Chapter 6

C Language Issues

“One day you will understand.”

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Introduction

When you’re reviewing software to uncover potential security holes, it’s important to understand the underlying details of how the programming language implements data types and operations, and how those details can affect execution flow. A code reviewer examining an application binary at the assembly level can see explicitly how data is stored and manipulated as well as the exact implications of an operation on a piece of data. However, when you’re reviewing an application at the source code level, some details are abstracted and less obvious. This abstraction can lead to the introduction of subtle vulnerabilities in software that remain unnoticed and uncorrected for long periods of time. A thorough auditor should be familiar with the source language’s underlying implementation and how these details can lead to security-relevant conditions in border cases or exceptional situations.
Chapter 6—C Language Issues

This chapter explores subtle details of the C programming language that could adversely affect an application’s security and robustness. Specifically, it covers the storage details of primitive types, arithmetic overflow and underflow conditions, type conversion issues, such as the default type promotions, signed/unsigned conversions and comparisons, sign extension, and truncation. You also look at some interesting nuances of C involving unexpected results from certain operators and other commonly unappreciated behaviors. Although this chapter focuses on C, many principles can be applied to other languages.

C Language Background

This chapter deals extensively with specifics of the C language and uses terminology from the C standards. You shouldn’t have to reference the standards to follow this material, but this chapter makes extensive use of the public final draft of the C99 standard (ISO/IEC 9899:1999), which you can find at www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/standards.

The C Rationale document that accompanies the draft standard is also useful. Interested readers should check out Peter Van der Linden’s excellent book Expert C Programming (Prentice Hall, 1994) and the second edition of Kernighan and Ritchie’s The C Programming Language (Prentice Hall, 1988). You might also be interested in purchasing the final version of the ISO standard or the older ANSI standard; both are sold through the ANSI organization’s Web site (www.ansi.org).

Although this chapter incorporates a recent standard, the content is targeted toward the current mainstream use of C, specifically the ANSI C89/ISO 90 standards. Because low-level security details are being discussed, notes on any situations in which changes across versions of C are relevant have been added.

Occasionally, the terms “undefined behavior” and “implementation-defined behavior” are used when discussing the standards. Undefined behavior is erroneous behavior: conditions that aren’t required to be handled by the compiler and, therefore, have unspecified results. Implementation-defined behavior is behavior that’s up to the underlying implementation. It should be handled in a consistent and logical manner, and the method for handling it should be documented.

Data Storage Overview

Before you delve into C’s subtleties, you should review the basics of C types—specifically, their storage sizes, value ranges, and representations. This section explains the types from a general perspective, explores details such as binary encoding, twos complement arithmetic, and byte order conventions, and winds up with some pragmatic observations on common and future implementations.
The C standards define an object as a region of data storage in the execution environment; its contents can represent values. Each object has an associated type: a way to interpret and give meaning to the value stored in that object. Dozens of types are defined in the C standards, but this chapter focuses on the following:

- **Character types**—There are three character types: char, signed char, and unsigned char. All three types are guaranteed to take up 1 byte of storage. Whether the char type is signed is implementation defined. Most current systems default to char being signed, although compiler flags are usually available to change this behavior.

- **Integer types**—There are four standard signed integer types, excluding the character types: short int, int, long int, and long long int. Each standard type has a corresponding unsigned type that takes the same amount of storage. (Note: The long long int type is new to C99.)

- **Floating types**—There are three real floating types and three complex types. The real floating types are float, double, and long double. The three complex types are float _Complex, double _Complex, and long double _Complex. (Note: The complex types are new to C99.)

- **Bit fields**—A bit field is a specific number of bits in an object. Bit fields can be signed or unsigned, depending on their declaration. If no sign type specifier is given, the sign of the bit field is implementation dependent.

**Note**

Bit fields might be unfamiliar to some programmers, as they usually aren’t present outside network code or low-level code. Here’s a brief example of a bit field:

```c
struct controller
{
    unsigned int id:4;
    unsigned int tflag:1;
    unsigned int rflag:1;
    unsigned int ack:2;
    unsigned int seqnum:8;
    unsigned int code:16;
};
```

The controller structure has several small members. id refers to a 4-bit unsigned variable, and tflag and rflag refer to single bits. ack is a 2-bit variable, seqnum is an 8-bit variable, and code is a 16-bit variable.
The members of this structure are likely to be laid out so that they’re contiguous bits in memory that fit within one 32-bit region.

From an abstract perspective, each integer type (including character types) represents a different integer size that the compiler can map to an appropriate underlying architecture-dependent data type. A character is guaranteed to consume 1 byte of storage (although a byte might not necessarily be 8 bits). \texttt{sizeof(char)} is always one, and you can always use an unsigned character pointer, \texttt{sizeof}, and \texttt{memcpy()} to examine and manipulate the actual contents of other types. The other integer types have certain ranges of values they are required to be able to represent, and they must maintain certain relationships with each other (long can’t be smaller than short, for example), but otherwise, their implementation largely depends on their architecture and compiler.

**Signed** integer types can represent both positive and negative values, whereas **unsigned** types can represent only positive values. Each signed integer type has a corresponding unsigned integer type that takes up the same amount of storage. Unsigned integer types have two possible types of bits: value bits, which contain the actual base-two representation of the object’s value, and padding bits, which are optional and otherwise unspecified by the standard. Signed integer types have value bits and padding bits as well as one additional bit: the sign bit. If the sign bit is clear in a signed integer type, its representation for a value is identical to that value’s representation in the corresponding unsigned integer type. In other words, the underlying bit pattern for the positive value 42 should look the same whether it’s stored in an int or unsigned int.

An integer type has a precision and a width. The **precision** is the number of value bits the integer type uses. The **width** is the number of bits the type uses to represent its value, including the value and sign bits, but not the padding bits. For unsigned integer types, the precision and width are the same. For signed integer types, the width is one greater than the precision.

Programmers can invoke the various types in several ways. For a given integer type, such as short int, a programmer can generally omit the \texttt{int} keyword. So the keywords \texttt{signed short int}, \texttt{signed short}, \texttt{short int}, and \texttt{short} refer to the same data type. In general, if the signed and unsigned type specifiers are omitted, the type is assumed to be signed. However, this assumption isn’t true for the char type, as whether it’s signed depends on the implementation. (Usually, chars are signed. If you need a signed character with 100% certainty, you can specifically declare a signed char.)

C also has a rich type-aliasing system supported via typedef, so programmers usually have preferred conventions for specifying a variable of a known size and representation. For example, types such as \texttt{int8_t}, \texttt{uint8_t}, \texttt{int32_t}, and \texttt{u_int32_t} are popular with UNIX and network programmers. They represent an 8-bit signed
integer, an 8-bit unsigned integer, a 32-bit signed integer, and a 32-bit unsigned integer, respectively. Windows programmers tend to use types such as BYTE, CHAR, and DWORD, which respectively map to an 8-bit unsigned integer, an 8-bit signed integer, and a 32-bit unsigned integer.

Binary Encoding

Unsigned integer values are encoded in pure binary form, which is a base-two numbering system. Each bit is a 1 or 0, indicating whether the power of two that the bit’s position represents is contributing to the number’s total value. To convert a positive number from binary notation to decimal, the value of each bit position $n$ is multiplied by $2^n$. A few examples of these conversions are shown in the following lines:

$$
\begin{align*}
0001 \; 1011 &= 2^4 + 2^3 + 2^1 + 2^0 = 27 \\
0000 \; 1111 &= 2^3 + 2^2 + 2^1 + 2^0 = 15 \\
0010 \; 1010 &= 2^5 + 2^3 + 2^1 = 42
\end{align*}
$$

Similarly, to convert a positive decimal integer to binary, you repeatedly subtract powers of two, starting from the highest power of two that can be subtracted from the integer leaving a positive result (or zero). The following lines show a few sample conversions:

$$
\begin{align*}
55 &= 32 + 16 + 4 + 2 + 1 \\
\text{\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quarter\text{207}
Ones complement—Again, the sign bit is 1 if the number is negative and 0 if the number is positive. Positive values can be read directly from the value bits. However, negative values can’t be read directly; the whole number must be negated first. In ones complement, a number is negated by inverting all its bits. To find the value of a negative number, you have to invert its bits. This system works better for the machine, but there are still complications with addition, and, like sign and magnitude, it has the amusing ambiguity of having two values of zero: positive zero and negative zero.

