Engineering: Learning to Embrace Failure" article, 320 Resiliency, 119–120 capacity planning, 370-371 DevOps, 178 exercises, 143 failure domains, 126-128 human error, 141–142 malfunctions, 121-123 overload failures, 138-141 physical failures. See Physical failures software failures, 128-131 software vs. hardware, 120-121 spare capacity for, 124-126 summary, 142 Resolution alert messages, 355 monitoring, 334 Resource pools, 99 Resource regression in capacity planning, 381-382 Resource sharing service platform selection, 62-65 virtual machines, 59 Resources contention, 59, 238 deallocation, 160 dynamic resource allocation, 138 Responsibilities for oncall, 294–296 Restarts, automated, 128-129 Restores in design for operations, 36

Retention monitoring, 338–339 Reverse proxy service, 80 Review workflows in design documents, 280 - 282Reviewers in design documents, 277, 281 Revising KPIs, 391–392 Revision numbers in design documents, 277,282 Rework time factor in service delivery, 201Rich, Amy, 51 Richard, Dylan, 320 Risk reduction, 309–311 Risk system, 24 Risk taking in DevOps, 178 Rituals in DevOps, 178 Robbins, Jesse communication benefits, 186 DiRT tests, 320 test planning, 319–320 ROC (Recovery-Oriented Computing), 461Roll back, 239 Roll forward, 239 Rolling upgrades, 226 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 275 Roosevelt, Theodore, 307 Root cause analysis, 301–302 Root servers, 17 Rossi, Chuck, 233 Rosters, oncall, 287 Round-robin for backends, 12 Round robin (RR) load balancing, 72-74 Royce, D. W. W., 175 RPC (Remote Procedure Call) protocol, 41 RSS feeds of build status, 205 Rubin, A. D., 79 Ruby language, 259–260 RUM (real user monitoring), 333 "Run run run dead" problem, 462 SaaS (Software as a Service), 51, 55–56 Safeguards, automation for, 253 Safety for automation, 249 Salesforce.com, 55-56 Sample launch readiness review survey, 157 - 158Sandbox environments, 197

Satellites in cloud-scale service, 83 Scalability Rules: 50 Principles for Scaling Web Sites, 100 Scale operations at, 152–155 visibility at, 10–11 Scaling, 95, 475 AKF Scaling Cube, 99–104 automation for, 252 Big O notation, 476-479 caching, 104-110 cloud computing era, 471 constant, linear, and exponential, 475-476 content delivery networks, 114-116 data sharding, 110-112 database access, 37 dot-bomb era, 462-463 exercises, 116-117 first web era, 456–457 general strategy, 96–98 monitoring, 350 PaaS services, 54 pre-web era, 454 queueing, 113-114 recommended reading, 489 in resiliency, 135 scaling out, 99-101 scaling up, 98-99 second web era, 467-468 small-scale computing systems, 470 summary, 116 threading, 112-113 three-tier web service, 76 Schedules continuous deployment, 238 oncall, 288–291 Schema changes, 234–236 Schlossnagle, Theo, 31, 172 Schroeder, B., 134 Scope in disaster preparedness, 317–318 Scraping attacks, 140–141 Scripting languages, 259–260 SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle), 184–185 SeaLand company, 62 Second web era (2003-2010), 465-469 Secondary resources in capacity planning, 372

Security in four-tier web service, 79 See, K. A., 249 Segments in lookup-oriented splits, 102-103 Selenium WebDriver project, 215 Self-service launches at Google, 159 Self-service requests, 154 Send to Repairs tool, 255 Senge, Peter, 147 Sensing and measurement systems, 345-350 Server trees, 16-17, 80 ServerFault.com, 102 Servers collections, 352 defined, 10 with multiple backends, 14–15 Service assessments, operational excellence, 407-410 Service delivery assessments, 442-445 build phase. See Builds deployment phase. See Deployment and deployment phase flow, 196 Service Deployment and Decommissioning (SDD), 404, 437–438 Service latency in cloud computing era, 471 Service level agreements (SLAs) Error Budgets, 152 load shedding, 139 monitoring, 334 oncall, 286-287 Service Level Indicators (SLIs), 334 Service Level Objectives (SLOs), 334 Service Level Targets (SLTs), 334 Service life cycle, 155 decommissioning services, 160 stages, 156–160 Service management monitoring, 334 Service-oriented architecture (SOA), 90-91 best practices, 91-92 flexibility, 91 support, 91 Service platform selection, 51–52 colocation, 65-66 containers, 60-61

