PRAISE FOR ENDPOINT SECURITY

“By the time I finished Mark’s book, he’d completely changed my mind on a lot of things. Most important, I realized closed-loop endpoint security is not such the complex nightmare it seems. For embedded devices, where closed loop is not achievable at this time, he identifies what you can do to start closing the loop on these devices, identifies which controls are missing, and makes plausible conjectures about how the missing controls will fall into place.”

—Deb Radcliff, award-winning industry writer, computer crime and security

“Just what’s needed to cut through the hype surrounding NAC and its cousins.”

—Joe Knape, Security Engineer, a leading telecommunications provider

“This book moves beyond monitoring the network for security events and provides a thorough guide both the novice and experienced information security specialist can use to improve the security posture of a wide variety of endpoint devices.”

—Kirby Kuehl, IPS Developer, Cisco Systems, Inc.

“Network perimeter is no longer a solid demarcation line at the company’s firewalls. The perimeter appears to have disappeared, and the question is, ‘How can a manager secure the disappearing perimeter?’ Mark Kadrich has approached the subject of securing the network perimeter using a new paradigm. His revolutionary, yet simple approach will cause experienced security managers to wonder, ‘Why has this method not been discussed before?’ Mark provides a scientific methodology that any system administrator or security professional can quickly adopt and put into practice to secure their networks and endpoints.”

—Curtis Coleman, CISSP, CISM, MSIA
“Kadrich has successfully delivered an insightful and engaging perspective about the real world of information security and why effectively addressing endpoint security is so critical. Delivered with wit, humor, and candor, this book also serves as a wake-up call to those who provide information security products and as a viable roadmap for security professionals to better address both strategic security initiatives and the attendant issues du jour. Bottom line: This book should be considered essential reading for the layperson and the security professional.”

—Harry Bing-You, President, Anasazi Group Inc.
Endpoint Security
This page intentionally left blank
This book is dedicated to my father, John Richard Kadrich. He taught me how to take things apart, to ask questions when I didn’t know what the parts did, and put them back together with no leftover parts.
This page intentionally left blank
Contents

Foreword xix
Preface xx
About the Author xxvii

Chapter 1 Defining Endpoints 1
Précis 2
Special Points of Interest 3
Windows Endpoints 4
Non-Windows Endpoints 5
Embedded Endpoints 6
Mobile Phones and PDAs 8
Palm 9
Windows CE—Windows Mobile 10
Symbian Operating System 11
Blackberry 12
Disappearing Perimeter—Humbug! 12
The Perimeter Is Adapting 14
Fast-Moving Isn’t Gone 14
Endpoints Are the New Perimeter 15
Protecting Data 16
Key Points 16
Endpoints Are the New Battleground 16
Things Are Moving Too Fast for Humans 17
Chapter 2  Why Security Fails  19
Précis  20
Special Points of Interest  20
Setting the Stage  21
Vendors Drive Process  23
  Solutions Address the Past  24
  We’re Not Asking Vendors Hard Questions  25
Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Bots  26
  Today’s Malware: Big, Fast, and Dangerous  27
  High-Profile Failures  28
  What Is Being Exploited?  28
  Bots  29
Predictably Poor Results  31
  Spending More Than Ever  31
  We Have No Way to Predict Success  32
  We’re Still Being Surprised  33
Is Something Missing?  34
  What Are We Doing Wrong?  34
  Have We Missed Some Clues?  35
Key Points  36
  Malware Continues  36
  Vendors Aren’t Helping  37
  We Need to Ask Harder Questions  37
  Are We Missing Something?  37

Chapter 3  Something Is Missing  39
Précis  40
Special Points of Interest  41
Present Attempts Have Failed (Present Modeling)  42
We Don’t Understand Why  43
We Continue to Use Old Thinking  43
Define Network as Control Problem  46
  Map Control Modes to Technology  49
  Identify Feedback Paths  50
  Identify Metrics That Influence Other Metrics  51
  Map Business and Technology Paths  52
  Can We Build a Better Model?  53
Identifying Control Nodes  54
  Map Technology to Control Nodes  54
  Map Control Nodes to Control Modes  55
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th>Missing Link Discovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Précis</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Points of Interest</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Data Points Hint at a Solution</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Vectors</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Control Analysis</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endpoints Look Like the Link</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target of Malware</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable Network Access</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Needs to Happen</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Blocking and Tackling</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Host Integrity</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Access to the Network</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Access Control</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify a Minimum Level of Trust</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Only Trusted Systems</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remediation of Evil Things</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage Technology to Enforce Decision</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Points</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endpoint Is Key</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must-Leverage Technology</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Network Is Part of Proportional Solution</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>Endpoints and Network Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Précis</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Points of Interest</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture Is Key</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basics</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Old Is Old?</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compartmentalization Is Still Effective</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Do I Need a Forklift?**

- Upgrades Are Expensive 89
- A Less-Expensive Way 89
- Technology Promises and Futures 93

**Endpoint Support**

- Authentication 94
- Vendor Support 94

**Vulnerabilities and Remediation**

- Detection 97
- Vulnerability Tracking Services 98
- Vulnerability Management 98
- Remediation 100
- Penetration Testing 100

**Contractors and Visitors**

**Key Points**

- Know Your Architecture 102
- Three Basic NAC Models 102
- Select Vendors Carefully 103
- Don’t Believe in Futures 103
- Allowing Controlled Access Is Important 104
- VM Has a Place in the Process 104
- Technology, Process, and Closing the Loop 104

**Chapter 6 Trustworthy Beginnings**

**Précis**

**Special Points of Interest**

**Start with a Secure Build**

- Process Is Key 107
- A Safe, Well-Lit Place for Builds 108
- Need a Secure Baseline 110
- Control Your Source 110

**Include Some Tools**

- Software Firewall 111
- Antivirus 112
- Patch Management 115
- Intrusion Detection 116
- Intrusion Prevention 117
- Host Integrity 119
- Encryption 120
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closing the Loop</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Points</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rootkits</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Protection</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check the Logs</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Integrity</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Tools</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing the Loop</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 10 Linux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Précis</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Points of Interest</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedora</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xandros</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Applications</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Speech</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit and Finish</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Endorsements!</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Health Check</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Scan</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding Rootkits</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Files</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spyware and Malware</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking at the Logs</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardening the Operating System</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing Dunselware</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updating and Patches</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Control</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading, Writing, and 'Rithmetic</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Management</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 12  Embedded Devices

### Précis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Points of Interest</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Is an Embedded System?</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Are Embedded Systems?</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Should I Worry?</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Threats</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Health Check</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools and Vendors</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Security</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing the Loop</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We’re Surrounded</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Real Security</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPM Isn’t Helping Embedded Solutions</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing the Loop</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You Can Do Something</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moving forward. This is the direction that information security needs to move today to have an even more secure cyberspace tomorrow. Moving forward means that we need to continue to innovate and be creative. In the past, people have innovated when they believed that they had a better way of doing something and they thought that they could make a difference. This book is about security innovation—it’s about doing something new and making a difference.

We need new tools if we are to continue to secure our critical infrastructure from those who would do us harm. Today’s security world isn’t just about hackers and thieves. We have to add to that list organized criminals, spies, and even “hactivists.” A day doesn’t go by when some part of our critical cyber infrastructure isn’t under attack. Nation states are trying to steal trade secrets and military secrets. Organized criminals are constantly chipping away at our cyber security with the hope of breaking through to a system that will afford them the opportunity to do some real damage. Organized crime is also turning the personal information of everyone into a commodity that can be traded, exploited, and hedged.

How we innovate is going to be the key to success in this battle, and part of that innovation is going to involve looking at things a little differently than how we have in the past. We need to be more than one step ahead of our enemies.

We need to move forward and quickly.

Information security has often been considered something between dark magic and art for quite some time, whereas the underlying technology has been considered an
engineering discipline. The circuits and chips are all part of the world of electrical engineering; the software is generally considered the domain of software engineers.

Encarta¹ says that an engineer is

1. Somebody who is trained in a branch of professional engineering
2. A member of a unit of the armed forces that specializes in building and sometimes destroying bridges, fortifications, and other large structures
3. Somebody who plans, oversees, or brings about something, especially something that is achieved with ingenuity or secretiveness

I like these definitions because we are truly professionals. But, besides being professionals, we are also engineers. We don’t guess at what an answer might be. We analyze, we test, and when we believe that we have an answer, we act. We are the ones who are building the fortifications that protect our networks. We are the ones who work to destroy the logical fortifications that hackers create and hide behind while they attack our endpoints. We are the overseers and protectors of everyone’s privacy.

The fact that information security is a science and discipline in its own right is clear. We are beginning to see this reflected in the curriculums at colleges. Institutes of learning are providing master’s degrees and doctorate programs in information security. More people are learning our engineering discipline, and they are learning about the processes and tools that we use to secure cyberspace.

This book adds to that by explaining why things are presently not completely working, and it provides an engineering framework that explains how things could work better and with more predictable results. This book serves as another tile in the mosaic foundation of our engineering discipline. We have another powerful tool in our battle to secure cyberspace so that we can continue to enjoy it and benefit from all it brings us all.

—Howard A. Schmidt, CISSP, CISM
President & CEO
R&H Security Consulting, LLC

¹ Encarta World English Dictionary © 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Developed for Microsoft by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
That was some of the best flying I’ve seen to date—right up to the part where you got killed.

—Jester to Maverick in the movie Top Gun

**Introduction**

I suppose the thing that bothers me the most is this: We think that we’re doing great right up to the moment that the network melts down. Over the years, we’ve seen the number of security tools deployed on our networks increase to the point where we are completely surprised when our computing environments are devastated by some new worm. We then ask, “But how can this happen?” How can we be spending so much money to increase our security and still be feeling the pain of the worm du jour? And not just feeling this pain once or twice a year, *we’re feeling it all the time.*

To begin to answer this question, all you have to do is pop the word *vulnerability* into Google and sit back and wait. My wait took a mere .18 seconds and returned more than 69 million hits. Adding the word *hacker* added an additional .42 seconds but did have the benefit of reducing the pool of hits to a tad more than 4.2 million. More than 4 million pieces of information in less than half a second, and for free! Now that’s value.

So, getting back to our problem and looking at the results pretty much sums up our present situation. We’re buried under all sorts of vulnerabilities, and we’re constantly struggling to get on top of things. The problem of patching vulnerabilities is so big that
an entire industry has sprung up just to address the problem. The problem of analyzing and generating patches is so big that Microsoft changed its release policy from an “as needed” to a “patch Tuesdays.”

What are they really trying to address with the patches? You might think that it’s about protecting the endpoint, what we’re going to call endpoint security. This is a big topic of discussion. If we go back to Google and enter endpoint security, we get a little more than 2.5 million hits. We can reduce that stratospheric result by entering the word solution. Now we’re down to a much more manageable 1,480,000 hits.

So, what’s the point? The point is that a lot of folks are talking about the problem, but they’re doing so from the perspective of a vendor-customer relationship: a relationship that is predicated on them selling you something, a solution, and you paying them for it. The sheer motive of profit motivates vendors to produce products that they can sell. Marketing departments are geared toward understanding what people need and how to shape their product in a way that convinces you that they can fill your need. How many times have you gone back to visit a vendor Web page only to be surprised that they now address your problem? Look at how many vendors moved from PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) to SSI (Single Sign On) and finally to IM (Identity Management). Why? Because nobody was buying PKI because of the enormous expense; so, the marketing departments decided to switch names or “repurpose” their product. Now it was about “leveraging their synergies” with the multiple sets of user credentials and promises of vastly simplified user experiences. When that tanked, the marketing people invented IM. Yep, that’s what I said, they invented IM so they could once again distance themselves from a failed marking ploy and get more people to give them more money. Profit.

Ask any CEO what his or her mission is. If the CEO doesn’t reply, “To maximize shareholder value,” I’ll show you a CEO soon to be looking for a new job. It’s all about making sales numbers and generating profit. The more profit, the happier vendors and their shareholders are.

Now don’t get me wrong. Profit is a good thing. It keeps our system working and our people motivated. However, when the system of generating profit still refuses to produce a good solution, we must ask, “What is the real problem that we’re trying to solve here?” I don’t want to be part of the solution that says that the problem is how to maximize shareholder value; I want to be part of a solution that says that the problem was understanding a well-defined set of criteria that ensured that my enterprise and the information that it produced were safe, trustworthy, and secure.