Twos complement—The sign bit is 1 if the number is negative and 0 if the number is positive. You can read positive values directly from the value bits, but you can’t read negative values directly; you have to negate the whole number first. In twos complement, a number is negated by inverting all the bits and then adding one. This works well for the machine and removes the ambiguity of having two potential values of zero.

Integers are usually represented internally by using twos complement, especially in modern computers. As mentioned, twos complement encodes positive values in standard binary encoding. The range of positive values that can be represented is based on the number of value bits. A twos complement 8-bit signed integer has 7 value bits and 1 sign bit. It can represent the positive values 0 to 127 in the 7 value bits. All negative values represented with twos complement encoding require the sign bit to be set. The values from -128 to -1 can be represented in the value bits when the sign bit is set, thus allowing the 8-bit signed integer to represent -128 to 127.

For arithmetic, the sign bit is placed in the most significant bit of the data type. In general, a signed twos complement number of width X can represent the range of integers from $-2^{X-1}$ to $2^{X-1}-1$. Table 6-1 shows the typical ranges of twos complement integers of varying sizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maximum and Minimum Values for Integers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum value (signed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum value (signed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum value (unsigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum value (unsigned)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As described previously, you negate a twos complement number by inverting all the bits and adding one. Listing 6-1 shows how you obtain the representation of -15 by inverting the number 15, and then you figure out the value of an unknown negative bit pattern.
Listing 6-1

Two's Complement Representation of -15

0000 1111 – binary representation for 15
1111 0000 – invert all the bits
0000 0001 – add one
1111 0001 – twos complement representation for -15

1101 0110 – unknown negative number
0010 1001 – invert all the bits
0000 0001 – add one
0010 1010 – twos complement representation for 42
   original number was -42

Byte Order

There are two conventions for ordering bytes in modern architectures: big endian and little endian. These conventions apply to data types larger than 1 byte, such as a short int or an int. In the big-endian architecture, the bytes are located in memory starting with the most significant byte and ending with the least significant byte. Little-endian architectures, however, start with the least significant byte and end with the most significant. For example, you have a 4-byte integer with the decimal value 12345. In binary, it’s 11000000111001. This integer is located at address 500. On a big-endian machine, it’s represented in memory as the following:

Address 500: 00000000
Address 501: 00000000
Address 502: 00110000
Address 503: 00111001

On a little-endian machine, however, it’s represented this way:

Address 500: 00111001
Address 501: 00110000
Address 502: 00000000
Address 503: 00000000

Intel machines are little endian, but RISC machines, such as SPARC, tend to be big endian. Some machines are capable of dealing with both encodings natively.

Common Implementations

Practically speaking, if you’re talking about a modern, 32-bit, twos complement machine, what can you say about C’s basic types and their representations?
In general, none of the integer types have any padding bits, so you don’t need to worry about that. Everything is going to use two’s complement representation. Bytes are going to be 8 bits long. Byte order varies; it’s little endian on Intel machines but more likely to be big endian on RISC machines.

The char type is likely to be signed by default and take up 1 byte. The short type takes 2 bytes, and int takes 4 bytes. The long type is also 4 bytes, and long long is 8 bytes. Because you know integers are two’s complement encoded and you know their underlying sizes, determining their minimum and maximum values is easy. Table 6-2 summarizes the typical sizes for ranges of integer data types on a 32-bit machine.

Table 6-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Width (in Bits)</th>
<th>Minimum Value</th>
<th>Maximum Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>signed char</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-128</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned char</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-32,768</td>
<td>32,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned short</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-2,147,483,648</td>
<td>2,147,483,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,294,967,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-2,147,483,648</td>
<td>2,147,483,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned long</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,294,967,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long long</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-9,223,372,036,854,775,808</td>
<td>9,223,372,036,854,775,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned long long</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18,446,744,073,709,551,615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What can you expect in the near future as 64-bit systems become more prevalent? The following list describes a few type systems that are in use today or have been proposed:

- **ILP32**—int, long, and pointer are all 32 bits, the current standard for most 32-bit computers.
- **ILP32LL**—int, long, and pointer are all 32 bits, and a new type—long long—is 64 bits. The long long type is new to C99. It gives C a type that has a minimum width of 64 bits but doesn’t change any of the language’s fundamentals.
- **LP64**—long and pointer are 64 bits, so the pointer and long types have changed from 32-bit to 64-bit values.
- **ILP64**—int, long, and pointer are all 64 bits. The int type has been changed to a 64-bit type, which has fairly significant implications for the language.
- **LLP64**—pointers and the new long long type are 64 bits. The int and long types remain 32-bit data types.
Table 6-3 summarizes these type systems briefly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ILP32</th>
<th>ILP32LL</th>
<th>LP64</th>
<th>ILP64</th>
<th>LLP64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>char</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long long</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pointer</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see, the typical data type sizes match the ILP32LL model, which is what most compilers adhere to on 32-bit platforms. The LP64 model is the de facto standard for compilers that generate code for 64-bit platforms. As you learn later in this chapter, the int type is a basic unit for the C language; many things are converted to and from it behind the scenes. Because the int data type is relied on so heavily for expression evaluations, the LP64 model is an ideal choice for 64-bit systems because it doesn’t change the int data type; as a result, it largely preserves the expected C type conversion behavior.

### Arithmetic Boundary Conditions

You’ve learned that C’s basic integer types have minimum and maximum possible values determined by their underlying representation in memory. (Typical ranges for 32-bit twos complement architectures were presented in Table 6-2.) So, now you can explore what can happen when you attempt to traverse these boundaries. Simple arithmetic on a variable, such as addition, subtraction, or multiplication, can result in a value that can’t be held in that variable. Take a look at this example:

```c
unsigned int a;
a=0xe0000020;
a=a+0x20000020;
```

You know that a can hold a value of 0x00000020 without a problem; Table 6-2 lists the maximum value of an unsigned 32-bit variable as 4,294,967,295, or 0xFFFFFFFF. However, when 0x20000020 is added to 0xE0000000, the result, 0x100000040, can’t be held in a. When an arithmetic operation results in a value higher than the maximum possible representable value, it’s called a numeric overflow condition.
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Here’s a slightly different example:

```c
unsigned int a;
a = 0;
a = a - 1;
```

The programmer subtracts 1 from `a`, which has an initial value of 0. The resulting value, -1, can’t be held in `a` because it’s below the minimum possible value of 0. This result is known as a **numeric underflow condition**.

**Note**

Numeric overflow conditions are also referred to in secure-programming literature as numeric overflows, arithmetic overflows, integer overflows, or integer wrapping. Numeric underflow conditions can be referred to as numeric underflows, arithmetic underflows, integer underflows, or integer wrapping. Specifically, the terms “wrapping around a value” or “wrapping below zero” might be used.

Although these conditions might seem as though they would be infrequent or inconsequential in real code, they actually occur quite often, and their impact can be quite severe from a security perspective. The incorrect result of an arithmetic operation can undermine the application’s integrity and often result in a compromise of its security. A numeric overflow or underflow that occurs early in a block of code can lead to a subtle series of cascading faults; not only is the result of a single arithmetic operation tainted, but every subsequent operation using that tainted result introduces a point where an attacker might have unexpected influence.

**Note**

Although numeric wrapping is common in most programming languages, it’s a particular problem in C/C++ programs because C requires programmers to perform low-level tasks that more abstracted high-level languages handle automatically. These tasks, such as dynamic memory allocation and buffer length tracking, often require arithmetic that might be vulnerable. Attackers commonly leverage arithmetic boundary conditions by manipulating a length calculation so that an insufficient amount of memory is allocated. If this happens, the program later runs the risk of manipulating memory outside the bounds of the allocated space, which often leads to an exploitable situation. Another common attack technique is bypassing a length check that protects sensitive operations, such as memory copies.
This chapter offers several examples of how underflow and overflow conditions lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. In general, auditors should be mindful of arithmetic boundary conditions when reviewing code and be sure to consider the possible implications of the subtle, cascading nature of these flaws.