Service platform selection (continued) exercises, 68 level of service abstraction, 52-56 machine overview, 56 physical machines, 57 resource sharing levels, 62-65 strategies, 66-68 summary, 68 virtual machines, 57-60 Service splits in AKF Scaling Cube, 101-102 Service testing in disaster preparedness, 313-314 Services assessing, 407-410 decommissioning, 160 defined, 10 installing, 219–220 restart, 34 SRE vs. traditional enterprise IT, 148–149 Session IDs, 76 7-day actives (7DA), 373 Sharding, 110-112 Shards, 16, 18–19 Shared oncall responsibilities, 183 Shared pools, 138 Shared state in load balancing, 75 Shaw, George Bernard, 387 Shedding, proportional, 230 Shell scripting languages, 259 Sheridan, T. B., 248 "Shewhart cycle," 172 Shifts, oncall, 164–165, 291–292 Shipping containers, 62 Short-lived machines, 58 Short-term analysis, 353 Shutdown in design for operations, 34-35 Sign-off for design documents, 281-282 Signal line crossover, 367 Silencing alert messages, 356–357 Silos, 174 Simian Army, 315 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), 351 Simple Queue Service (SQS), 86 Simplicity importance, 11 review workflows, 280 Singapore MAS requirements, 43

Single-machine web servers, 70–71 Site Reliability Engineering (SRE), 147-148 DevOps, 181 overview, 151-152 vs. traditional enterprise IT, 148-149 Site reliability practices, 151–152 Size batches, 178–179 caches, 108-110 SLAs (service level agreements) Error Budgets, 152 load shedding, 139 monitoring, 334 oncall, 286–287 SLIs (Service Level Indicators), 334 SLOs (Service Level Objectives), 334 Sloss, Benjamin Treynor Google Error Budget, 396 site reliability practices, 151 Slow start algorithm, 13 SLTs (Service Level Targets), 334 Small-scale computing systems, scaling, 470SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-phrased) criteria, 388 Smart phone apps for alerts, 293 Smoke tests, 192 SMS messages for alerts, 293 SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), 351 SOA (service-oriented architecture), 90-91 best practices, 91–92 flexibility, 91 support, 91 Soft launches, 148, 382 Software as a Service (SaaS), 51, 55–56 Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), 184–185 Software engineering tools and techniques in automation, 262-263 code reviews, 268-269 issue tracking systems, 263-265 packages, 266 style guides, 266–267, 270 sufficient code, 269-270 test-driven development, 267-268 version control systems, 265-266
Software engineers (SWEs), 199 Software failures, 128 crashes, 128-129 hangs, 129–130 queries of death, 130–131 Software load balancers, 136 Software packages. See Packages Software resiliency, 120–121 Software upgrades in design for operations, 36 Solaris containers, 60 Solid-state drives (SSDs) failures, 132 speed, 26 Source control systems, 206 SOX requirements, 43 Spafford, G., 172 Spare capacity, 124–125 load sharing vs. hot spares, 126 need for, 125-126 Spear, S., 172 Special constraints in design documents, 278Special notations in style guides, 267 Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-phrased (SMART) criteria, 388 Speed importance, 10 issues, 26-29 Spell check services, abstraction in, 24 Spindles, 26 Split brain, 23 Split days oncall schedules, 289 Spolsky, J., 121 Sprints, 189 SQS (Simple Queue Service), 86 SRE (Site Reliability Engineering), 147 - 148DevOps, 181 overview, 151-152 vs. traditional enterprise IT, 148-149 SSDs (solid-state drives) failures, 132 speed, 26 Stability vs. change, 149–151 Stack Exchange, 167 Stack ranking, 360 Stakeholders, 148