But, for some strange vendor-driven reason, we can’t seem to do that.

This book makes the assumption that if we’ve been doing the same thing for years and we continue to fail, we must be doing something wrong. Some basic assumption about what we’re doing and why we’re doing it is incorrect. Yes, incorrect. However, we
continue to behave as if nothing is wrong. The pain is there, but now the problem is that it’s so ubiquitous that we’ve become desensitized to it. Like the buzzing that fluorescent lights make (yes, they do make an annoying sound) or the violence on TV, we’ve just gotten so used to having it around that we’ve come up with coping mechanisms to deal with it. Why hasn’t anyone asked why the pain is there in the first place?

This book does.

This book is different because it uses a basic tenant of science to understand what the problem is and how to manage it. This book uses a process control model to explain why securing the endpoint is the smartest thing you can do to manage the problem of network contamination and infestation. You’ll learn the differences between endpoints and how to secure them at various levels. We start with the basic tools and settings that come with each endpoint, move to those required tools such as antivirus, and progress to endpoints that have been upgraded with additional security protocols and tools, such as 802.1x and the supplicant, that enable a closed-loop process control (CLPC) model that enforces a minimum level of security.

**INTENDED AUDIENCE**

If you’re a security manager, security administrator, desktop support person, or someone who will be or is managing, responding to, or responsible for the security issues of the network, this book is for you. If your job depends on ensuring that the network is not just “up” but functional as a tool for generating, sharing, and storing information, you’ll want to read this book. If you’ve ever been fired because some script kiddie managed to gain access to the CEO’s laptop, you’ll want this book on your shelf. If you’re worried about Barney in the cube next to yours downloading the latest “free” video clip or the latest cool chat client, you want to buy this book and give it to your desktop administrator.

**INTENDED PURPOSE**

Many books describe how systems can be exploited or how vulnerabilities can be discovered and leveraged to the dismay of the system owner. If you’re looking for a book on hacking, this isn’t it. If that’s what you want to do, this is the wrong book for you. Give it to your admin friend; I’m sure he’ll need it after you go get your book on hacking. So, instead of the “hacker’s eye” view, this book gives you something a bit more useful: the practitioner’s eye view.
This book not only shows you what to look for, it also tells you why you should be looking for it. Yes, in some places it is somewhat of a step-by-step guide, but this book follows the axiom “give a man a fish and he eats for a day, but teach a man to fish and he eats for the rest of his life.” It’s a corny saying, but it gets the message across pretty well.

This book teaches you how to configure your network to be secure by addressing the issue at its root: the endpoint.

This book also takes a look at how we got here in the hopes that we won’t make the same mistakes again. Some of my reviewers took offense at Chapter 2 because I placed a portion of the blame for much of our situation squarely on the shoulders of the vendors that have been crafting our solutions. Yes, there are open source security tools, but they don’t drive our security market.

My hope is that when you have finished with this book you will understand why I believe a CLPC model works and how to apply it in your day-to-day security solutions.

**On Ignoring Editors:** “We” and “Them”

Editors are wonderful people. Many writers hate editors because they change the magnificent prose that the author has spent hours generating and refining. They reinterpret what the author has said and change the way the ideas are presented to the reader by changing the order of words or the use of tone. Some authors hate that. Not me. I’m a rookie, and I’m lazy. This is a bad combination for a writer, so I don’t mind some constructive criticism. Usually.

We is a simple word that when used by an author is supposed to imply that an intimacy exists between the author and the reader when the reader is engaged in the pages of the book. When an author says “we,” it’s supposed to mean that small group of people who the reader is tied to by the story line of the book—that is, unless the author isn’t using the second person as a construct. For instance, the writer could mean the “we” of the group exclusive of the reader (as in, “We hacked into this computer to find evidence of kiddy porn”). The reader is clearly not included in that group of “we.”

So, why have I brought this up at the beginning of a book about endpoint security? Because I made the mistake of using the word we throughout the book without explaining who “we” are each and every time. I thought it was obvious who “we” are.

My editor hated that. Politely, concisely, but nonetheless, she hated it.

Every time I got a chapter back, the word we was highlighted, and a polite note was attached asking who “we” referred to. “Mark, who is we? Please tell us who ‘we’ is.” Yep. Each and every time I used the word we, I got a highlight and a note. I was quite annoyed because I thought that it was clear. So, in an effort to find the final answer, I asked an
authority—my girlfriend, Michelle—to read some of the magnificent prose that I’d generated with the hope that she would agree with me. I should have known better. She asked, “Who is ‘we?’” Because this was not the response I was expecting, all I could do was look at her blankly and stammer, “Well, um, we is us!”

I felt like an idiot. Her look confirmed it. I was an idiot.

But “we” is us. We are the security people of the world trying to solve a huge problem. So, when I talk about “we” in this book, I’m referring to all of us who have tried, are trying, to create secure and reliable networks.

Now, I’m sure that “they” is going to come up next, so let me attack that here. “They” is them, those who are not us. Vendors are great “thems,” and it’s usually who I’m referring to when I say “them.”

So, we and us are the good guys, and they and them, well, aren’t.

**Why Are We Doing This?**

As I said earlier, if you’re doing something and it doesn’t work no matter how many times you try it, you must be doing something wrong, and it’s time to take a step back and make an attempt at understanding why. The old stuff isn’t working, and it’s time to try something new. Now, securing the endpoint isn’t a new idea. The methods to accomplish endpoint security are well known. However, we have done a great deal of research that seems to indicate that without considering the endpoint as a key component in your security program, as a point of enforcement, that you are doomed—yes, doomed—to failure.

Okay, doomed might be a bit harsh; but if you get fired because some weasel changes two bytes of code in a virus and it rips through your network, what’s the difference? You’re hosed, and hosed is just the past tense of doomed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to start by thanking Jessica Goldstein for listening to someone who probably sounded quite crazy when he talked about information security and security theory. Her wisdom, help, and guidance have been absolutely invaluable to the production of this book.

My friends on the reviewing team deserve an immense thank you for taking time out of their overcommitted schedules to review the drafts and to add comments and corrections. I had a great team that consisted of Dan Geer, Curtis Coleman, Rodney Thayer, Debra Radcliff, Joe Knape, Kirby Kuehl, Jean Pawluc, Kevin Kenan, and Harry Bing-You. When I started to rant, Dan and Rodney called me on it. Kirby and Joe pulled duty as my technical editors, making sure that my facts (and my references to NetBIOS) were correct. Curtis and Deb provided the view from the business side, asking questions that the executives would want to know the answers to. Jean, Kevin, and Harry got to review the fruits of their labors and provide the final comments.

I also want to thank my editors at Addison Wesley, starting with Sheri Cain (who did a great deal of the original editing), Jana Jones, Kristen Weinberger, Rommy French, Karen Gettman, Andrew Beaster, and Gina Kanouse. Kristen and Rommy are largely responsible for managing me and the project and making sure that I didn’t blow past my deadlines too far. Not to be left out, Keith Cline has to be the best copy editor on the planet. Thanks to him, it sounds like I actually passed my grammar classes.

I especially want to thank Howard Schmidt for his foreword to this book. Coming home to find the power to his house gone for the duration due to winter storms, Howard proved that a handheld device can do more than connect calls and play music.

Finally, I want like to thank my beloved girlfriend, Michelle Reid. She tolerated me while I cursed and worked and cheered me on when I was ready to quit. Michelle was also invaluable as my sounding board when I needed to explain something technical in plain English.

I owe each and every one of these people a debt of gratitude. They made this book immensely better through their contributions and insight. I couldn’t have done it without them.
For the past 20 years, **Mark Kadrich** has been a contributing member of the security community. His strengths are in systems-level design, policy generation, endpoint security, and risk management. Mr. Kadrich has been published numerous times and is an avid presenter.

Mr. Kadrich is presently president and CEO of The Security Consortium (TSC), a privately held company whose mission is to provide better security product knowledge to their customers. TSC performs in-depth testing and evaluation of security products and the vendors that provide them. As CEO and chief evangelist, Mr. Kadrich is responsible for ensuring that the company continues to grow successfully.

After the Symantec acquisition of Sygate Technologies, Mr. Kadrich took a position as senior manager of network and endpoint security with Symantec. His role was to ensure that the Symantec business units correctly interpreted security policy during their pursuit of innovative technology solutions.

Mr. Kadrich was senior scientist with Sygate Technologies prior to the Symantec acquisition. In his role as senior scientist, Mr. Kadrich was responsible for developing corporate policies, understanding future security trends, managing government certification programs, and evangelizing on demand. Mr. Kadrich joined Sygate through the acquisition of a start-up company (AltView) of which he was a founding member.

As a founding member of AltView, Mr. Kadrich was the principal architect of a system that scanned and contextualized the network, the endpoints on it, and built a detailed knowledge base. Eventually known as Magellan, the system could determine what
endpoints were on a network, how the network was changing, what endpoints were manageable, and if they were being managed.

As CTO/CSO for LDT Systems, Mr. Kadrich assisted with the development and support of a Web-based system used to securely capture and track organ-donor information.

Mr. Kadrich was director of technical services for Counterpane Internet Security. He was responsible for the generation of processes that supported and improved Counterpane’s ability to deploy and support customer-related security activities.

Mr. Kadrich was director of security for Conxion Corporation. As the director of security, his role was to plot the strategic course of Conxion’s information security solutions.

Prior to Conxion, he was a principal consultant for International Network Services (INS), for which he created a methodology for performing security assessments and interfaced with industry executives to explain the benefits of a well-implemented security program.

Mr. Kadrich is a CISSP, holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems from the University of Phoenix, and has degrees in Computer Engineering and Electrical Engineering (Memphis, 1979). Publications contributed to include TCP Unleashed, Publish Magazine, Planet IT, RSA, CSI, and The Black Hat Briefings.
I’m going to start this chapter by saying that a toilet has a better control system built in to it than our networks do. We understand how toilets work, what happens when they don’t, and most important, why they fail. I know it sounds strange, but there is a similarity here that can be exploited—we just need to understand the science behind it.

So, from the preceding two chapters, we know that something is clearly missing. We’re spending like mad, have no way to predict success (much less failure), and we still have the day-to-day problem of being attacked constantly.

I think part of the problem has to do with the fact that many people honestly believe that the network is too complex to understand and that “security” is the purview of hackers and vendors. I’ve actually had security people tell me in meetings that their network is too large, too distributed, and too complex to identify all the endpoints on it! On another note, I’ve actually had a hacker sit across from me in meetings, pound the table, and scream—yes, scream at me—“I can own your network!” I told him, “Great, I’ll need a weekly status report.” He didn’t seem to be a bit amused with my sarcasm, but using fear, uncertainty, and doubt to sell a service has never been a big hit with me.

I touched on the idea that we should use science to help solve our problems, and I really think that’s where the answer lies. We need to understand not just how, but why our networks operate the way they do. We’re being driven by the fire of the day, and we’re letting it drive our solution space. This is not how engineers do things, and for all practical purposes, no matter how we got here, we are engineers.

In this chapter, we explore the notion that the network and the endpoints that populate it is a problem that can be expressed as a closed-loop process control problem.
Like the system that controls the heat and power in your building, a closed-loop process control system establishes a “set-point,” such as the temperature, and works the system’s compressors, coolers, and heating elements to maintain the temperature within a few degrees of the set-point. I submit that our networks have no such control and that’s why we’re having the problems we have now.

The network folks have known about this kind of a solution for years. All critical systems, such as switches, routers, Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPSs), file servers, and even things like network-enabled power strips, all talk to a central system called a network management system (NMS). Properly instrumented systems talk with the NMS using a standard protocol called the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Using SNMP, systems report on their status, throughput, and general health. Details such as the number of packets passed, packets dropped, types of packets, temperature of the system, voltage level, battery life, routing protocols in use … well, you get the idea. All that information at their fingertips enables the good folks in the network operations center (NOC) to keep the network up and functional.

As things change, the information is reported to the NOC, where decisions can be made to set things right. Using the capability of an NMS-equipped network, administrators can make tactical decisions to address acute situations, or they can use the trending information for strategic purposes.