In the following sections, you look at arithmetic boundary conditions affecting unsigned integers and then examine signed integers.

Warning
An effort has been made to use int and unsigned int types in examples to avoid code that’s affected by C’s default type promotions. This topic is covered in “Type Conversions” later in the chapter, but for now, note that whenever you use a char or short in an arithmetic expression in C, it’s converted to an int before the arithmetic is performed.

Unsigned Integer Boundaries
Unsigned integers are defined in the C specification as being subject to the rules of modular arithmetic (see the “Modular Arithmetic” sidebar). For an unsigned integer that uses X bits of storage, arithmetic on that integer is performed modulo 2^X. For example, arithmetic on a 8-bit unsigned integer is performed modulo 2^8, or modulo 256. Take another look at this simple expression:

```c
unsigned int a;
a=0xE0000020;
a=a+0x20000020;
```

The addition is performed modulo 2^32, or modulo 4,294,967,296 (0x100000000). The result of the addition is 0x40, which is (0xE0000020 + 0x20000020) modulo 0x100000000.

Another way to conceptualize it is to consider the extra bits of the result of a numeric overflow as being truncated. If you do the calculation 0xE0000020 + 0x20000020 in binary, you would have the following:

```
1110 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0010 0000
+ 0010 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0010 0000
= 1 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000
```
The result you actually get in `a` is 0x40, which has a binary representation of 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000.

### Modular Arithmetic

Modular arithmetic is a system of arithmetic used heavily in computer science. The expression “X modulo Y” means “the remainder of X divided by Y.” For example, 100 modulo 11 is 1 because when 100 is divided by 11, the answer is 9 and the remainder is 1. The modulus operator in C is written as `%`. So in C, the expression `(100 % 11)` evaluates to 1, and the expression `(100 / 11)` evaluates to 9.

Modular arithmetic is useful for making sure a number is bounded within a certain range, and you often see it used for this purpose in hash tables. To explain, when you have X modulo Y, and X and Y are positive numbers, you know that the highest possible result is Y-1 and the lowest is 0. If you have a hash table of 100 buckets, and you need to map a hash to one of the buckets, you could do this:

```c
struct bucket *buckets[100];
...
bucket = buckets[hash % 100];
```

To see how modular arithmetic works, look at a simple loop:

```c
for (i=0; i<20; i++)
    printf("%d ", i % 6);
printf("\n");
```

The expression `(i % 6)` essentially bounds `i` to the range 0 to 5. As the program runs, it prints the following:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1
```

You can see that as `i` advanced from 0 to 19, `i % 6` also advanced, but it wrapped back around to 0 every time it hit its maximum value of 5. As you move forward through the value, you wrap around the maximum value of 5. If you move backward through the values, you wrap “under” 0 to the maximum value of 5.

You can see that it’s the same as the result of the addition but without the highest bit. This isn’t far from what’s happening at the machine level. For example, Intel architectures have a **carry flag** (CF) that holds this highest bit. C doesn’t have a mechanism for allowing access to this flag, but depending on the underlying architecture, it could be checked via assembly code.

Here’s an example of a numeric overflow condition that occurs because of multiplication:
unsigned int a;
a=0xe0000020;
a=a*0x42;

Again, the arithmetic is performed modulo 0x100000000. The result of the multiplication is 0xC0000840, which is (0xE0000020 * 0x42) modulo 0x100000000. Here it is in binary:

```
1110 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0010 0000
* 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0010
= 11000000000000000000001000010000000
```

The result you actually get in a, 0xC0000840, has a binary representation of 1100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1000 0100 0000. Again, you can see how the higher bits that didn’t fit into the result were effectively truncated. At a machine level, often it’s possible to detect an overflow with integer multiplication as well as recover the high bits of a multiplication. For example, on Intel the `imul` instruction uses a destination object that’s twice the size of the source operands when multiplying, and it sets the flags OF (overflow) and CF (carry) if the result of the multiplication requires a width greater than the source operand. Some code even uses inline assembly to check for numeric overflow (discussed in the “Multiplication Overflows on Intel” sidebar later in this chapter).

You’ve seen examples of how arithmetic overflows could occur because of addition and multiplication. Another operator that can cause overflows is left shift, which, for this discussion, can be thought of as multiplication with 2. It behaves much the same as multiplication, so no example has been provided.

Now, you can look at some security exposures related to numeric overflow of unsigned integers. Listing 6-2 is a sanitized, edited version of an exploitable condition found recently in a client’s code.

**Listing 6-2**

*Integer Overflow Example*

```c
u_char *make_table(unsigned int width, unsigned int height, u_char *init_row)
{
    unsigned int n;
    int i;
    u_char *buf;

    n = width * height;

    buf = (char *)malloc(n);
    if (!buf)
        return (NULL);
```
The purpose of the `make_table()` function is to take a width, a height, and an initial row and create a table in memory where each row is initialized to have the same contents as `init_row`. Assume that users have control over the dimensions of the new table: `width` and `height`. If they specify large dimensions, such as a `width` of 1,000,000, and a `height` of 3,000, the function attempts to call `malloc()` for 3,000,000,000 bytes. The allocation likely fails, and the calling function detects the error and handles it gracefully. However, users can cause an arithmetic overflow in the multiplication of `width` and `height` if they make the dimensions just a bit larger. This overflow is potentially exploitable because the allocation is done by multiplying `width` and `height`, but the actual array initialization is done with a `for` loop. So if users specify a `width` of 0x400 and a `height` of 0x1000001, the result of the multiplication is 0x400000400. This value, modulo 0x100000000, is 0x00000400, or 1024. So 1024 bytes would be allocated, but then the `for` loop would copy `init_row` roughly 16 million too many times. A clever attacker might be able to leverage this overflow to take control of the application, depending on the low-level details of the process’s runtime environment.

Take a look at a real-world vulnerability that’s similar to the previous example, found in the OpenSSH server. Listing 6-3 is from the OpenSSH 3.1 challenge-response authentication code: `auth2-chall.c` in the `input_userauth_info_response()` function.

**Listing 6-3**

**Challenge-Response Integer Overflow Example in OpenSSH 3.1**

```c
u_int nresp;
...
    nresp = packet_get_int();
    if (nresp > 0) {
        response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char*));
        for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
            response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
    }
    packet_check_eom();
```

The `nresp` unsigned integer is user controlled, and its purpose is to tell the server how many responses to expect. It’s used to allocate the `response[]` array and fill it with network data. During the allocation of the `response[]` array in the call to `xmalloc()`, `nresp` is multiplied by `sizeof(char*)`, which is typically 4 bytes. If users specify an `nresp` value that’s large enough, a numeric overflow could occur, and the
result of the multiplication could end up being a small number. For example, if
nresp has a value of 0x40000020, the result of the multiplication with 4 is 0x80.
Therefore, 0x80 bytes are allocated, but the following for loop attempts to retrieve
0x40000020 strings from the packet! This turned out to be a critical remotely
exploitable vulnerability.

Now turn your attention to numeric underflows. With unsigned integers,
subtractions can cause a value to wrap under the minimum representable value of
0. The result of an underflow is typically a large positive number because of the
modulus nature of unsigned integers. Here’s a brief example:

unsigned int a;
a=0x10;
a=a-0x30;

Look at the calculation in binary:

```
  0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 0000
-  0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0011 0000
  = 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1110 0000
```

The result you get in a is the bit pattern for 0xffffffff0, which in twos comple-
ment representation is the correct negative value of -0x20. Recall that in modulus
arithmetic, if you advance past the maximum possible value, you wrap around to 0.
A similar phenomenon occurs if you go below the minimum possible value: You
wrap around to the highest possible value. Since a is an unsigned int type, it has a
value of 0xffffffff0 instead of -0x20 after the subtraction. Listing 6-4 is an example of
a numeric underflow involving an unsigned integer.

**Listing 6-4**

*Unsigned Integer Underflow Example*

```c
struct header {
    unsigned int length;
    unsigned int message_type;
};

cchar *read_packet(int sockfd)
{
    int n;
    unsigned int length;
    struct header hdr;
    static char buffer[1024];

    if(full_read(sockfd, (void *)&hdr, sizeof(hdr))<=0){
        error("full_read: %m");
        return NULL;
    }
}
This code reads a packet header from the network and extracts a 32-bit length field into the `length` variable. The `length` variable represents the total number of bytes in the packet, so the program first checks that the data portion of the packet isn’t longer than 1024 bytes to prevent an overflow. It then tries to read the rest of the packet from the network by reading `(length – sizeof(struct header))` bytes into `buffer`. This makes sense, as the code wants to read in the packet’s data portion, which is the total length minus the length of the header.