Standard capacity planning, 366–368 Standardized shipping containers, 62 Startup in design for operations, 34-35 States, distributed, 17–20 Static content on web servers, 70 Status of design documents, 277, 282 Steal time, 59 Stickiness in load balancing, 75 Storage systems, monitoring, 345, 362 Stranded capacity, 57 Stranded resources in containers, 61 Style guides automation, 266-267, 270 code review systems, 269 Sub-linear scaling, 477 Subscribers in message bus architectures, 86 Subsystems, linking tickets to, 263–264 Suggested resolution in alert messages, 355 Summarization, monitoring, 339 Super-linear scaling, 477 Survivable systems, 120 SWEs (software engineers), 199 Synthesized measurements, 347-348 System administration, automating, 248-249, 253 System logs, 340 System testing in build phase, 203 vs. canarying, 228-229 overview, 215 T-bird database system, 103 Tags in repositories, 208 Taking down services for upgrading, 225-226 Targeting in system integration, 250 Tasks assessments, 423-425 automating, 153–155 TCO (total cost of ownership), 172 TDD (test-driven development), 267–268 Team managers in operational rotation, 162 TeamCity tool, 205 Teams, 160–162 automating processes, 155 fix-it days, 166

focus, 165-166

Teams (continued) in Incident Command System, 326 oncall days, 163-164 organizing strategies, 160–166 project-focused days, 162-163 ticket duty days, 164-165 toil reduction, 166 virtual offices, 166-167 Technical debt, 166 Technical practices in DevOps, 184-185 Technology cloud computing era, 472 dot-bomb era, 460-461 first web era, 455-456 pre-web era, 453-454 second web era, 465-466 Telles, Marcel, 401 Templates design documents, 279, 282, 481-484 postmortem, 484-485 Terminology for Incident Command System, 324 Test-driven development (TDD), 267-268 Tests vs. canarying, 228–229 continuous deployment, 237 deployment phase, 215-216 **DevOps**, 186 disaster preparedness. See Disaster preparedness early and fast, 195 environments, 197 flag flips for, 232–233 Text-chat, 167 Text files for configuration, 33 Text messages for alerts, 293 Theme for operational teams, 165–166 Theory, recommended reading for, 488 Thialfi system, 86 "Things You Should Never Do" essay, 121 Third-party vendors design for operations, 48 oncall escalation, 298 30-day actives (30DA), 373 Thompson, Ken, 245 Threading, 112–113 Three-tier web service, 71-72 load balancer methods, 74

load balancer types, 72–73 load balancing with shared state, 75 scaling, 76–77 user identity, 76 Ticket duty description, 161-162 ticket duty days, 164–165 Time Management for System Administrators, 162, 256 Time savings, automation for, 253 Time series, 366 Time to live (TTL) value for caches, 108 Time zones in oncall schedules, 289 Timed release dates, 232 Timelines of events, 301 Timestamps in logs, 341–342 Timetables in capacity planning, 371 Titles in design documents, 277, 282 TODO comments in style guides, 267, 270 Toggling features, 39, 230–233 Toil defined, 244 reducing, 166, 257, 446-447 Tool building vs. automation, 250–252 Torvalds, Linus, 276 Total cost of ownership (TCO), 172 Tracebacks, 129 Tracking system integration, 250 Traffic defined, 10 surges, 138-139 Trailing averages, 13 Training disaster preparedness, 311–312, 315-317 oncall, 287 Transit ISPs, 83 Trends, monitoring, 333 Triggers, 353 Trustworthiness of automation, 249 Tseitlin, A., 315, 320 TTL (time to live) value for caches, 108 Tufte, E. R., 362 Tumblr Invisible Touch system, 218 Twain, Mark, 243 Twitter, 103 Two-way pagers, 293