It wasn’t all that easy, but after many years of development, the network management people have successfully closed the loop, and our networks have become a commodity resource because of it.

We have no such solution in the security world.

**Précis**

I start our journey through this chapter by discussing a new way to look at our network and the security systems that inhabit it. As discussed in the previous chapters, our present methods aren’t working, so I discuss a new process that will help us understand how our network technology interacts with our security technology. Each system has a distinct role and a unique mode of operation. When we understand these control modes, we can begin to understand how they talk and who they talk to. Like the NMS systems, we need a way to leverage communications protocols in a way that gets us information quickly and reliably.

Now the hard part: We’re going to have to map our business processes to our security model. I say “hard” because when I’ve seen security fail, a good many times the reason it happened was because the security process didn’t mesh properly with the goals and
objectives of the business. We already know that if it’s a choice between better security and higher profits, security gets the axe.

At the end of the chapter, I cover one other issue: nomenclature and iconology. Every engineering discipline has its own language and way of expressing things pictorially. Security people have resorted to drawing pictures of walls to represent firewalls, and I think that it’s time we begin to standardize on some schematic representations that enable us to convey the complexity of our environments in a concise manner.

When these really easy things are complete, we can begin to understand what is missing in our present network, build a better model of our network, and understand how we can use the endpoints to control the amount of risk introduced into the enterprise.

**Special Points of Interest**

Any time you use a toilet to explain something, especially something as serious as the flaws in network security, you should expect the occasional snicker or guffaw. Many people have used “toilet humor” through the years to highlight elements of our society that we don’t like to discuss in public forums. From Frank Zappa to South Park, toilet humor has been used as a way of getting a message out. So it is with this chapter. So, I ask you to open your mind up a bit as you read this chapter, because I’m going to apply process control as a method to understand our present security problem, and I’m going to use a toilet to explain why it works.

As you might suspect, this isn’t a traditional application, and some people will question the notion that the network can be controlled in such a way. However, I believe that I make a good case for it and provide a solid foundation for my claims.

So, this chapter is about looking at things in a different way. By deconstructing why we’re failing, we can gain some insight into a method of understanding that will enable us to apply some “new to us” technology to our solution. I say that it’s “new to us” because lots of other folks have been successfully using control processes for quite a few years. As a matter of fact, we will examine one group of dedicated control computers in Chapter 12, “Embedded Devices.” (Remember when you read Chapter 12 that I said “successfully” here, not “securely.”)

I also suggest that you pay special attention to the section that maps process control modes to existing security; that section reveals some interesting traits regarding our security technology selections to date.

At the end of this chapter, you’ll find some proposed icons and symbology that allow us to reduce a large and complex network environment to a simple drawing. I believe that this type of schematic representation of the network and its security functions is crucial to helping us understand how to build better security systems.
PRESENT ATTEMPTS HAVE FAILED (PRESENT MODELING)

Many security-modeling tools are on the market, and it would be easy to spend a week listening to salespeople tell you how well their products work. These tools talk about “risk” and measure it as a product of endpoint vulnerability and the availability of a suitable exploit. If you have a vulnerability, and you have a way to exploit it, you have a risk that someone will use the exploit on your system. The message here is that if you eliminate the vulnerabilities on your network, you will be secure.

If you think about it, that’s not a bad way of attacking the problem if all you’re interested in is removing the known vulnerabilities from your network. Many networks can operate this way because they’re essentially “open” in the sense that no private data is being loaded on them and anyone can use their resources. The main concern is to keep them up and functional. Public libraries and universities operate in this mode, with the main difference being that a library owns the endpoints and a university hosts its students’ endpoints.

In the library, the users browse the Internet or do research. Some systems allow the use of office tools such as word processors and spreadsheets, but you use them at your own risk (because you’ll be leaving a copy of your data somewhere on the system). I wouldn’t be comfortable working on my diary at the local public library. To ensure that they’re as available as possible, libraries lock down their systems to the point where the user is unable to make any changes to the system at all. Users are not allowed to install software, remove software, and in some jurisdictions, browse to some sites on the Internet. I see this same type of installation at airports that have made computers available to pilots for flight planning.

At the other end of the spectrum, universities are not concerned with the security of the endpoint per se. Their concern comes from their charter regarding the network and their service level agreement with the students. The university’s mission is to provide a reliable network service to their users, and because the university doesn’t control the endpoint, they need a different way of managing the connections. They register users and the machine address that they’re working from. When they detect that a specific machine address is abusing the system, they cut it off.

The problem with this kind of an approach in a corporate environment is that it’s not practical to rely solely on vulnerability management. There are other threats to your network, such as trusted systems doing untrustworthy things.
WE DON’T UNDERSTAND WHY

I say that “we”1 don’t understand why security continues to fail because there are so many people saying that they have the answer. To me this means that

- We have many things wrong with our networks.
- We don’t understand what’s really wrong.
- Both.

I’m one of those people who believe that the answer is really closer to the last bullet than either of the first two. The fact is that there are so many things that are broken we haven’t taken the time to figure out what the real problem is. We spend our days trying to keep the barbarians from the gates, so we don’t have the time to really craft a reliable model of our security.

Various enclaves of thought bring up good reasons for our failure, such as we don’t measure enough things, but it boils down to the fact that there are lots of broken bits and no way to replicate a successful model.

In many ways, our world is like the world of the theoretical physicist—they’re trying to make sense out of a science that they can’t see. There are many theories, but little empirical evidence to back them up. The most fleeting of these is the unification of the three forces into a grand definition of the universe. They keep hammering away at it by devising experiments to prove some minute aspect of their theories. Each time, they get one more tiny piece of evidence that brings them closer to the truth. I’m sure that one day they will succeed in completing the grand model of the universe, but we don’t have that kind of time to wait for a security solution.

WE CONTINUE TO USE OLD THINKING

Present systems use vulnerability management models to understand what will happen when the network is attacked. You take your vulnerability information and pop it into the model, and out comes a result that tells you how much “risk” you have of suffering an attack.

Consider a simple model where all you want to do is control the temperature in your house. Using vulnerability management as the basis for your design philosophy, you would start by getting an idea of how much heat your house leaks. The simple way to do this is to have somebody point an infrared sensor at your house and take a picture of the hot spots. This is analogous to having your network scanned for vulnerabilities.

---

1 I covered what we refers to in the Preface; in case you’re confused about who we are, however, we refers collectively to all the security world.
Now that you have an idea of where the heat is leaking out, you can plug the holes using better insulation, or, if you’re cheap like me, clear plastic and duct tape.

According to the vulnerability management dogma, all you have to do to keep your temperature constant is to take periodic infrared snapshots of your house and fix the discovered leaks that might have popped up. The thinking is that there could have been a storm that tore the plastic over the windows, or worse, somebody could have opened a window and left it open. Therefore, this recurring analysis of your house is needed.

Before we move on, this is in no way intended to be a complete dissertation on the many ways one can model a network, but I believe that a brief description of the most popular methods will help lay the foundation for what we’re going to talk about later.

Threat modeling is a way to understand how an attacker would attempt to breach your security. You start by assessing your network and applications the way an attacker would. The first thing you do is scan your network using something like nmap to find out what endpoints are on your network and what applications are running. You then drill down into those applications using other tools to look for weaknesses. For example, your scan might have discovered a Web server that hosts a custom application that is supporting the HR benefits service. These types of applications are typically Web-based user interfaces with a database back end. The next step is to use a Web scanning tool such as nikto to find out whether the Web server and database are vulnerable to things such as cross-site scripting or Structured Query Language (SQL) attacks.

After you have a list of potential attack methods, you prioritize them based on the value of the target endpoint and the probability that an attack will succeed. Web servers buried deep in your enterprise behind firewalls and layers of networks are obviously less susceptible to external SQL hacking attempts than the systems in your DMZ. However, as you can see in Figure 3-1, anything in your DMZ is only one hop away from both sides of the security perimeter.

Conversely, application servers on your DMZ would be the first systems that you fix because they are the most exposed.

Now that you have this list, you can better understand how a hacker might penetrate your network.

If you’ve been in the security business for more than a week, you’ve heard the term risk analysis mentioned more than once. Risk analysis is another way of looking at your vulnerabilities and determining how they can be leveraged against your enterprise.

---

2 www.insecure.org/nmap/
3 www.cirt.net/code/nikto.shtml
4 Demilitarized zone. A special part of the network that provides limited access to specific applications to Internet users.
The difference is that the result is expressed as a probability, or, as we say, risk. Now, you’re probably saying that risk is a pretty subjective thing, and you are right. There are those who say if you have a vulnerability, it’s only a matter of time before it’s exploited, and they are right, too.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3-1** A simple pictogram that depicts how close the DMZ is to the Internet and how it can act as a bridge to the internal network.

**Warning**

You must protect this information in the strongest possible manner. It is a complete roadmap for an attacker; and if you lose it, you and your enterprise are in serious trouble. Think seriously about changing careers, because you’ll never get a job in technology again. On the other hand, you will be famous … for a short time.

There are other, more esoteric modeling techniques, but they all pretty much use the same vulnerability assessment methodology as their baseline foundation. The problem with this approach is that it is a reactive way of addressing the problem. Now before everyone starts filling up my inbox, the reason I say that it’s reactive is because from the time that the endpoint is deployed to the time that you do the scan, you have a vulnerability on your network.

If you start with a vulnerability-based approach, you need to ensure that every single endpoint hasn’t been compromised before you’re sure you’re more secure than when you

---

5 I had the word *dogma* here, but some found it too harsh.
started. Who’s to say that some evil person hasn’t already used one of your vulnerabilities to make a nice nest in your network somewhere? Not all hacks are apparent or obvious. As you will recall from Chapter 1, “Defining Endpoints,” some hacks are placed on a system for later usage.

Now please don’t run off and say, “Kadrich says that threat modeling and risk analysis are useless.” Far from it. What I am saying is that although they are indeed useful tools for helping you understand the security posture of your network, they are not the models that are going to solve our endpoint security problem.

However, I am saying that there might be another, more effective way to model the network. It might be a bit unconventional, however.

**DEFINE NETWORK AS CONTROL PROBLEM**

Security is about control. If we can’t control our environment, we can’t give any assurances that we are secure. One day it hit me: Our security problem is really a process control problem.

Allow me to digress for a moment and explain how I reached this conclusion. I had the unique experience of being an electrical engineer while I was also responsible for securing the network. It wasn’t uncommon for me to be designing a flight termination system for a missile while I was writing the security procedures for a classified network. (By the way, if you have a sleep-deprivation problem, I highly recommend either “Standard Practices and Procedures for the Classified Network Supporting the Theater High Altitude Area Defense System” or “Range Ordinance Safety Specifications for the White Sands Missile Test Range.” The last one is a little hard to get because they’re mimeographed copies, but if you can get it, it’s cheaper than Ambian!)

One of my other tasks was designing and installing a system that was designed to control the world’s second largest cryo-vacuum chamber. A special type of computer called a programmable logic controller (PLC) is used to interface with the valves, pumps, switches, and sensors that are needed to simulate a deep space environment in the cryovac chamber. The computer knows what the set-points are for atmospheric pressure and temperature and manages the devices to achieve that goal. Whereas the thermostat in your house is really a bimodal control (it turns the heater on and off), my cryovac system used a proportional process control methodology. The difference is that the only feedback to your home system is via the thermostat, whereas in a process control system numerous feedback paths help to achieve and maintain a specific set-point.

---

6 An ancient method of reproducing documents that used an ink drum and special typewriter-generated stencils to create many copies of the original document.
Why do we need these numerous feedback paths? Because there are time constants associated with each control action. For example, when your home thermostat detects that the air temperature is too low, it turns on the heater. The heater does its job of pumping hot air back into the house through the various paths provided by the air ducts. The temperature isn’t changed instantly, so the thermostat has to wait for the warm air to reach it. What that means is that by the time the thermostat reaches the correct temperature, the temperature by the heating ducts is actually higher. The rate of change, all things being equal, is fairly constant.

The net result of this bang-bang type of control is that the temperature in the house actually varies around the set-point by a couple of degrees. If you set the thermostat to 68 degrees, the temperature in the rooms typically oscillates around the set-point, as depicted in Figure 3-2. I know that this is going to sound a bit anal, but I have a recording thermometer in my bedroom that records the minimum and maximum temperatures (along with the humidity). With the temperature set in the hallway to 68 degrees, the temperature in the master bedroom, way down the hall, records a minimum of 66 and a maximum of 70 degrees, as shown in Figure 3-2.