The vulnerability is that if users supply a length less than `sizeof(struct header)`, the subtraction of `(length – sizeof(struct header))` causes an integer underflow and ends up passing a very large size parameter to `full_read()`. This error could result in a buffer overflow because at that point, `read()` would essentially copy data into the buffer until the connection is closed, which would allow attackers to take control of the process.

**Multiplication Overflows on Intel**

Generally, processors detect when an integer overflow occurs and provide mechanisms for dealing with it; however, they are seldom used for error checking and generally aren’t accessible from C. For example, Intel processors set the overflow flag (OF) in the EFLAGS register when a multiplication causes an overflow, but a C programmer can’t check that flag without using inline assembler. Sometimes this is done for security reasons, such as the NDR unmarshalling routines for handling
MSRPC requests in Windows operating systems. The following code, taken from rpcrt4.dll, is called when unmarshalling various data types from RPC requests:

```
sub_77D6B6D4    proc near

var_of          = dword ptr -4
arg_count       = dword ptr 8
arg_length      = dword ptr 0Ch

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push ecx
and [ebp+var_of], 0
; set overflow flag to 0
push esi
mov esi, [ebp+arg_length]
imul esi, [ebp+arg_count]
; multiply length * count
jno short check_of
mov [ebp+var_of], 1
; if of set, set out flag

check_of:
cmp [ebp+var_of], 0
jnz short raise_ex
; must not overflow
cmp esi, 7FFFFFFFh
jbe short return
; must be a positive int

raise_ex:
push 6C6h
; exception
call RpcRaiseException

return:
mov eax, esi
; return result
pop esi
leave
retn 8
```

Arithmetic Boundary Conditions

continues...
Multiplication Overflows on Intel  Continued
You can see that this function, which multiplies the number of provided elements with the size of each element, does two sanity checks. First, it uses jno to check the overflow flag to make sure the multiplication didn't overflow. Then it makes sure the resulting size is less than or equal to the maximum representable value of a signed integer, 0x7FFFFFFF. If either check fails, the function raises an exception.

Signed Integer Boundaries
Signed integers are a slightly different animal. According to the C specifications, the result of an arithmetic overflow or underflow with a signed integer is implementation defined and could potentially include a machine trap or fault. However, on most common architectures, the results of signed arithmetic overflows are well defined and predictable and don’t result in any kind of exception. These boundary behaviors are a natural consequence of how twos complement arithmetic is implemented at the hardware level, and they should be consistent on mainstream machines.

If you recall, the maximum positive value that can be represented in a twos complement signed integer is one in which all bits are set to 1 except the most significant bit, which is 0. This is because the highest bit indicates the sign of the number, and a value of 1 in that bit indicates that the number is negative. When an operation on a signed integer causes an arithmetic overflow or underflow to occur, the resulting value “wraps around the sign boundary” and typically causes a change in sign. For example, in a 32-bit integer, the value 0x7FFFFFFF is a large positive number. Adding 1 to it produces the result 0x80000000, which is a large negative number. Take a look at another simple example:

```c
int a;
a=0x7FFFFFF0;
a=a+0x100;
```

The result of the addition is -0x7fffffff, or -2,147,483,408. Now look at the calculation in binary:

```
  0111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 0000
+  0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 0000
=  1000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1111 0000
```

The result you get in a is the bit pattern for 0x800000f0, which is the correct result of the addition, but because it’s interpreted as a twos complement number, the value is actually interpreted as -0x7fffffff. In this case, a large positive number plus a small positive number resulted in a large negative number.
With signed addition, you can overflow the sign boundary by causing a positive number to wrap around 0x80000000 and become a negative number. You can also underflow the sign boundary by causing a negative number to wrap below 0x80000000 and become a positive number. Subtraction is identical to addition with a negative number, so you can analyze them as being essentially the same operation. Overflows during multiplication and shifting are also possible, and classifying their results isn’t as easy. Essentially, the bits fall as they may; if a bit happens to end up in the sign bit of the result, the result is negative. Otherwise, it’s not. Arithmetic overflows involving multiplication seem a little tricky at first glance, but attackers can usually make them return useful, targeted values.

**Note**
Throughout this chapter, the `read()` function is used to demonstrate various forms of integer-related flaws. This is a bit of an oversimplification for the purposes of clarity, as many modern systems validate the length argument to `read()` at the system call level. These systems, which include BSDs and the newer Linux 2.6 kernel, check that this argument is less than or equal to the maximum value of a correspondingly sized signed integer, thus minimizing the risk of memory corruption.

Certain unexpected sign changes in arithmetic can lead to subtly exploitable conditions in code. These changes can cause programs to calculate space requirements incorrectly, leading to conditions similar to those that occur when crossing the maximum boundary for unsigned integers. Bugs of this nature typically occur in applications that perform arithmetic on integers taken directly from external sources, such as network data or files. Listing 6-5 is a simple example that shows how crossing the sign boundary can adversely affect an application.

**Listing 6-5**

*Signed Integer Vulnerability Example*

```c
char *read_data(int sockfd) {
    char *buf;
    int length = network_get_int(sockfd);
    if(!((buf = (char *)malloc(MAXCHARS)))
        die("malloc: %m");
    if(length < 0) || length + 1 >= MAXCHARS){
        free(buf);
        die("bad length: %d", value);
    }
```
if(read(sockfd, buf, length) <= 0){
  free(buf);
  die("read: %m");
}

buf[value] = '\0';
return buf;

This example reads an integer from the network and performs some sanity checks on it. First, the length is checked to ensure that it’s greater than or equal to zero and, therefore, positive. Then the length is checked to ensure that it’s less than MAXCHARS. However, in the second part of the length check, 1 is added to the length. This opens an attack vector: A value of 0x7FFFFFFF passes the first check (because it’s greater than 0) and passes the second length check (as 0x7FFFFFFF + 1 is 0x80000000, which is a negative value). `read()` would then be called with an effectively unbounded length argument, leading to a potential buffer overflow situation.

This kind of mistake is easy to make when dealing with signed integers, and it can be equally challenging to spot. Protocols that allow users to specify integers directly are especially prone to this type of vulnerability. To examine this in practice, take a look at a real application that performs an unsafe calculation. The following vulnerability was in the OpenSSL 0.9.6 codebase related to processing Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN.1) encoded data. (ASN.1 is a language used for describing arbitrary messages to be sent between computers, which are encoded using BER, its basic encoding rules.) This encoding is a perfect candidate for a vulnerability of this nature because the protocol deals explicitly with 32-bit integers supplied by untrusted clients. Listing 6-6 is taken from `crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c`—the `ASN1_d2i_fp()` function, which is responsible for reading ASN.1 objects from buffered IO (BIO) streams. This code has been edited for brevity.

**Listing 6-6**  
Integer Sign Boundary Vulnerability Example in OpenSSL 0.9.6

```c
  c.inf=ASN1_get_object(&(c.p),&(c.slen),&(c.tag),&(c.xclass),
                        len-off);

  ...  

  { /* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
    want=(int)c.slen;
    if (want > (len-off))
    {  
      want-=(len-off);
      if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b,len+want))
```

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Type Conversions

This code is called in a loop for retrieving ASN.1 objects. The `ASN1_get_object()` function reads an object header that specifies the length of the next ASN.1 object. This length is placed in the signed integer `c.slen`, which is then assigned to `want`. The ASN.1 object function ensures that this number isn’t negative, so the highest value that can be placed in `c.slen` is 0x7FFFFFFF. At this point, `len` is the amount of data already read in to memory, and `off` is the offset in that data to the object being parsed. So, `(len-off)` is the amount of data read into memory that hasn’t yet been processed by the parser. If the code sees that the object is larger than the available unparsed data, it decides to allocate more space and read in the rest of the object.