UAT (User Acceptance Testing), 216 Ubuntu Upstart system, 34 Unaligned failure domains, 127 Undersubscribed systems, 53 Unified goals, 397–398 Uninterrupted time, 164 Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems, 34 Unit tests in build phase, 203 UNIX, recommended reading, 489 Unused code, bugs in, 270 Updating state, 18 Upgrades Blog Search, 226 overview, 156 software, 36 Upgrading live services, 225–226 blue-green deployment, 230 canary process, 227-228 continuous deployment, 236-239 exercises, 241-242 failed code pushes, 239–240 live code changes, 236 live schema changes, 234–236 phased roll-outs, 229 proportional shedding, 230 release atomicity, 240-241 rolling upgrades, 226–227 summary, 241 taking down services for, 225-226 toggling features, 230-233 Uploading to CDNs, 115 UPS (uninterruptible power supply) systems, 34 Uptime in SRE vs. traditional enterprise IT, 149 Urgent bug count, monitoring, 336 Urgent bug resolution, monitoring, 336 URLs for CDNs, 115 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Administration web site, 324 User Acceptance Testing (UAT), 216 User identity in three-tier web service, 76 User satisfaction, monitoring, 336 User-specific data, global load balancing with, 82-83 User stories, 189 User wait time, automation for, 253

Utilization, segmentation by, 103 Utilization Limit load balancing, 74 Vagrant framework, 219 Value streams in DevOps, 176 Varnish HTTP accelerator, 478 VCSs (version control systems), 265-266 Velocity in DevOps, 179 Vendor lock-in, 56 Vendors design for operations, 48 oncall escalations, 298 Version conflicts in containers, 60–61 Version control systems (VCSs), 265-266 Version-controlled builds, 191 Vertical integration, 64 Views in live schema changes, 234 Virtual machine monitor (VMM), 58-59 Virtual machines benefits, 58 deployment phase, 218 disadvantages, 59-60 IaaS, 52 I/O, 58–59 overview, 57 service platform selection, 66 Virtual offices, 166–167 Virtuous cycle of quality, 200–201 Visibility at scale, 10–11 Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 362 Visualization, monitoring, 333, 358–362 VMM (virtual machine monitor), 58–59 Voice calls for alerts, 293 Volatile data in OS installation, 219–220 Wait time automation for, 253 service delivery, 201 WAN (wide area network) connections, 83 Warmed caches, 106 Watchdog timers, 130 Waterfall methodology overview, 173-175 phases, 199 WAUs (weekly active users), 373 "Weathering the Unexpected" article,

320

Web "Hit" logs, 340 "Web Search for a Planet: The Google Cluster Architecture" article, 464 Web servers, single-machine, 70-71 Web services four-tier, 77-80 three-tier, 71-77 Weber, W.-D. drive errors, 133, 338 memory errors, 134 Weekly active users (WAUs), 373 Weekly oncall schedules, 288-289 Weighted RR load balancing, 74 Wheel of Misfortune game, 311-312 "When the Nerds Go Marching in" article, 316, 320 Whitebox monitoring, 346-347 Whitelists, 40-42 "Why Do Internet Services Fail, and What Can Be Done about It?" paper, 141, 171 Wickens, C. D., 248 Wide area network (WAN) connections, 83

Wilde, Oscar, 345 Willis, John, 180, 200 Willy Wonka, 195 Woolf, B., 87 Worker threads, 112 Workflows design documents, 280-282 DevOps, 176-177 Working from home, 166–167 Writes in updating state, 18 X-axes in AKF Scaling Cube, 99–101 X-Forwarded-For headers, 73 Y-axes in AKF Scaling Cube, 99, 101-102 Yan, B., 371 "You're Doing It Wrong" article, 479 Young, M., 188, 215 Z-axes in AKF Scaling Cube, 99, 102–104 Zero line crossover, 367 Zones, Solaris, 60 ZooKeeper system, 231, 363