![Figure 3-2](image)

Figure 3-2 Typical room temperature variance around the set-point as verified in the author’s master bedroom. Notice the time difference between when the heater turns on and when the room temperature begins to rise.

Now let’s look at something also close to you—your car. If you’re fortunate enough to have a car with an environmental control system, you’ll notice that the fan is running all the time. If you look closely, you’ll also notice that the air conditioner is running. The reason is that your car uses a proportional sensor that tells the computer what the temperature is and how much difference there is between it and the desired temperature or set-point. Your car actually mixes heat and cold to produce an output air temperature designed to keep the temperature inside the car where you set it. When the sun beats down on the windows, the system mixes in more cold air. When you’re scraping snow off the windshield, it mixes in more hot air.

This how they can sell cars with dual-zone environmental controls.
I brought this up at the beginning of the chapter, and I want to discuss one more device in your life that is a great example of proportional control: the toilet in your house. Yes, the toilet in your house has a proportional control mechanism in it. As you can see in Figure 3-3, the proportional control in your toilet is a combination of two valves and a float. One valve, the refill valve, allows water to refill the system at a rate based on the position of the float. The other valve, the control valve, or as it’s known at the hardware store, the flapper valve, allows the system to be “activated” and reset.

![Figure 3-3](image.png)

Figure 3-3 A toilet is a basic proportional control at work. The float controls the level of water in the system within a narrow band. The pressure regulator ensures that the float and valve fill the tank to the same level every time.

When the system has completed its designed task, the reset process kicks in, and this is where the proportional control takes over. This is a fairly critical process. If not enough water is put back into the system, it fails when we try to use it. If there’s too much water put into the system, we have another, arguably less desirable, failure mode to deal with. We need the same amount of water each and every time no matter how much water pressure there is. The float connected to the refill valve provides this type of proportional control. As the float rises in the tank, it gradually closes off the opening in the valve, thereby slowing down the rate at which the tank fills until the valve is shut off completely and the tank is full. The system has been successfully reset.

When you activate the system, the water rushes out cleaning the bowl, the flapper valve closes, the float drops, and the water is allowed to refill the tank. The metric for success is simple: You look into the bowl and either know success or hit the lever again. If the system fails, the failure is obvious … on many levels.
MAP CONTROL MODES TO TECHNOLOGY

Because we’re looking to proportional control technology to help us solve our problem, let’s look at the basic components of that solution.

As mentioned in the preceding section, the main component in this process is the proportional control, the central process that acts as the foundation for the system. In our previous examples, we found that this process was a combination of a sensor, such as the thermostat or the float, working in conjunction with an energy source, such as the heater or the water pressure. However, we know that in those systems there is always variation. Sometimes, the doors are open a bit longer, and the heater has to run longer to catch up. The result is that the temperature in the room doesn’t stay a constant 72 degrees. It varies around the set-point by a few degrees because there is nothing to tell it how fast the room is cooling down or how fast it’s heating up.

To address the basic shortcomings of a proportional-only control, two other “helper” processes make it easier for the proportional control to do its job. These control modes are derivative and integral.

The derivative process controls the rate of change. Using our toilet process in Figure 3-3, let’s say that the water pressure doubles in the system. Because the float and valve are designed to work within a fairly narrow band of water pressure, doubling the pressure causes the tank to fill up much faster and to a slightly higher level. This is because the float and valve can’t work fast enough to prevent the overflow. So, to control the pressure, we add a pressure regulator to the system to keep the water pressure that the intake valve sees at a normal level or slightly below it. What this means is that it will take a little bit more time to fill the bowl. What this also means is derivative controls lower the response frequency of the system. Instead of 60 flushes per minute, we might only get 50 flushes.

Unfortunately, using proportional and derivative controls means that it’s possible to have a stable system that still doesn’t hit the set-point, because the resolution on the sensors is not capable of seeing the potential error. Enter integration. The integral process adds the small errors over time to create an accumulated error that forces the system to once again correct itself.

Although a toilet is a great example of a proportional control, being a simple mechanical device it’s not a great example of either a derivative or integral control. (After all, I don’t know of anyone with a regulator on his or her incoming toilet water.) So, we’ll have to go back to our climate control example to explain integration.

Our system can sample the air temperature once every 20 seconds and in doing so discovers that the temperature is 71 degrees rather than 72 degrees. Because our thermostat has only a 2-degree resolution, we need a way to tell the system that we’re not really at our set-point if we want to exactly hit 72 degrees. Integration enables us to do this by
accumulating our error each time we collect a sample. We add the 1-degree difference to our feedback signal each time we take a sample. Eventually, our feedback signal exceeds our 2-degree threshold, the heater is forced back on, and the process starts all over again.

We can see that it takes all three control modes—proportional, integral, and derivative—to make a functioning PID control system. Derivative and integral functions are there to ensure that the set-point the proportional control works around is accurately achieved and maintained.

**IDENTIFY FEEDBACK PATHS**

The reason closed-loop control processes work is because they have identified what kind of feedback they need to close the loop. In the heating example, it’s the thermometer in the various rooms. In the toilet example, the feedback path is the float. As the water rises, it pushes the float and slowly closes off the valve.

The lesson here is that feedback can be either electronic or mechanical. We just need to identify what kind of feedback we need in our system. The good news is that an examination of our network reveals that it’s just one big potential feedback loop!

Each system that lives on the network produces logs and alerts, and most can exchange management messages. Authentication protocols are designed to provide a feedback loop such that failed attempts are reported as alerts and accounts can be locked out. This is a great example of an integration function because it takes a number of them over time to generate a change in the system.

Another good example of a basic feedback loop can be observed in 802.1x, an authentication protocol designed initially for wireless networks. 802.1x works in conjunction with a Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) server and can act as the backbone in a proportional control process because it can act as the valve that meters the amount of risk introduced onto the network.

An 802.1x-enabled network could query each endpoint that makes an attempt to join the network based on the following:

- Endpoint security state
- User authentication
- Resources accessed

A decision can be made to allow privileged access, decline all access, initiate a remediation plan, or allow restricted access. This is a bit more than present 802.1x authentication does, so we discuss how this works a bit later.

7 www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3580.html 802.1x RFC reference
**Identify Metrics That Influence Other Metrics**

You can find some good books on metrics, but by using our process control model, we can more accurately identify metrics that have a greater impact on our security. As you might recall from the previous discussion, time constants are associated with the control process. By adding controls, we’re essentially adding delay lines. These delay lines can help us by slowing down the spread of fast-moving worms, or they can hurt us by slowing down the remediation process. Without understanding where and what these metrics are, we have no way of planning for their usage or implementation.

If we make the assumption that no endpoint is going to join our network unless it meets a minimum level of trust, and part of that trust is based on the security posture of the endpoint, it stands to reason that one element that we must consider is patch level.

A good metric to examine at this point is as follows:

- How many endpoints need patches?
- How many patch levels are required per endpoint?
- How long does it take to deploy new patches to the enterprise?
- How has this changed since the last time we looked at it?

An answer to these questions would look something like this:

- 546 of 785, or 70% of endpoints require patches
- 50% require the latest patch (one level down)
- 5% require the latest two patches (two levels down)
- 2 days to approve a deployment
- 45 minutes to deploy to the enterprise
- 6% improvement over last week

Many people would measure the time it takes to load the patch file into the server and push it out to the endpoints, saying that anything else is out of their control. This would only be the tip of the iceberg, however.

Automated patch management systems do help a bit, but how many of the endpoints are truly being updated? Other, “long” time constant questions must be asked:

---


9. Actually, it’s 69.554%, but I rounded up for ease of comprehension.
• How long does the approval process take for the deployment?
• How long does it take to determine just how many endpoints are on the network?
• What percentage of the endpoints meets the requirements for the patch?
• What is the difference in deployment time between desktop endpoints and critical resources?

The difference here is that these questions usually generate long-time constant-based responses because a human has to get into the loop to provide an accurate answer.

**Map Business and Technology Paths**

This might sound like a no-brainer, but it’s a bit more complicated when you dig into it. We’ve learned to think of technology as complex mechanisms and sophisticated software. However, if you talk to an archeologist, the stone axe is also an example of technology. Ancient technology, yes, but technology nonetheless.

I think this opinion of what “technology” is, is the reason that we ignore a major type of technology that glues our present solutions together: people. When an organization engages in process reengineering, the first thing that they do is look at the relationship of people and how efficiently they exchange information in the quest to accomplish their mission. They ask how well they use the tools that have been afforded them and how many workarounds are in place to “fix” poorly engineered processes. All too often, we’re given new technology, but instead of reexamining how we can put this new technology to good use, we just use it to take the place of an older process without understanding how it can make the overall process better.

We do this with our security technology by trying to make it completely transparent. We overlay it on top of our existing processes in the hope that we can get some level of increased protection without disturbing the user community. The problem with that is that it obscures the human element of the security problem to both the practitioners and the users.

To counter this, we must examine our business processes with respect to security so that we can understand where the human paths are with respect to the technology paths. We must also be willing to push for change where needed. Our technology paths, both human and technological, need to be understood if we’re going to create a closed-loop process.

We need to be able to identify them and measure them to understand how much of an impact any delay is going to have on our security process. For example, your organization might have an automated patch management system that pushes patches and
updates out to thousands of endpoints in a few minutes. Because of this technology, you can stand up in front of the board of directors and tell them that your solution pushes updates to vulnerabilities in minutes! The problem is that in many organizations there’s a manual process of evaluating the patch, called regression testing, that can take as long as three months!

I’m not saying that you should eliminate regression testing. What I am saying is that for a process control solution to work, you must embrace the idea that you do have human feedback paths that can dramatically degrade your ability to respond to an attack. Regression testing is a business process that has a huge effect on security.

Another example of business and security intersecting is during the incident response cycle. Many people think of incident response as responding to an intrusion detection system (IDS) alert. What if I call the help desk and claim that I’m the CFO and I want my password changed? This is clearly an indicator that my network may be under attack and that something should be done, but how long will it take for this information to move through the business process of the help desk?

This means that we, as security people, need to understand our company’s business processes and instead of saying “no,” we need to find ways to say “yes” that encourage the business plan to grow and adapt to the changing business objectives. When new technologies appear, we need to understand how those technologies will impact our security and our ability to compete effectively in the marketplace. How many organizations, because the security group is afraid of it, haven’t deployed wireless technology regardless of its demonstrated ability to simplify deployment and reduce associated costs?

Who do you think is going to win in the marketplace when the market gets tough and margins get small? The organization afraid to use technology because their security process can’t handle it, or the agile group that understands that security and business processes can work together?

**Can We Build a Better Model?**

I believe the answer to this question is a resounding yes. I think that most of what we need is already here; we just need to connect it a little better than we have in the past.

The answer lies in identifying how we allow risk to be introduced into our networks and setting a low limit that prevents endpoints that don’t meet our criteria from joining. That instantly begs the question of how to define risk. Well, I think that’s the wrong question to ask. I think we need to ask this: What is an acceptable risk? When I go car shopping, I know what I don’t want. I don’t want a car that’s so old that it doesn’t have air bags and antilock brakes. I don’t want a car that has broken windows and bald tires. I don’t want a car that has a torn-up interior or rusty fenders.
I know that I can have a mechanic go over the car with a fine-tooth comb, but that won’t eliminate the possibility of a flat tire or an exploding engine later on. I’ve reduced my risk by examining the car prior to buying it, but I still run the risk that something could happen later.

What I have done by taking the effort to examine the car is begin the process of engendering trust. By setting a minimum level of capability, I have enabled myself to trust the system—in this case, my car—to behave in a manner acceptable to me. I believe that this is also possible on our networks. By setting a minimum level of capability, we can set a minimum level of trust in the systems that join our network.

### Identifying Control Nodes

Now that we have a new way of approaching the problem using closed-loop process control, all we have to do is identify those parts of our network that can assist with the basic control modes associated with proportional, integral, and derivative controls.