The `BUF_MEM_grow()` function is called to allocate the required space in the memory buffer `b`; its second argument is a size parameter. The problem is that the `len+want` expression used for the second argument can be overflowed. Say that upon entering this code, `len` is 200 bytes, and `off` is 50. The attacker specifies an object size of 0x7FFFFFFF, which ends up in `want`. 0x7FFFFFFF is certainly larger than the 150 bytes of remaining data in memory, so the allocation code will be entered. `want` will be subtracted by 150 to reflect the amount of data already read in, giving it a value of 0x7FFFFF69. The call to `BUF_MEM_grow()` will ask for `len+want` bytes, or 0x7FFFFF69 + 200. This is 0x80000031, which is interpreted as a large negative number.

Internally, the `BUF_MEM_grow()` function does a comparison to check its length argument against how much space it has previously allocated. Because a negative number is less than the amount of memory it has already allocated, it assumes everything is fine. So the reallocation is bypassed, and arbitrary amounts of data can be copied into allocated heap data, with severe consequences.

Type Conversions

C is extremely flexible in handling the interaction of different data types. For example, with a few casts, you can easily multiply an unsigned character with a signed long integer, add it to a character pointer, and then pass the result to a function expecting a pointer to a structure. Programmers are used to this flexibility, so they tend to mix data types without worrying too much about what’s going on behind the scenes.
To deal with this flexibility, when the compiler needs to convert an object of one type into another type, it performs what’s known as a type conversion. There are two forms of type conversions: explicit type conversions, in which the programmer explicitly instructs the compiler to convert from one type to another by casting, and implicit type conversions, in which the compiler does “hidden” transformations of variables to make the program function as expected.

**Note**
You might see type conversions referred to as “type coercions” in programming-language literature; the terms are synonymous.

Often it’s surprising when you first learn how many implicit conversions occur behind the scenes in a typical C program. These automatic type conversions, known collectively as the default type conversions, occur almost magically when a programmer performs seemingly straightforward tasks, such as making a function call or comparing two numbers.

The vulnerabilities resulting from type conversions are often fascinating, because they can be subtle and difficult to locate in source code, and they often lead to situations in which the patch for a critical remote vulnerability is as simple as changing a char to an unsigned char. The rules governing these conversions are deceptively subtle, and it’s easy to believe you have a solid grasp of them and yet miss an important nuance that makes a world of difference when you analyze or write code.

Instead of jumping right into known vulnerability classes, first you look at how C compilers perform type conversions at a low level, and then you study the rules of C in detail to learn about all the situations in which conversions take place. This section is fairly long because you have to cover a lot of ground before you have the foundation to analyze C’s type conversions with confidence. However, this aspect of the language is subtle enough that it’s definitely worth taking the time to gain a solid understanding of the ground rules; you can leverage this understanding to find vulnerabilities that most programmers aren’t aware of, even at a conceptual level.

**Overview**
When faced with the general problem of reconciling two different types, C goes to great lengths to avoid surprising programmers. The compilers follow a set of rules that attempt to encapsulate “common sense” about how to manage mixing different types, and more often than not, the result is a program that makes sense and simply does what the programmer intended. That said, applying these rules can often lead to surprising, unexpected behaviors. Moreover, as you might expect, these unexpected behaviors tend to have dire security consequences.
Type Conversions

You start in the next section by exploring the conversion rules, the general rules C uses when converting between types. They dictate how a machine converts from one type to another type at the bit level. After you have a good grasp of how C converts between different types at the machine level, you examine how the compiler chooses which type conversions to apply in the context of C expressions, which involves three important concepts: simple conversions, integer promotions, and usual arithmetic conversions.

Note
Although non-integer types, such as floats and pointers, have some coverage, the primary focus of this discussion is on how C manipulates integers because these conversions are widely misunderstood and are critical for security analysis.

Conversion Rules
The following rules describe how C converts from one type to another, but they don’t describe when conversions are performed or why they are performed.

Note
The following content is specific to two's complement implementations and represents a distilled and pragmatic version of the rules in the C specification.

Integer Types: Value Preservation
An important concept in integer type conversions is the notion of a value-preserving conversion. Basically, if the new type can represent all possible values of the old type, the conversion is said to be value-preserving. In this situation, there’s no way the value can be lost or changed as a result of the conversion. For example, if an unsigned char is converted into an int, the conversion is value-preserving because an int can represent all of the values of an unsigned char. You can verify this by referring to Table 6-2 again. Assuming you’re considering a two's complement machine, you know that an 8-bit unsigned char can represent any value between 0 and 255. You know that a 32-bit int can represent any value between -2147483648 and 2147483647. Therefore, there’s no value the unsigned char can have that the int can’t represent.

Correspondingly, in a value-changing conversion, the old type can contain values that can’t be represented in the new type. For example, if you convert an int into an unsigned int, you have potentially created an intractable situation. The unsigned
int, on a 32-bit machine, has a range of 0 to 4294967295, and the int has a range of -2147483648 to 2147483647. The unsigned int can’t hold any of the negative values a signed int can represent.

According to the C standard, some of the value-changing conversions have implementation-defined results. This is true only for value-changing conversions that have a signed destination type; value-changing conversions to an unsigned type are defined and consistent across all implementations. (If you recall from the boundary condition discussion, this is because unsigned arithmetic is defined as a modulus arithmetic system.) Twos complement machines follow the same basic behaviors, so you can explain how they perform value-changing conversions to signed destination types with a fair amount of confidence.

**Integer Types: Widening**

When you convert from a narrow type to a wider type, the machine typically copies the bit pattern from the old variable to the new variable, and then sets all the remaining high bits in the new variable to 0 or 1. If the source type is unsigned, the machine uses **zero extension**, in which it propagates the value 0 to all high bits in the new wider type. If the source type is signed, the machine uses **sign extension**, in which it propagates the sign bit from the source type to all unused bits in the destination type.

**Warning**
The widening procedure might have some unexpected implications: If a narrow signed type, such as signed char, is converted to a wider unsigned type, such as unsigned int, sign extension occurs.

Figure 6-1 shows a value-preserving conversion of an unsigned char with a value of 5 to a signed int.

![Figure 6-1](Conversion of unsigned char to int (zero extension, big endian))

The character is placed into the integer, and the value is preserved. At the bit pattern level, this simply involved zero extension: clearing out the high bits and moving the least significant byte (LSB) into the new object’s LSB.
Now consider a signed char being converted into an int. An int can represent all the values of a signed char, so this conversion is also value-preserving. Figure 6-2 shows what this conversion looks like at the bit level.

This situation is slightly different, as the value is the same, but the transformation is more involved. The bit representation of -5 in a signed char is 1111 1011. The bit representation of -5 in an int is 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1011. To do the conversion, the compiler generates assembly that performs sign extension. You can see in Figure 6-2 that the sign bit is set in the signed char, so to preserve the value -5, the sign bit has to be copied to the other 24 bits of the int.

The previous examples are value-preserving conversions. Now consider a value-changing widening conversion. Say you convert a signed char with a value of -5 to an unsigned int. Because the source type is signed, you perform sign extension on the signed char before placing it in the unsigned int (see Figure 6-3).

As mentioned previously, this result can be surprising to developers. You explore its security ramifications in “Sign Extension” later in this chapter. This conversion is value changing because an unsigned int can’t represent values less than 0.

**Integer Types: Narrowing**

When converting from a wider type to a narrower type, the machine uses only one mechanism: **truncation**. The bits from the wider type that don’t fit in the new narrower type are dropped. Figures 6-4 and 6-5 show two narrowing conversions. Note that all narrowing conversions are value-changing because you’re losing precision.
Integer Types: Signed and Unsigned

One final type of integer conversion to consider: If a conversion occurs between a signed type and an unsigned type of the same width, nothing is changed in the bit pattern. This conversion is value-changing. For example, say you have the signed integer -1, which is represented in binary as 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111.

If you interpret this same bit pattern as an unsigned integer, you see a value of 4,294,967,295. The conversion is summarized in Figure 6-6. The conversion from unsigned int to int technically might be implementation defined, but it works in the same fashion: The bit pattern is left alone, and the value is interpreted in the context of the new type (see Figure 6-7).

Figure 6-6 Conversion of int to unsigned int (big endian)

Figure 6-5 Conversion of integer to signed char (truncation, big endian)
Here are some practical rules of thumb for integer type conversions:

- When you convert from a narrower signed type to a wider unsigned type, the compiler emits assembly to do sign extension, and the value of the object might change.
- When you convert from a narrower signed type to a wider signed type, the compiler emits assembly to do sign extension, and the value of the object is preserved.
- When you convert from a narrower unsigned type to a wider type, the compiler emits assembly to do zero extension, and the value of the object is preserved.
- When you convert from a wider type to a narrower type, the compiler emits assembly to do truncation, and the value of the object might change.
- When you convert between signed and unsigned types of the same width, the compiler effectively does nothing, the bit pattern stays the same, and the value of the object might change.

Table 6-4 summarizes the processing that occurs when different integer types are converted in two's complement implementations of C. As you cover the information in the following sections, this table can serve as a useful reference for recalling how a conversion occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-4</th>
<th>Integer Type Conversion in C (Source on Left, Destination on Top)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>signed char</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signed char</td>
<td>Compatible types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bit pattern same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6-7 Conversion of unsigned int to signed int (big endian)
### Table 6-4 continued

**Integer Type Conversion in C (Source on Left, Destination on Top)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
<th>Destination Type</th>
<th>Implementation Defined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signed char</td>
<td>Value compatible types</td>
<td>Unsigned char</td>
<td>Value preserving Zero extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bit pattern same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short int</td>
<td>Value changing types</td>
<td>Unsigned int</td>
<td>Value changing Bit pattern same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truncation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsigned short int</td>
<td>Value changing types</td>
<td>Short int</td>
<td>Value changing Bit pattern same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truncation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int</td>
<td>Value changing types</td>
<td>Unsigned int</td>
<td>Value changing Bit pattern same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truncation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation defined</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsigned int</td>
<td>Value changing types</td>
<td>Int</td>
<td>Value changing Bit pattern same</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Truncation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation defined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Floating Point and Complex Types**

Although vulnerabilities caused by the use of floating point arithmetic haven't been widely published, they are certainly possible. There's certainly the possibility of subtle errors surfacing in financial software related to floating point type conversions or representation issues. The discussion of floating point types in this chapter is fairly brief. For more information, refer to the C standards documents and the previously mentioned C programming references.

The C standard's rules for conversions between real floating types and integer types leave a lot of room for implementation-defined behaviors. In a conversion from a real type to an integer type, the fractional portion of the number is...
discarded. If the integer type can't represent the integer portion of the floating point number, the result is undefined. Similarly, a conversion from an integer type to a real type transfers the value over if possible. If the real type can't represent the integer's value but can come close, the compiler rounds the integer to the next highest or lowest number in an implementation-defined manner. If the integer is outside the range of the real type, the result is undefined.

Conversions between floating point types of different precision are handled with similar logic. Promotion causes no change in value. During a demotion that causes a change in value, the compiler is free to round numbers, if possible, in an implementation-defined manner. If rounding isn’t possible because of the range of the target type, the result is undefined.

Other Types
There are myriad other types in C beyond integers and floats, including pointers, Booleans, structures, unions, functions, arrays, enums, and more. For the most part, conversion among these types isn’t quite as critical from a security perspective, so they aren’t extensively covered in this chapter.

Pointer arithmetic is covered in “Pointer Arithmetic” later in this chapter. Pointer type conversion depends largely on the underlying machine architecture, and many conversions are specified as implementation defined. Essentially, programmers are free to convert pointers into integers and back, and convert pointers from one type to another. The results are implementation defined, and programmers need to be cognizant of alignment restrictions and other low-level details.

Simple Conversions
Now that you have a good idea how C converts from one integer type to another, you can look at some situations where these type conversions occur. Simple conversions are C expressions that use straightforward applications of conversion rules.

Casts
As you know, typecasts are C’s mechanism for letting programmers specify an explicit type conversion, as shown in this example:

(unsigned char) bob

Whatever type bob happens to be, this expression converts it into an unsigned char type. The resulting type of the expression is unsigned char.

Assignments
Simple type conversion also occurs in the assignment operator. The compiler must convert the type of the right operand into the type of the left operand, as shown in this example:
short int fred;
int bob = -10;

fred = bob;

For both assignments, the compiler must take the object in the right operand and convert it into the type of the left operand. The conversion rules tell you that conversion from the int bob to the short int fred results in truncation.

Function Calls: Prototypes
C has two styles of function declarations: the old K&R style, in which parameter types aren’t specified in the function declaration, and the new ANSI style, in which the parameter types are part of the declaration. In the ANSI style, the use of function prototypes is still optional, but it’s common. With the ANSI style, you typically see something like this:

```c
int dostuff(int jim, unsigned char bob);
```

```c
void func(void)
{
    char a = 42;
    unsigned short b = 43;
    long long int c;

    c = dostuff(a, b);
}
```

The function declaration for `dostuff()` contains a prototype that tells the compiler the number of arguments and their types. The rule of thumb is that if the function has a prototype, the types are converted in a straightforward fashion using the rules documented previously. If the function doesn’t have a prototype, something called the default argument promotions kicks in (explained in "Integer Promotions").

The previous example has a character (a) being converted into an int (jim), an unsigned short (b) being converted into an unsigned char (bob), and an int (the `dostuff()` function’s return value) being converted into a long long int (c).

Function Calls: return
`return` does a conversion of its operand to the type specified in the enclosing function’s definition. For example, the int a is converted into a char data type by `return`:
char func(void)
{
    int a=42;
    return a;
}

**Integer Promotions**

*Integer promotions* specify how C takes a narrow integer data type, such as a char or short, and converts it to an int (or, in rare cases, to an unsigned int). This up-conversion, or promotion, is used for two different purposes:

- Certain operators in C require an integer operand of type int or unsigned int. For these operators, C uses the integer promotion rules to transform a narrower integer operand into the correct type—int or unsigned int.

- Integer promotions are a critical component of C’s rules for handling arithmetic expressions, which are called the **usual arithmetic conversions**. For arithmetic expressions involving integers, integer promotions are usually applied to both operands.

**Note**

You might see the terms “integer promotions” and “integral promotions” used interchangeably in other literature, as they are synonymous.

There’s a useful concept from the C standards: Each integer data type is assigned what’s known as an **integer conversion rank**. These ranks order the integer data types by their width from lowest to highest. The signed and unsigned varieties of each type are assigned the same rank. The following abridged list sorts integer types by conversion rank from high to low. The C standard assigns ranks to other integer types, but this list should suffice for this discussion:

- long long int, unsigned long long int
- long int, unsigned long int
- unsigned int, int
- unsigned short, short
- char, unsigned char, signed char
- _Bool
Basically, any place in C where you can use an int or unsigned int, you can also use any integer type with a lower integer conversion rank. This means you can use smaller types, such as chars and short ints, in the place of ints in C expressions. You can also use a bit field of type _Bool, int, signed int, or unsigned int. The bit fields aren’t ascribed integer conversion ranks, but they are treated as narrower than their corresponding base type. This makes sense because a bit field of an int is usually smaller than an int, and at its widest, it’s the same width as an int.

If you apply the integer promotions to a variable, what happens? First, if the variable isn’t an integer type or a bit field, the promotions do nothing. Second, if the variable is an integer type, but its integer conversion rank is greater than or equal to that of an int, the promotions do nothing. Therefore, ints, unsigned ints, long ints, pointers, and floats don’t get altered by the integer promotions.

So, the integer promotions are responsible for taking a narrower integer type or bit field and promoting it to an int or unsigned int. This is done in a straightforward fashion: If a value-preserving transformation to an int can be performed, it’s done. Otherwise, a value-preserving conversion to an unsigned int is performed.

In practice, this means almost everything is converted to an int, as an int can hold the minimum and maximum values of all the smaller types. The only types that might be promoted to an unsigned int are unsigned int bit fields with 32 bits or perhaps some implementation-specific extended integer types.