### Map Technology to Control Nodes

A control node is a place where we can enforce a condition or extract data for the purposes of managing the process. In our networks, we have multiple devices that we can easily consider control nodes, including the following:

- Switches
- Routers
- VPN gateways
- DHCP servers

These are great examples of control nodes because they all have the capability to decide what happens to the traffic that passes through them. In addition, they all can report data that enables us to make other decisions in support of either derivative or integral control functions.

From a basic security perspective, we also have the following:

- Firewalls
- IDSs (intrusion detection systems)
- IPSs (intrusion prevention systems)
- AV systems (antivirus systems)
Map Control Nodes to Control Modes

When we consider their roles in our PID-based solution, we can see that most of these systems, with a few exceptions, fall under the category of derivative controls. Their purpose is to help us understand just how fast things are changing and to give us notice that we might have to deal with an overshoot of our expected status quo. I say “overshoot” because it’s not often that our systems notify us that nothing is happening.

As mentioned previously, we can use some log information to provide an integration function. Three failed login attempts and the endpoint is locked out for a period of ten minutes is a good example of this function.

The exceptions I was referring to earlier are firewalls and VPN concentrators. Firewalls and VPN concentrators can also function as proportional controls if their operation is tied to some action such as limiting traffic loads rather than the simple bimodal yes or no. However, some people are not comfortable with the idea that an automated system can change the configuration of the network. Failures have occurred, and money has been lost, so now there is usually a human in the loop.

In Table 3-1, you can see how the different types of technology map to the four control modes. Devices can be classified as proportional, derivative, or integral. Some devices are simple bimodal on or off and are called bang-bang controls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Proportional</th>
<th>Integral</th>
<th>Derivative</th>
<th>Bang-Bang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firewall</td>
<td>Perimeter control</td>
<td>Not alone</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIDS</td>
<td>Intrusion trigger</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIDS</td>
<td>IRP trigger</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPS</td>
<td>Attack prevention</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPS</td>
<td>Network protection</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAV</td>
<td>Server AV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAV</td>
<td>Endpoint AV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Router</td>
<td>Traffic control</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch</td>
<td>Traffic control</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN</td>
<td>Privacy enforcement</td>
<td>Not alone</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHCP</td>
<td>Network provisioning</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continues
Now, just to confuse things a little, all these systems also function as bang-bang controls, because they make binary decisions about what to do with traffic. Either it passes traffic or it doesn’t. I think it’s this dual-mode operation has masked their possible contribution as control systems.

**Quantify Time Constants**

A time constant is just the amount of time it takes to complete any specific part of the process. If it takes one minute to fill the toilet bowl prior to a refush, the time constant for that process is one minute. If you try to recycle the process before the time constant completes, you wind up with less than satisfactory results. To have an effective process control system, you must understand these time constants; otherwise, you risk creating a system that oscillates wildly around the set-point.

The hard part is identifying them in your process and accurately measuring them. This is part of what the metrics people are trying to do. The problem is that each enterprise has a different set of requirements and dependencies, and therefore the same process in a different environment has different time constants associated with it.

Let’s look at the incident response cycle again. Every enterprise that has a decent security program has an incident response plan. It’s triggered when something evil happens and an alert is sent “somewhere.” Maybe the IDS has seen a suspicious packet stream and has sent out an alert, or perhaps the help desk has too many trouble tickets complaining of slow systems. In many cases, this alert is sent to the security group. Someone with a pager gets the alert and either runs to a computer or, if that person is off-site, makes a phone call. That call can be to someone close to the system or it can be to the data center. After the call has been made, the process of evaluating the event kicks into gear, and the decision process takes over:

- Is it a false positive?
- Is it a truly evil event?
• Is it internal or external?
• Are we hemorrhaging data?
• Can we recover?
• Do we need to call law enforcement?
• How much time has elapsed since the initial alert?

For most organizations, this time constant will probably be on the order of minutes.

By deconstructing the processes, you can discover how long each individual part of it takes, and thus identify where you should put your effort to improve it. Each breakpoint in the process is an opportunity to gather some information about the state of the process.

We can move from the alerting entity to the notification channel, through the analysis process, and into the resolution process, tracking the time it takes for each. For example, we examine our analysis portion of our hypothetical process and discover that the notification process takes more than 15 minutes. Clearly, 15 minutes is not a reasonable time to be notified that a critical condition exists on your network.

Another benefit of this effort is to identify exactly where the various control nodes in your network are, be they technological or human based. You now have a list that you can use or pass on to someone else. What you’ve done is move from a talent-based response to a role-based response that doesn’t pigeonhole you as a resource. You’ll also discover that the human-based process components are the ones with the long time constants and, by the way, the ones with the lowest level of repeatability and reliability.

**Control Paths and the Business Processes**

You might be wondering what exactly a control path is. A control path is the path that the control and feedback signals take to change the set-point of the system. I believe that you need to map your control paths to the business processes to understand where the cracks in the security process are. Understanding how control signals are generated and understanding where they go, and possibly don’t go, can prove critical to your success. This can also help you understand where a little bit of automation can make your life a lot easier (and identify some important metrics).

Let’s start by looking at some of the information that passes through a control path. We’ll call this our control signal. Perhaps that will help us understand how the business
process affects our control process. Because we’re talking about security, let’s define a control signal as anything that is security relevant, such as the following:

- Failed login attempts
- Firewall rule violations
- IDS alerts
- New user requests
- User termination
- New software requests
- New protocol requests
- Software decommissioning
- Network access requests

Next, we have to ask ourselves how much of this information is made available to us by our control nodes as they were defined in the previous section, and how much is made available to us by the business process. As you can see, things such as firewall rule violations and IDS alerts are more like spam, because they’re “made available” to us all the time in large numbers. However, the rest of them are made available to us through a business process that may or may not include the security group in the notification path.

The other sad part of this story is that all these processes are open loop—that is, there is no notification that they were completed, denied, or simply disregarded. How do you manage network access requests? Does a verification process occur prior to the decision to allow access? In most cases, the answer is yes, but only for that particular moment. After access has been granted, there is little follow-up to ensure that the system remains compliant with policy, so our control process breaks at the point where we hand the user his or her system.

Another good example starts with a question: Where do login errors go, and how are they processed? A large number of failed logins can indicate that someone is trying to break into your network. If that’s the case, the behavior of the network should change in a way that attempts to eliminate those login attempts. In many cases, low-frequency failures are not noticed because they don’t trigger the “three failed attempts per hour” rule. This kind of low and slow attack can easily be automated, but is difficult to detect. An interesting metric that you can use as a control signal is the number of failed login attempts compared to the number of successful attempts per user over a longer period of time (for example, a day). You can then compare that number to the preceding day and look for trends.
Completing the Picture

I’m starting this section with some questions: How do we capture the configuration information of our network and processes and do it in a way that enables us to share that information with other professionals? How do we gather all this process control information and represent it in a meaningful way? I suppose we have to start by asking this: What does our network look like?

Some people subscribe to an organic analogy and say that the network is a living organism. Others think that the network is better envisioned as a biosphere. I suppose people are comfortable with organic analogies because it’s easier to identify with something that you’re familiar with. We’re organic, so why shouldn’t our view of all things be an organic one? The short answer: because the random nature and boundless complexity of life simply doesn’t exist in our networks. Our networks are designed by humans, built by humans, used by humans, and abused by humans. It stands to reason that humans should be able to understand and document them in a reasonable fashion.

Because I’m an engineer, I approach this from an engineer’s perspective. Simply put, our networks are really just bits of electronic technology connected by electronic technology into larger and larger islands of electronic technology. The problem is that the islands have gotten so large that it’s difficult, if not impossible, for the biological humans who manage them to visualize them.

Another problem is that to properly describe our problem, we need to be able to visualize it so that we can discuss it and share our thoughts with others. Therein lies another problem: Security people have no common nomenclature or iconology to describe our problem. Sure, we have firewalls and IDSs, but how do you draw a picture of it? Even the networking folks resort to drawing pictures of switches. Each vendor has their own clip art libraries that work with programs such as Visio that allow engineers to render network diagrams in great detail. However, no standard set of schematic representations exists.

In our world, if you put 5 people in front of a white board and tell them to draw a picture of a 22-user network that has a firewall, a DMZ, and 25 endpoints of which 20 are user systems, 3 are servers, and 2 are the firewall and switch, you’ll get 5 different drawings! We’ve all been there, in a meeting, and someone draws a firewall as a box with some cross-hatching in it to represent the bricks. Or, they draw a wall and draw flames over it to signify a firewall. Then come the boxes and the notes that are supposed to add clarity to it. When you come back to the white board the next day, you have to spend some time reinterpreting the drawing. What if you get it wrong? “Was that 25 users and 22 endpoints, or was it 25 endpoints and 22 user systems?”
What I’m proposing is that we begin by defining some basic terms and icons so that we can talk about the process from a high level and drill down into more detail as needed. I’ll start by saying that there are two basic kinds of endpoints: sources of data and sinks for data. This isn’t an uncommon notion. If you have DSL, you probably have aDSL, which is Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line. The aDSL protocol provides for faster download speed than upload speed because the assumption is that you’re going to be sending things such as URLs and requests for email while receiving lots of data in Web pages and your now-abundant email.

Now that we have a basic endpoint definition, we need to add some control. Routers and switches essentially provide data routing services, whether that service occurs at Layer 2 or Layer 3. We also need a security gateway, a device that compartmentalizes the network into two or more trust domains. A firewall is a good example of this type of device. Let’s add some networking icons. Figure 3-4 shows how we can start.

Occam’s razor principle states that simple is better, that the simple answer is probably the correct one. In our security world, things start to fail when they get overly complex, so the goal is to keep our nomenclature and iconology simple. But, having a workable set of icons is only half the problem. We need a way to connect them that helps us differentiate between the different paths of information and control. Looking at Figure 3-5, we see that we need three basic types of traffic: network, infrastructure, and process. So, now we have the basic elements that we need to be able to draw a network. Putting it all together, our 22-user network would look like our drawing in Figure 3-6. You can see that we added one additional icon: a diamond that represents the number of users on the network. (Some people have suggested to me that users should be represented by a rock, but I think a diamond is more appropriate because it signifies the creative potential that many users truly represent.)

Now that we have the basic network elements, we need to add the process control modes to our lexicon. I selected the icons in Figure 3-7 because I believe that they quickly and easily represent their function. The up arrow in the integration function shows the accumulation of error; the horizontal arrow depicts a stable set-point. Just to

---

**Figure 3-4** Basic security and networking diagram icons. Note that a source of data points toward the network; a sink of data points away. Sources and sinks of data can combine as gateways or peer connections.
confuse things a bit, the device that performs the derivative function is also referred to as a differentiator (and thus the downward arrow as depicted in Figure 3-7). A bang-bang control is pretty much on or off, so I thought a simple switch would do nicely.

We have some good schematic icons, but we still haven’t identified the summation or correlation points. I think that the icons in Figure 3-8 will work well because they visually represent their function. Okay, maybe the bull’s eye is a reach for the correlation function, but I think it still works.

![Schematic icons](image1)

**Figure 3-5** Path designations allow us to tell the difference between our network data, the infrastructure management data, and our control path data.

![Schematic drawing](image2)

**Figure 3-6** A complete schematic drawing of our 22 users, 23 endpoints, firewall, switch, and the Internet. Note that the DMZ network is empty.

![Control modes icons](image3)

**Figure 3-7** Icons for the four basic control modes. A differentiator provides the derivative data, and the integrator provides integral data for the summation function.

![Summation and correlation icons](image4)

**Figure 3-8** Summation and correlation functions. Summation adds the PID signals to produce an output, whereas correlation provides either integral or derivative signal outputs.
Note that correlation and summation are *not* the same process. Correlation examines data looking for trends; summation adds control inputs in an attempt to provide a master control.

Now that we have some basic tools, let’s look at a couple of drawings that pull it all together.

Examining our climate control problem and using the schematic icons outlined in this section, a drawing of our climate control system looks like Figure 3-9. Notice that the room is depicted as a sink and that it’s between the thermostat and the control process.

![Figure 3-9](image)

We need to discuss one more process control element: gain. Gain is the multiplier that acts to increase or decrease the impact of our control inputs. Think of it as leverage in the system. In this case, the gain of the system is fixed by the size of the room. If the heater capacity remains the same, and we increase the size of the room, it will take longer for the heater to move the temperature to the desired set-point. The implication here is that the gain of the system has been reduced.

So, now that we have a method and some nomenclature for depicting our control process, let’s apply it to our network. Adding to the 25-user network we defined in the early paragraphs of this chapter, we can make some basic assumptions about our network:

- We have a system for probing our network for vulnerabilities.
- We have some way of identifying intrusion attempts.
- Gain is going to be controlled by how many systems we have.

Looking at Figure 3-10, we can see that our network has the following:

- 25 registered users
- 28 endpoints in total
• 3 server endpoints
• 22 user endpoints
• 1 firewall
• 1 probe system
• 1 security information manager
• 1 IDS
• 1 switch (infrastructure)
• 1 connection to the Internet

Looking at this in light of our control nomenclature, we have the following:

• 24 sinks (user endpoints, IDS, SIM)
• 4 sources (servers and probe)
• 1 integrator (IDS)
• 1 differentiator (probe)
• 1 correlator (SIM)
• 1 bang-bang (firewall)
• 1 control device

It becomes pretty obvious that we’re missing a few critical components. The control outputs from the probe, the IDS, and the SIM go to a summation function, which isn’t defined! We need to understand what this missing mystery function is. It’s clearly not the
SIM, because the SIM is yet another provider of feedback into the system. The SIM doesn’t affect the security set-point of the system, and the purpose of the summation process is to provide a control input. However, a great deal of valuable endpoint-related information gets sent to the SIM. Perhaps some of this information, in conjunction with something new, can help us identify this missing summation process.

**Key Points**

The old way of modeling networks—that networks are living organisms that can’t be controlled—is based on thinking that doesn’t take into account basic science and engineering principles. Unfortunately for us, this kind of thinking has controlled our network designs and management techniques for too long.

**We Need a Better Idea**

The fact that we’re not gaining any ground in the security world tells us that we need a better idea. We need to understand how our systems interact and how the information that they produce can be used to our advantage. We need to apply basic engineering control principles to our network to control how risk is introduced so that we can predict how our networks are going to react when they are attacked.

**Trust vs. Risk**

Although risk is an important factor in determining the overall state of security for a network, perhaps a better way of looking at individual endpoints should be based on trust. By setting a minimum level of configuration for each endpoint, you begin to build the element of trust into each system. You trust that a system will behave in a pre-described manner when faced with security stress.

**Process Control Helps Build a Model**

The basic engineering principle that can help us is based on process control technology. Process control technology uses the PID algorithm to ensure that a predetermined set-point is achieved and maintained within identified limits. All the devices on the network have a role, and that role can be associated with some form of control. By using this new model, we can more accurately set an acceptable limit of risk, build trust, and thus protect our networks more effectively. In addition, we can
identify those elements of technology that are wasting our time and budget, because we will more easily understand their role and contribution in the solution.

**Business Processes Cannot Be Ignored**

As you map control processes to control modes and feedback paths, you must remember to look at the business process that they affect (and vice versa). The human element plays a large role in those processes and in many cases is the most unreliable or variable element within it.

**We Need a Common Language**

Like all other engineering disciplines, the information security discipline needs a universal set of icons and nomenclature that allows security professionals to exchange information effectively and reliably. Our present system of scratching out bricks with fire on them and clouds representing networks and the associated endpoints isn’t working.

The set of icons presented in this chapter form the foundation for a schematic representation of our security elements and their associated control processes.
Index

Numerics
802.1x authentication protocol, 50
 as enforcement policy, 83
 on Linux machines, 246

A
access control, 127
 for Linux machines, 234-240
 network access control (NAC), 75-77
 enforcing trust, 79
 remediation with, 78-79
 verifying trust, 77-78
access points (APs), 6
account lockout policy, setting, 156
Ad-aware, 150
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), 139
administrator account, changing name of, 158
ADSs (alternate data streams),
 finding, 146
adstools, 146
AGC (Apollo Guidance Computer), 286
alternate data streams (ADSs),
 finding, 146
anonymous FTP 245
anti-spyware programs, 150-151, 193-195
antivirus (AV) software, 112-114
 for handheld devices, 279
 on Macintoshes, 205-206
 on Windows machines, 158-159
Apache, 245
Apollo Guidance Computer (AGC), 286
Apple Remote Desktop (ARD), 203-204
application rootkits, 143
application security for handheld devices, 267
browsing, 268
e-mail, 267
instant messaging, 268

applications
on embedded systems, 297-298
enterprise management applications for Linux, 215-216
network applications, securing on Linux machines, 244-245
Office applications on Linux, 213-214
security settings on Linux machines, 240
Office applications, 240-242
remote management, 242-243
security settings on Mac OS X machines, 200-201
security settings on Windows machines, 164
Internet Explorer, 165-166
NetMeeting, 166
Software Restriction Policy (SRP), 164-165
terminal services, 167
Windows Messenger, 167
Windows Update, 167-168

threat vectors, 125, 132-133
chat applications, 133-134
peer-to-peer networking (P2P), 132-134

APs (access points), 6
architecture
concentric architecture, 84-85
importance of, 82-83
zone-based architecture, 84-86
ARD (Apple Remote Desktop), 203-204
ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization), 139
ATMs (automated teller machines), 7
attack vectors, 70
attacks (viruses). See also security failures; vulnerability management
endpoints as targets of, 71-72
in executable files, 130
losses from, 26
number of, 4
removing from Mac OS X, 193-195
speed of, 27-28
attrib, 173
authentication, 94
automated teller machines (ATMs), 7
automatic updates, enabling, 159-160
autoplay, disabling, 161
AV (antivirus) software, 112-114
for handheld devices, 279
on Macintoshes, 205-206
on Windows machines, 158-159
B
backing up Registry, 147
bang-bang controls, 55
Bank of America (BoA) example (security failures), 28
Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND), 244
BES (Blackberry Enterprise Server), 261
bimodal controls, 55
BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain), 244
Blackberry, 261-262
    endpoints, 12
    security features, 265-266
Blackberry Enterprise Server (BES), 261
Blacklight, 143
blind scanning embedded systems, 292
Bluefire, 276-277
Bluetooth, 8
    on handheld devices, 270-273
BoA (Bank of America) example (security failures), 28
Bonjour, 200
bots, 29-31
browsers, security on handheld devices, 268
build environment, creating secure, 106
    isolation of build network, 108-109
process, 107
secure baseline, importance of, 110
source code control, 110-111
build network, isolation of, 108-109
built-in operating system protections, 126-129
built-in operating system weaknesses, 129-132
business cycle of vendors, 23-24
business processes, mapping
    to control paths, 57-58
    with technology processes, 52-53
C
CAN (Controller-Area Networking), 288
capabilities (Symbian), 260
CardiGSM device, 298
CardSystems Solutions example (security failures), 28
case studies
    CodeRed virus, 306-308
    DNS server attacks, 312-313
    internal network access, 308-309
    similarities in, 314
    system administrator failure, 310-311
CAVE (Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption), 274
CD-ROM/DVD player, disabling autoplay, 161
cell phone protocols, 273-275
cell phones. See handheld devices
Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE), 274
certificate rules, 165
chat applications, 133-134
  security on handheld devices, 268
Check Point Integrity, 96
chmod command, 239-240
CIP (Common Industrial Protocol), 289
Cisco, 82
Cisco Network Admission Control
  (CNAC), 171
ClamXav, 206
classification of data,
  compartmentalization by, 87
closed-loop process control (CLPC),
  40, 315
architecture, importance of, 82-83
contractor Internet access, 101-102
DHCP, 89-93
endpoint support, 94
  authentication, 94
  hardware vendors for, 94-96
enforcement policies, 83
  802.1x as, 83
  compartmentalization as, 84-88
for handheld devices, 281
hardware upgrades, expense of, 89
in Linux environment, 249-250
in Mac OS X environment, 207
penetration testing, 100-101
remediation, 100
technology, effect of, 93
vulnerability assessment (scans), 96-97
vulnerability detection, 97
vulnerability management, 98-99
vulnerability tracking services, 98
in Windows environment, 171-172
CNAC (Cisco Network Admission
  Control), 171
CodeRed virus case study, 306-308
collision attacks on hash functions, 131
collusion, 22
Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), 289
Common UNIX Printing System
  (CUPS), 231
Common Vulnerability and Exposures
  (CVE), 98
communication protocols in SCADA
  (Supervisory Control and Data
  Acquisition) systems, 290
CommWarrior.a virus, 264
compartmentalization as enforcement
  policy, 84-88
complexity, reliability and, 35-36
concentric architecture for
  compartmentalization, 84-85
content protection on Blackberry
  devices, 266
contractors, Internet access, 101-102
control modes, mapping control nodes to,
  55-56
control nodes
- identifying location of, 57
- mapping technology processes to, 54
- mapping to control modes
  - (proportional, derivative, integral), 55-56
control paths, mapping to business processes, 57-58
Controller-Area Networking (CAN), 288
correlation, 62
cost of embedded systems security, 31-32, 302
CrossOver Office, 214, 241
crucialads, 146
cryptography, 105
  - hash functions, 130-131
CSI/FBI survey, 26
CUPS (Common UNIX Printing System), 231
CVE (Common Vulnerability and Exposures), 98

D
data classification, compartmentalization by, 87
data protection, 16
default user accounts, removing, 234
delay lines, 51
deleting. See also erasing
  - default user accounts, 234
  - guest accounts, 234
rootkits, 144
spyware, 150-151, 193-195
unneeded programs, 229-230
viruses from Mac OS X, 193-195
demilitarized zone (DMZ), 44n
deperimeterization, 2, 12, 15
derivative process controls, 49-50
  - mapping control nodes to, 55-56
desktop antivirus (AV) software, 113
development history of Mac OS X, 178-179
DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), 89-93
diagramming network configuration, 59-64
digital rights management (DRM), 121, 193, 242
digital signatures. See signatures
dir, 173
disabling
  - autoplay, 161
  - Dr. Watson, 162-164
  - guest access in Windows, 154
  - NetMeeting, 166
  - terminal services, 167
  - Windows Messenger, 167
disallowed mode (Software Restriction Policy), 164
Disk Utility, 185
DMZ (demilitarized zone), 44n
DNP3 protocol, 299
DNS server attacks case study, 312-313
Dr. Watson, disabling, 162-164
Draper, Charles Start, 286
DRM (digital rights management), 121, 193, 242
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), 89-93

E
ECU (Engine Control Unit), as embedded system, 288
Egghead example (security failures), 28
email security on handheld devices, 267
embedded system endpoints, 6-8
embedded systems
  applications on, 297-298
defined, 286
networking capability of, 289-291, 298-299
scanning, 292-297
security systems needed, 300-302
security tools/vendors, 299
TPM (Trusted Platform Module), 299-300
types of, 287-289, 301
vulnerabilities in, 291-292
enabling
  automatic updates, 159-160
  encryption, 161-163
network access, 72
encryption
  cell phone protocols, 273-275
  enabling, 161-163
  tools, 120-121
endpoint support, 94
authentication, 94
hardware vendors for, 94-96
endpoints
  as attack vectors, 70
  Blackberry endpoints, 12
  bots on, 29-31
defined, 2
  embedded system endpoints, 6-8
  as evidence, 139
  mobile phones as, 8-9
  non-Windows endpoints, 5
  Palm endpoints, 9
  PDAs as, 8-9
  as perimeter, 15
  as point of attack, 28
  in proportional controls, 71
  enabling network access, 72
  as virus targets, 71-72
relationship with network, 67-68
Symbian endpoints, 11
types of, 2-3
Windows CE endpoints, 10
Windows endpoints, 4-5
enforcement policies, 83
  802.1x as, 83
  compartmentalization as, 84-88
  enforcing trust, 79
Engine Control Unit (ECU), as embedded system, 288
engineers, defined, xx
Enterasys, 95
enterprise management in Linux environment, 215-216, 246-247
enterprise patch management, 115
enterprise security in Windows environment, 168-170
erasing handheld device contents, 255. See also removing
EVDO (Evolution Data Optimized), 2n evidence, endpoints as, 139
Evolution Data Optimized (EVDO), 2n exec command, 221
executables files, viruses in, 130
exports file, 233
Extreme, 95
Fedora, 214-215. See also Linux enterprise management, 247
  hardening installation process, 228
  running processes, checking, 223-224
  system scans, 218-219
  updates, 230
feedback paths, identifying, 50
file ownership, 127
file sharing, 130
file systems in Mac OS X, 179
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 245
files, hiding, 127-129
FileVault, 200
find command, 222-223
FIPS 140-2 certification, 265, 277
firewalls
  on Linux, 228
  on Macintoshes, 201-202
  nmap scans against, 181-183
  software firewalls, 111-112
  in Windows, checking, 156-157
Foundry, 95
free speech, Linux and, 216
Frontline, 273
fs_usage, 190
FTP (File Transfer Protocol), 245
dimension, compartmentalization by, 87-88
G

gain, defined, 62
Garfinkle, Simpson, 15
getmac, 173
Good, 275-276
Granneman, Scott, 4
groups, access control, 127
guest access, 131
  in Windows, disabling, 154
guest accounts, removing, 234