### Historical Note
The C89 standard made an important change to the C type conversion rules. In the K&R days of the C language, integer promotions were unsigned-preserving rather than value-preserving. So with the current C rules, if a narrower, unsigned integer type, such as an unsigned char, is promoted to a wider, signed integer, such as an int, value conversion dictates that the new type is a signed integer. With the old rules, the promotion would preserve the unsigned-ness, so the resulting type would be an unsigned int. This changed the behavior of many signed/unsigned comparisons that involved promotions of types narrower than int.

### Integer Promotions Summary
The basic rule of thumb is this: If an integer type is narrower than an int, integer promotions almost always convert it to an int. Table 6-5 summarizes the result of integer promotions on a few common types.
Table 6-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Result Type</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unsigned char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Promote; source rank less than int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>char</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Promote; source rank less than int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Promote; source rank less than int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned short</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Promote; source rank less than int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int: 24</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Promote; bit field of unsigned int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int: 32</td>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>Promote; bit field of unsigned int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>Don’t promote; source rank equal to int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>Don’t promote; source rank equal to int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long int</td>
<td>long int</td>
<td>Don’t promote; source rank greater than int rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>float</td>
<td>float</td>
<td>Don’t promote; source not of integer type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>char *</td>
<td>char *</td>
<td>Don’t promote; source not of integer type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integer Promotion Applications

Now that you understand integer promotions, the following sections examine where they are used in the C language.

Unary + Operator

The unary + operator performs integer promotions on its operand. For example, if the bob variable is of type char, the resulting type of the expression (+bob) is int, whereas the resulting type of the expression (bob) is char.

Unary - Operator

The unary - operator does integer promotion on its operand and then does a negation. Regardless of whether the operand is signed after the promotion, a twos complement negation is performed, which involves inverting the bits and adding 1.

The Leblancian Paradox

David Leblanc is an accomplished researcher and author, and one of the world’s foremost experts on integer issues in C and C++. He documented a fascinating nuance of twos complement arithmetic that he discovered while working on the SafeInt class with his colleague Atin Bansal (http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/dncode/html/secure01142004.asp). To negate a twos complement number, you flip all the bits and add 1 to the result. Assuming a 32-bit signed data type, what’s the inverse of 0x80000000?

continues...
The Leblancian Paradox  Continued

If you flip all the bits, you get 0x7fffffff. If you add 1, you get 0x80000000. So the unary negation of this corner-case number is itself!

This idiosyncrasy can come into play when developers use negative integers to represent a special sentinel set of numbers or attempt to take the absolute value of an integer. In the following code, the intent is for a negative index to specify a secondary hash table. This works fine unless attackers can specify an index of 0x80000000. The negation of the number results in no change in the value, and 0x80000000 % 1000 is -648, which causes memory before the array to be modified.

```c
int bank1[1000], bank2[1000];
...
void hashbank(int index, int value)
{
    int *bank = bank1;

    if (index<0) {
        bank = bank2;
        index = -index;
    }

    bank[index % 1000] = value;
}
```

Unary ~ Operator

The unary ~ operator does a ones complement of its operand after doing an integer promotion of its operand. This effectively performs the same operation on both signed and unsigned operands for two's complement implementations: It inverts the bits.

Bitwise Shift Operators

The bitwise shift operators >> and << shift the bit patterns of variables. The integer promotions are applied to both arguments of these operators, and the type of the result is the same as the promoted type of the left operand, as shown in this example:
char a = 1;
char c = 16;
int bob;
bob = a << c;

a is converted to an integer, and c is converted to an integer. The promoted type of the left operand is int, so the type of the result is an int. The integer representation of a is left-shifted 16 times.

Switch Statements
Integer promotions are used in switch statements. The general form of a switch statement is something like this:

switch (controlling expression)
{
    case (constant integer expression): body;
        break;
    default: body;
        break;
}

The integer promotions are used in the following way: First, they are applied to the controlling expression, so that expression has a promoted type. Then, all the integer constants are converted to the type of the promoted control expression.

Function Invocations
Older C programs using the K&R semantics don’t specify the data types of arguments in their function declarations. When a function is called without a prototype, the compiler has to do something called default argument promotions. Basically, integer promotions are applied to each function argument, and any arguments of the float type are converted to arguments of the double type. Consider the following example:

int jim(bob)
char bob;
{
    printf("bob=%d\n", bob);
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
In this example, a copy of the value of `a` is passed to the `jim()` function. The char type is first run through the integer promotions and transformed into an integer. This integer is what’s passed to the `jim()` function. The code the compiler emits for the `jim()` function is expecting an integer argument, and it performs a direct conversion of that integer back into a char format for the `bob` variable.

**Usual Arithmetic Conversions**

In many situations, C is expected to take two operands of potentially divergent types and perform some arithmetic operation that involves both of them. The C standards spell out a general algorithm for reconciling two types into a compatible type for this purpose. This procedure is known as the **usual arithmetic conversions**. The goal of these conversions is to transform both operands into a **common real type**, which is used for the actual operation and then as the type of the result. These conversions apply only to the arithmetic types—integer and floating point types. The following sections tackle the conversion rules.

**Rule 1: Floating Points Take Precedence**

Floating point types take precedence over integer types, so if one of the arguments in an arithmetic expression is a floating point type, the other argument is converted to a floating point type. If one floating point argument is less precise than the other, the less precise argument is promoted to the type of the more precise argument.

**Rule 2: Apply Integer Promotions**

If you have two operands and neither is a float, you get into the rules for reconciling integers. First, integer promotions are performed on both operands. *This is an extremely important piece of the puzzle!* If you recall from the previous section, this means any integer type smaller than an int is converted into an int, and anything that’s the same width as an int, larger than an int, or not an integer type is left alone. Here’s a brief example:

```c
unsigned char jim = 255;
unsigned char bob = 255;
if ((jim + bob) > 300) do_something();
```

In this expression, the `+` operator causes the usual arithmetic conversions to be applied to its operands. This means both `jim` and `bob` are promoted to ints, the
addition takes place, and the resulting type of the expression is an int that holds the result of the addition (510). Therefore, do_something() is called, even though it looks like the addition could cause a numeric overflow. To summarize: Whenever there’s arithmetic involving types narrower than an integer, the narrow types are promoted to integers behind the scenes. Here’s another brief example:

```c
unsigned short a=1;
if ((a-5) < 0) do_something();
```

Intuition would suggest that if you have an unsigned short with the value 1, and it’s subtracted by 5, it underflows around 0 and ends up containing a large value. However, if you test this fragment, you see that do_something() is called because both operands of the subtraction operator are converted to ints before the comparison. So a is converted from an unsigned short to an int, and then an int with a value of 5 is subtracted from it. The resulting value is -4, which is a valid integer value, so the comparison is true. Note that if you did the following, do_something() wouldn’t be called:

```c
unsigned short a=1;
a=a-5;
if (a < 0) do_something();
```

The integer promotion still occurs with the (a-5), but the resulting integer value of -4 is placed back into the unsigned short a. As you know, this causes a simple conversion from signed int to unsigned short, which causes truncation to occur, and a ends up with a large positive value. Therefore, the comparison doesn’t succeed.

**Rule 3: Same Type After Integer Promotions**

If the two operands are of the same type after integer promotions are applied, you don’t need any further conversions because the arithmetic should be straightforward to carry out at the machine level. This can happen if both operands have been promoted to an int by integer promotions, or if they just happen to be of the same type and weren’t affected by integer promotions.

**Rule 4: Same Sign, Different Types**

If the two operands have different types after integer promotions are applied, but they share the same signed-ness, the narrower type is converted to the type of the wider type. In other words, if both operands are signed or both operands are unsigned, the type with the lesser integer conversion rank is converted to the type of the operand with the higher conversion rank.

Note that this rule has nothing to do with short integers or characters because they have already been converted to integers by integer promotions. This rule is
more applicable to arithmetic involving types of larger sizes, such as long long int or long int. Here’s a brief example:

```c
int jim = 5;
long int bob = 6;
long long int fred;
fred = (jim + bob)
```

Integer promotions don’t change any types because they are of equal or higher width than the int type. So this rule mandates that the int jim be converted into a long int before the addition occurs. The resulting type, a long int, is converted into a long long int by the assignment to fred.