H

Hall, Eldo C., 286
handheld devices, 254
  application security, 267
    browsing, 268
    email, 267
    instant messaging, 268
  closed-loop process control (CLPC), 281
  as endpoints, 8-9
  erasing contents of, 255
  initial security checks, 263
  loss of, 255
  networking security, 268
    Bluetooth, 270-273
    cell phone protocols, 273-275
    WiFi, 269
  operating systems, 257
    Blackberry, 261-262
    Linux, 262-263
    Palm, 262
    Symbian, 259-260
    Windows Mobile, 257-258
  security features, 263
    for Blackberry, 265-266
    for Palm, 265
    for Symbian, 264
    for synchronization, 266-267
    for Windows Mobile, 264
  security tools/vendors, 275
    antivirus (AV) software, 279
    Bluefire, 276-277
    Good, 275-276
    Mobile Armor, 278
    single-user solutions, 279-280
    SMobile Systems, 277-278
    websites for information, 280
  synchronizing with, 256
  hardening process
  Linux machines
    access control, 234-240
    installation process, 228
    networking configuration, 231-233
    removing unneeded programs, 229-230
    updates and patches, 230
  Mac OS X machines, 197-199
  Windows machines, 152-153
  stand-alone systems, 153-164
  hardware upgrades, expense of, 89
hardware vendors for endpoint support, 94-96
hash functions, 130-131
hash rules, 165
hcitool, 271
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 21
Herfurt, Martin, 270
HFS+ (Hierarchical File System), 179
HI (host integrity) checker, 119-120
hiding files, 127-129
HIDS (host-based IDS), 116
Hilton, Paris, 254
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996), 21
HIPS (host-based IPS), 117
history of Mac OS X, 178-179
host integrity (HI) checker, 119-120
host-based IDS (HIDS), 116
host-based IPS (HIPS), 117
hosts file, checking, 151, 190-192
  on Linux machines, 231

i
iChat, 200
icons
  for process control systems, 59-64
  for protected endpoints, 138
ICSA survey, 26
IDS (intrusion detection system), 116-117
IE (Internet Explorer), 165-166
IEC 60870-5 protocols, 299
ifconfig, 191-192, 226
IM (instant messaging), 133-134
  security on handheld devices, 268
incident response process (IRP), 313
industrial controls, as embedded systems, 289
inetd.conf, 232
Infoblox, 96
installation of Linux, hardening, 228
instant messaging (IM), 133-134
  security on handheld devices, 268
integral process controls, 49-50
  mapping control nodes to, 55-56
integrity of system, maintaining, 73
  minimum requirements, 73-74
  network access control, 75-79
Intel-based Macintoshes, 180
intellectual property management (IPM), 121
internal network access case study, 308-309
Internet connections
  for build networks, 109
  for contractors, 101-102
Internet Explorer (IE), 165-166
Internet sharing on Macintoshes, 202
intrusion detection system (IDS), 116-117
intrusion prevention system (IPS), 117-119
ipconfig, 173
IPM (intellectual property management), 121
iPods, as embedded systems, 288
IPS (intrusion prevention system), 117-119
IRP (incident response process), 313
isolation of build network, creating secure build environment, 108-109

J–K
Jaquith, Andrew, 24
Juniper, 82, 94
kernel rootkits, 142

L
last command, 197
Laurie, Adam, 270
LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), 127
legacy programs, 130
legal issues, endpoints as evidence, 139
legislation
  HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996), 21
  SOx (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), 21-22
library rootkits, 142
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), 127
Linux, 211-212
  application security, 240
  Office applications, 240-242
  remote management, 242-243
  closed-loop process control (CLPC), 249-250
  enterprise management, 215-216, 246-247
Fedora, 214-215
  enterprise management, 247
hardening installation process, 228
running processes, checking, 223-224
system scans, 218-219
updates, 230
free speech and, 216
on handheld devices, 262-263
hardening process
  access control, 234-240
  installation settings, 228
  networking configuration, 231-233
  removing unneeded programs, 229-230
  updates and patches, 230
initial security checks, 217
log files, viewing, 228
network configuration, 226-227
processes, checking, 223-225
rootkits, finding, 220
spyware, 227-228
system files, 221-223
system scans, 217-220
networking security
802.1x protocol, 246
NetBIOS 243
for network applications, 244-245
wireless connections, 243-244
Office applications on, 213-214
security tools/vendors, 247-249
support for, 213
Windows versus, 213
Xandros, 215
  enterprise management, 246
hardening installation process, 228
NetBIOS on, 243
Red Hat versus, 212
running processes, checking, 224
system scans, 218-220
updates, 230
wireless connections, 243-244
Little Snitch, 204-205
local security policy, setting, 155-156
localhost, 190
log files, viewing, 151, 196-197, 228
loss of handheld devices, 255
ls command, 221-222
lsof command, 225

Mac OS X
application security, 200-201
closed-loop process control (CLPC), 207
development history of, 178-179
file systems, 179
hardening process, 197-199
initial security checks, 180
hosts file, checking, 190-192
log files, viewing, 196-197
processes, checking, 186-190
rootkits, finding, 184-185
spyware and viruses, removing, 193-195
system files, 185-186
system scans, 181-184
Intel-based Macintoshes, 180
networking security, 201-203
security tools/vendors, 203-206
vulnerabilities in, 178
x86 processor support, 179
macros, warnings about, 200
MacScan, 194-195
malware. See also security failures
endpoints as targets of, 71-72
in executable files, 130
losses from, 26
number of, 4
removing from Mac OS X, 193-195
speed of, 27-28
marketing departments of vendors, 21
Maxi, Donna, 255
media files, checking, 152
message digests, 130-131
metrics, identifying, 51-52
Microsoft, 82
Microsoft documentation, 172
Microsoft Office macros, warnings about, 200
Microsoft TechNet Threats and Countermeasures website, 138
Microsoft Windows
application security, 164
  Internet Explorer, 165-166
  NetMeeting, 166
  Software Restriction Policy (SRP), 164-165
terminal services, 167
Windows Messenger, 167
Windows Update, 167-168
closed-loop process control (CLPC), 171-172
endpoints, 4-5
enterprise security, 168-170
hardening process, 152-153
  stand-alone systems, 153-164
initial security checks, 140
  alternate data streams (ADSs), finding, 146
hosts file, checking, 151
log files, viewing, 151
media files, checking, 152
processes, checking, 149-150
Registry, checking, 147-149
rootkits, finding, 142-144
spyware, removing, 150-151
system files, verifying signatures, 145
system scans, 141-142
Linux versus, 213
ports, list of, 142
security tools/vendors, 172-173
server security, 170-171
Microsoft Windows Vista, 139-140
mmc, 173
Mobile Armor, 278
mobile devices, 254
  application security, 267
    browsing, 268
    email, 267
    instant messaging, 268
closed-loop process control (CLPC), 281
as endpoints, 8-9
erasing contents of, 255
initial security checks, 263
loss of, 255
networking security, 268
  Bluetooth, 270-273
  cell phone protocols, 273-275
  WiFi, 269
operating systems, 257
  Blackberry, 261-262
  Linux, 262-263
  Palm, 262
  Symbian, 259-260
  Windows Mobile, 257-258
security features, 263
  for Blackberry, 265-266
  for Palm, 265
  for Symbian, 264
  for synchronization, 266-267
  for Windows Mobile, 264
security tools/vendors, 275
  antivirus (AV) software, 279
  Bluefire, 276-277
  Good, 275-276
  Mobile Armor, 278
  single-user solutions, 279-280
  SMobile Systems, 277-278
  websites for information, 280
synchronizing with, 256
mobile phones, as endpoints, 8-9, 11
mode, 173
movie files, checking, 152
music files, checking, 152

N
NAC (network access control), 75-77.
  See also enforcement policies
  enforcing trust, 79
  remediation with, 78-79
  verifying trust, 77-78
NAC (Network Admission Control), 171
NAP (Network Access Protection), 171
nbstat, 173
NetBIOS, on Linux machines, 243
Netinfo Manager, 183
NetMeeting, disabling, 166
netstat, 143, 173, 191-192
network, relationship with endpoints,
  67-68. See also hosts file
network access, enabling, 72
network access control (NAC), 75-77. See
  also enforcement policies
  enforcing trust, 79
  remediation with, 78-79
  verifying trust, 77-78
Network Access Protection (NAP), 171
Network Access Quarantine Control, 171
Network Admission Control (NAC), 171
network applications, securing on Linux
  machines, 244-245
network configuration
  diagramming, 59-64
  for Linux machines, 231-233
network configuration checks, on Linux,
  226-227
Network File System (NFS), 245
Network Information Service (NIS), 127
network management, as closed-loop
  process control systems, 40
network management system (NMS), 40
network modeling
reasons for failure of, 43
risk analysis, 44
threat analysis, 44-45
vulnerability management as, 42-46
network security
on handheld devices, 268
Bluetooth, 270-273
cell phone protocols, 273-275
WiFi, 269
on Linux machines
802.1x protocol, 246
NetBIOS, 243
for network applications, 244-245
wireless connections, 243-244
on Mac OS X, 201-203
network-based IDS (NIDS), 116
network-based IPS (NIPS), 117
network-enabled power strips, 3
NFS (Network File System), 245
NIDS (network-based IDS), 116
NIPS (network-based IPS), 117
NIS (Network Information Service), 127
nmap, 141, 181-183, 218-219
NMS (network management system), 40
nomenclature for process control systems, 59-64
non-Windows endpoints, 5

obexFTP, 273
Office applications on Linux, 213-214
security settings, 240-242
OMA Data Synchronization V1.2, 267
Open1x protocol, 246
Opener, 193
OpenOffice, 241
OpenSSH, 245
operating systems
on handheld devices, 257
Blackberry, 261-262
Linux, 262-263
Palm, 262
Symbian, 259-260
Windows Mobile, 257-258
threat vectors, 125-126
built-in protections, 126-132
OS X. See Mac OS X
OSX.Inqtana.A virus, 193
OSX.Leap.A worm, 193
ownership of files, 127

P
P2P (peer-to-peer networking), 132-134
package management, 229
Palm, 262
endpoints, 9
security features, 265
PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules), 233
passwords
   changing, 158
   on printers, 296-297
patch level, measuring, 51-52
patch management, 115
patches for Linux machines, 230
path rules, 165
PBX (private branch exchange), 7
PDAs (personal digital assistants). See handheld devices
peer-to-peer networking (P2P), 132-134
penetration testing, 100-101
perimeter
   adaptability of, 14
   changes to, 2
   for data protection, 16
   endpoints as, 15
   as fast moving, 14-15
   military analogy, 12-14
personal digital assistants (PDAs). See handheld devices
picture files, checking, 152
PID systems
   derivative process controls, 49-50
   mapping control nodes to, 55-56
   integral process controls, 49-50
   mapping control nodes to, 55-56
   proportional process control systems, 47-48
   derivative and integral process controls, 49-50
   feedback paths, 50
   mapping business and technology processes together, 52-53
   mapping control nodes to, 55-56
   metrics, 51-52
   risk management, 53-54
ping, 173
pinpoint identification scanning, embedded systems, 292-297
PLCs (programmable logic controllers), 289
Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM), 233
ports, list of Windows ports, 142
Potter, Bruce, 270
printers
   CUPS (Common UNIX Printing System), 231
   as embedded systems, 6, 287
   passwords on, 296-297
   TELNET on, 292-293
private branch exchange (PBX), 7
privileges, levels of, 126-127
process, creating secure build environment, 107
process control analysis, 70
process control systems, 46-48
  closed-loop process control (CLPC), 40, 315
  architecture, importance of, 82-83
  contractor Internet access, 101-102
  DHCP, 89-93
  endpoint support, 94-96
  enforcement policies, 83-88
  for handheld devices, 281
  hardware upgrades, expense of, 89
  in Linux environment, 249-250
  in Mac OS X environment, 207
  penetration testing, 100-101
  remediation, 100
  technology, effect of, 93
  vulnerability assessment (scans), 96-97
  vulnerability detection, 97
  vulnerability management, 98-99
  vulnerability tracking services, 98
  in Windows environment, 171-172
  gain, 62
  mapping control paths to business processes, 57-58
  nomenclature and iconology, 59-64
  proportional process control systems, 47-48
  derivative and integral process controls, 49-50
  feedback paths, 50
  mapping business and technology processes together, 52-53
  metrics, 51-52
  risk management, 53-54
  time constants, 56-57
  process-oriented failures, in case studies, 314
  processes, checking running processes, 149-150, 186-190, 223-225
  programmable logic controllers (PLCs), 289
  proportional controls. See also
  closed-loop process control (CLPC)
  endpoints in, 71
  enabling network access, 72
  as virus targets, 71-72
  risk, 69
  attack vectors, 70
  process control analysis, 70
  system integrity, maintaining, 73
  minimum requirements, 73-74
  network access control, 75-79
  proportional process control systems, 47-48
  derivative and integral process controls, 49-50
  feedback paths, 50
  mapping business and technology processes together, 52-53
mapping control nodes to, 55-56
metrics, 51-52
risk management, 53-54
protected endpoints, icons for, 138
protecting data. See data protection
ps command, 186-187, 223-224

Q–R
QNX Software Systems, vulnerabilities in, 291
reactive solutions from vendors, 24-25
recovery agents, creating, 162-163
Recovery Console, 144
Red Hat, Xandros versus, 212
Registry
   backing up, 147
   checking, 147-149
regression testing, 53
reliability, complexity and, 35-36
remediation, 100
   with network access control (NAC), 78-79
remote management on Linux machines, 242-243
removing. See also erasing
default user accounts, 234
guest accounts, 234
rootkits, 144
spyware, 150-151, 193-195
unneeded programs, 229-230
viruses from Mac OS X, 193-195
return on investment (ROI)
calculators, 31
risk, 69
   attack vectors, 70
defined, 33
   process control analysis, 70
   trust versus, 64
risk analysis, 44
risk management, 53-54
RKDetect, 143
RKdetector, 144
rkhunter, 185, 220
ROI (return on investment)
calculators, 31
Rootkit Revealer, 143
rootkits
   finding
   on Linux machines, 220
   on Mac OS X machines, 184-185
   on Windows machines, 142-144
   removing, 144
route, 173
routers, DHCP request handling, 92
rpm command, 229
rules, Software Restriction Policy, 164
running processes, checking, 149-150,
  186-190, 223-225
INDEX

S

Safari, scripting vulnerability in, 180
SafeNet, 299
Samba, 245
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOx), 21-22
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, 289-290
scans (vulnerability assessment), 96-97
embedded systems, 292-297
Linux systems, 217-220
Mac OS X systems, 181-184
Windows systems, 141-142
scientific method
in security, 34-35
Wright Brothers example, 34
scopes, 91
scripting vulnerabilities in Safari, 180
secure baseline, importance of, 110
secure build environment, creating, 106
isolation of build network, 108-109
process, 107
secure baseline, importance of, 110
source code control, 110-111
securetty file, 233
security
cost of, 31-32
predicting success, 32-33
as process control system, 46-48
scientific method in, 34-35
surprises to, 33-34
security failures, 22-23. See also viruses
Bank of America (BoA) example, 28
CardSystems Solutions example, 28
Egghead example, 28
security legislation
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996), 21
SOx (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), 21-22
security modeling
reasons for failure of, 43
risk analysis, 44
threat modeling, 44-45
vulnerability management as, 42-46
security perimeter
adaptability of, 14
changes to, 2
for data protection, 16
endpoints as, 15
as fast moving, 14-15
military analogy, 12-14
security vendors. See also tools
business cycle of, 23-24
embedded systems security, 299
handheld device security, 275
antivirus (AV) software, 279
Bluefire, 276-277
Good, 275-276
Mobile Armor, 278
single-user solutions, 279-280
SMobile Systems, 277-278
websites for information, 280
hardware vendors for endpoint support, 94-96
Linux security, 247-249
Mac OS X security, 203-206
marketing departments, 21
questions to ask, 25-26
reactive solutions from, 24-25
Windows security, 172-173
sendmail, 244
server antivirus (AV) software, 113
servers, securing in Windows environment, 170-171
service command, 224
SGID (set group ID), 235-239
sharing files, 130
Sheahan, Jeff, 28
signatures
  in OpenOffice, 241
  of system files, verifying, 145
sigverif, 145
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), 40
single-user solutions for handheld devices, 279-280
Skype, 222
smartphones. See handheld devices
SMobile Systems, 277-278
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), 40
snort (IDS), 117
social engineering, 100-101
software firewalls, 111-112
Software Restriction Policy (SRP), 164-165
solutions, reactive solutions from vendors, 24-25
source code control, 110-111
SOx (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), 21-22
specialized security—limited functionality (SSLF), 138, 168
SPs (smartphones). See handheld devices
Spy Sweeper, 151
Spybot Search and Destroy, 151
spyware
  bots, 29-31
  on Linux machines, 227-228
  removing, 150-151, 193-195
Spyware Doctor, 151
SRP (Software Restriction Policy), 164-165
SSEP (Symantec Sygate Enterprise Protection), 95
SSLF (specialized security—limited functionality), 138, 168
stand-alone patch management, 115
stand-alone Windows systems, hardening process, 153-164
Star Trek, 229
StarOffice, 241
statistics
  cost of security, 31-32
  losses from viruses, 26
  spyware infections, 30
Stifter, Paula, 255
streams, finding ADSs (alternate data streams), 146
su command, 221
success, predicting, 32-33
sudo command, 221
SUID (switch user ID), 235-239
summation, 62
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 289-290
supplicants, 76
support for Linux, 213
Sygate Technologies, 299
Symantec, 82, 95, 205-206
Symantec Sygate Enterprise Protection (SSEP), 95
Symbian, 259-260
  endpoints, 11
  security features, 264
synchronizing handheld devices, 256
  security features for, 266-267
SyncML 266
system administrator failure case study, 310-311
system files
  checking
    on Linux machines, 221-223
    on Mac OS X, 185-186
  verifying signatures, 145
system integrity, maintaining, 73
  minimum requirements, 73-74
  network access control, 75-79
System Preferences, 198-199
System Profiler, 184, 194-195
system scans
  Linux, 217-220
  Mac OS X, 181-184
  Windows, 141-142
systeminfo, 173
T
tasklist, 173
TCB (Trusted Computing Base), 259
TCG (Trusted Computing Group), 299-300
technology, effect of, 93
technology processes, mapping
  with business processes, 52-53
  to control nodes, 54
TELNET on printers, 292-293
terminal services, disabling, 167
testing
  importance of, 121-122
  tracking results of, 122-123
threat modeling, 44-45
threat vectors. See also vulnerabilities
applications, 125, 132-133
chat applications, 133-134
peer-to-peer networking (P2P),
132-134
operating system, 125-126
built-in protections, 126-129
built-in weaknesses, 129-132
time constants, quantifying, 56-57
TNC (Trusted Network Connect), 300
tools. See also vendors
antivirus software, 112-114
encryption, 120-121
handheld device security, 275
antivirus (AV) software, 279
Bluefire, 276-277
Good, 275-276
Mobile Armor, 278
single-user solutions, 279-280
SMobile Systems, 277-278
websites for information, 280
host integrity (HI) checker, 119-120
intrusion detection system (IDS),
116-117
intrusion prevention system (IPS),
117-119
Linux security, 247-249
list of, 111
Mac OS X security, 203-206
patch management, 115
software firewalls, 111-112
Windows security, 172-173
top command, 188-189
TPM (Trusted Platform Module), 94,
299-300
tracert, 173
tracking testing results, 122-123
Tripwire, 186
Trojan horses, bots and, 29-31
trust. See also secure build environment
enforcing, 79
risk versus, 64
verifying, 77-78
Trusted Computing Base (TCB), 259
Trusted Computing Group (TCG),
299-300
Trusted Network Connect (TNC), 300
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), 94,
299-300

U
unhackme, 144
uniq command, 190
UNIX endpoints, 5
unneeded programs, removing, 229-230
unrestricted mode (Software Restriction
Policy), 164
updates
automatic updates, enabling, 159-160
for Linux machines, 230
upgrades, expense of hardware
upgrades, 89
users, access control, 127

V
VA (Veterans Administration), 254
vending machines, embedded system
security, 300
vendors. See also tools
business cycle of, 23-24
embedded systems security, 299
handheld device security, 275
antivirus (AV) software, 279
Bluefire, 276-277
Good, 275-276
Mobile Armor, 278
single-user solutions, 279-280
SMobile Systems, 277-278
websites for information, 280
hardware vendors for endpoint support, 94-96
Linux security, 247-249
Mac OS X security, 203-206
marketing departments, 21
questions to ask, 25-26
reactive solutions from, 24-25
Windows security, 172-173
verifying
system file signatures, 145
trust, 77-78

version control systems, 110-111
Veterans Administration (VA), 254
viewing log files, 151, 196-197, 228
Virex, 206
Virtual Network Computing (VNC), 242-243
virtual private networks (VPNs), 105
viruses. See also security failures
endpoints as targets of, 71-72
in executable files, 130
losses from, 26
number of, 4
removing from Mac OS X, 193-195
speed of, 27-28
Vista, 139-140
VNC (Virtual Network Computing), 242-243
VoIP (Voice over IP), 6
VPNs (virtual private networks), 105
vulnerabilities
in embedded systems, 291-292
in Mac OS X, 178
in Safari, 180
vulnerability assessment (scans), 96-97
vulnerability detection, 97
vulnerability management, 98-99
as security modeling, 42-46
vulnerability tracking services, 98
W
W3C DSIG, 241
websites
  for handheld device security information, 280
  Microsoft TechNet Threats and Countermeasures, 138
WiFi on handheld devices, 269
Windows
  application security, 164
    Internet Explorer, 165-166
    NetMeeting, 166
    Software Restriction Policy (SRP), 164-165
    terminal services, 167
    Windows Messenger, 167
    Windows Update, 167-168
closed-loop process control (CLPC), 171-172
endpoints, 4-5
enterprise security, 168-170
hardening process, 152-153
  stand-alone systems, 153-164
initial security checks, 140
  alternate data streams (ADSs), finding, 146
hosts file, checking, 151
log files, viewing, 151
media files, checking, 152
processes, checking, 149-150
Registry, checking, 147-149
rootkits, finding, 142-144
spyware, removing, 150-151
system files, verifying signatures, 145
system scans, 141-142
Linux versus, 213
ports, list of, 142
security tools/vendors, 172-173
server security, 170-171
Windows CE. See Windows Mobile
Windows Messenger, disabling, 167
Windows Mobile, 257-258
  endpoints, 10
  security features, 264
Windows NT, 138
Windows Recovery Console, 144
Windows Registry
  backing up, 147
  checking, 147-149
Windows Update, security settings, 167-168
Windows Vista, 139-140
Wine, 241
Wine Project, 214
wireless connections on Linux machines, 243-244
wireless network connections, access points (APs), 6
wireless networking
  on handheld devices
    Bluetooth, 270-273
    cell phone protocols, 273-275

INDEX
347
WiFi, 269
  on Macintoshes, 202
Wotring, Brian, 270

X–Z

x86 processor support in Mac OS X, 179
Xandros, 215. See also Linux
  enterprise management, 246
  hardening installation process, 228
  NetBIOS on, 243
  Red Hat versus, 212
  running processes, checking, 224
  system scans, 218-220
  updates, 230
  wireless connections, 243-244
xinetc.conf, 232-233

zone rules, 165
zone-based compartmentalization, 84-86