In the next section, you consider operands of different types, in which one is signed and the other is unsigned, which gets interesting from a security perspective.

**Rule 5: Unsigned Type Wider Than or Same Width as Signed Type**

The first rule for this situation is that if the unsigned operand is of greater integer conversion rank than the signed operand, or their ranks are equal, you convert the signed operand to the type of the unsigned operand. This behavior can be surprising, as it leads to situations like this:

```c
int jim = -5;
if (jim < sizeof (int))
    do_something();
```

The comparison operator `<` causes the usual arithmetic conversions to be applied to both operands. Integer promotions are applied to jim and to sizeof (int), but they don’t affect them. Then you continue into the usual arithmetic conversions and attempt to figure out which type should be the common type for the comparison. In this case, jim is a signed integer, and sizeof (int) is a size_t, which is an unsigned integer type. Because size_t has a greater integer conversion rank, the unsigned type takes precedence by this rule. Therefore, jim is converted to an unsigned integer type, the comparison fails, and do_something() isn’t called. On a 32-bit system, the actual comparison is as follows:

```c
if (4294967291 < 4)
    do_something();
```

**Rule 6: Signed Type Wider Than Unsigned Type, Value Preservation Possible**

If the signed operand is of greater integer conversion rank than the unsigned operand, and a value-preserving conversion can be made from the unsigned integer type to the signed integer type, you choose to transform everything to the signed integer type, as in this example:
long long int a=10;
unsigned int b = 5;
(a+b);

The signed argument, a long long int, can represent all the values of the unsigned argument, an unsigned int, so the compiler would convert both operands to the signed operand’s type: long long int.

**Rule 7: Signed Type Wider Than Unsigned Type, Value Preservation Impossible**

There’s one more rule: If the signed integer type has a greater integer conversion rank than the unsigned integer type, but all values of the unsigned integer type can’t be held in the signed integer type, you have to do something a little strange. You take the type of the signed integer type, convert it to its corresponding unsigned integer type, and then convert both operands to use that type. Here’s an example:

unsigned int a = 10;
long int b=20;
(a+b);

For the purpose of this example, assume that on this machine, the long int size has the same width as the int size. The addition operator causes the usual arithmetic conversions to be applied. Integer promotions are applied, but they don’t change the types. The signed type (long int) is of higher rank than the unsigned type (unsigned int). The signed type (long int) can’t hold all the values of the unsigned type (unsigned int), so you’re left with the last rule. You take the type of the signed operand, which is a long int, convert it into its corresponding unsigned equivalent, unsigned long int, and then convert both operands to unsigned long int. The addition expression, therefore, has a resulting type of unsigned long int and a value of 30.

**Summary of Arithmetic Conversions**

The following is a summary of the usual arithmetic conversions. Table 6-6 demonstrates some sample applications of the usual arithmetic conversions.

- If either operand is a floating point number, convert all operands to the floating point type of the highest precision operand. You’re finished.
- Perform integer promotions on both operands. If the two operands are now of the same type, you’re finished.
- If the two operands share the same signed-ness, convert the operand with the lower integer conversion rank to the type of the operand of the higher integer conversion rank. You’re finished.
• If the unsigned operand is of higher or equal integer conversion rank than the signed operand, convert the signed operand to the type of the unsigned operand. You’re finished.

• If the signed operand is of higher integer conversion rank than the unsigned operand, and you can perform a value-preserving conversion, convert the unsigned operand to the signed operand’s type. You’re finished.

• If the signed operand is of higher integer conversion rank than the unsigned operand, but you can’t perform a value-preserving conversion, convert both operands to the unsigned type that corresponds to the type of the signed operand.

Table 6-6
Usual Arithmetic Conversion Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left Operand Type</th>
<th>RightOperand Type</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Common Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>int</td>
<td>float</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to float</td>
<td>float</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>double</td>
<td>char</td>
<td>1. Right operand converted to double</td>
<td>double</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>1. Right operand converted to unsigned int</td>
<td>unsigned int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned short</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned char</td>
<td>unsigned short</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to int, 2. Right operand converted to int</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int: 32</td>
<td>short</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to unsigned int, 2. Right operand converted to int, 3. Right operand converted to unsigned int</td>
<td>unsigned int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>long int</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to unsigned long int</td>
<td>unsigned long int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>long long int</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to long long int</td>
<td>long long int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unsigned int</td>
<td>unsigned long long int</td>
<td>1. Left operand converted to unsigned long long int</td>
<td>unsigned long long int</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Usual Arithmetic Conversion Applications

Now that you have a grasp of the usual arithmetic conversions, you can look at where these conversions are used.
Type Conversions

Addition
Addition can occur between two arithmetic types as well as between a pointer type and an arithmetic type. Pointer arithmetic is explained in “Pointer Arithmetic,” but for now, you just need to note that when both arguments are an arithmetic type, the compiler applies the usual arithmetic conversions to them.

Subtraction
There are three types of subtraction: subtraction between two arithmetic types, subtraction between a pointer and an arithmetic type, and subtraction between two pointer types. In subtraction between two arithmetic types, C applies the usual arithmetic conversions to both operands.

Multiplicative Operators
The operands to * and / must be an arithmetic type, and the arguments to % must be an integer type. The usual arithmetic conversions are applied to both operands of these operators.

Relational and Equality Operators
When two arithmetic operands are compared, the usual arithmetic conversions are applied to both operands. The resulting type is an int, and its value is 1 or 0, depending on the result of the test.

Binary Bitwise Operators
The binary bitwise operators &-, ^, and | require integer operands. The usual arithmetic conversions are applied to both operands.

Question Mark Operator
From a type conversion perspective, the conditional operator is one of C’s more interesting operators. Here’s a short example of how it’s commonly used:

```c
int a=1;
unsigned int b=2;
int choice=-1;
...
result = choice ? a : b ;
```

In this example, the first operand, choice, is evaluated as a scalar. If it’s set, the result of the expression is the evaluation of the second operand, which is a. If it’s not set, the result is the evaluation of the third operand, b.

The compiler has to know at compile time the result type of the conditional expression, which could be tricky in this situation. What C does is determine which type would be the result of running the usual arithmetic conversions against the
second and third arguments, and it makes that type the resulting type of the expression. So in the previous example, the expression results in an unsigned int, regardless of the value of choice.

Type Conversion Summary
Table 6-7 shows the details of some common type conversions.

Table 6-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Operand Types</th>
<th>Conversions</th>
<th>Resulting Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Typcast</td>
<td>Expression is converted to type using simple conversions</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(type)expression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assignment =</td>
<td>Right operand converted to left operand type using simple conversions</td>
<td>Type of left operand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function call with prototype</td>
<td>Arguments converted using simple conversions according to prototype</td>
<td>Return type of function</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function call without prototype</td>
<td>Arguments promoted via default argument promotions, which are essentially integer promotions</td>
<td>int</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unary +, -</td>
<td>Operand must be arithmetic type</td>
<td>Operand undergoes integer promotions</td>
<td>Promoted type of operand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unary ~</td>
<td>Operand must be integer type</td>
<td>Operand undergoes integer promotions</td>
<td>Promoted type of operand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitwise &lt;&lt; and &gt;&gt;</td>
<td>Operands must be integer type</td>
<td>Operands undergo integer promotions</td>
<td>Promoted type of left operand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>switch statement</td>
<td>Expression must have integer type</td>
<td>Expression undergoes integer promotion; cases are converted to that type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary +, -</td>
<td>Operands must be arithmetic type</td>
<td>Operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</td>
<td>Common type from usual arithmetic conversions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Type Conversions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Binary * and /</th>
<th>Operands must be arithmetic type</th>
<th>Operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</th>
<th>Common type from usual arithmetic conversions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binary %</td>
<td>Operands must be integer type</td>
<td>Operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</td>
<td>Common type from usual arithmetic conversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary subscript [ ] a[b]</td>
<td>Interpreted as *(a)+(b))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unary !</td>
<td>Operand must be arithmetic type or pointer</td>
<td></td>
<td>int, value 0 or 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sizeof</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>size_t (unsigned integer type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary &lt; &gt; &lt;= =&gt; == !=</td>
<td>Operands must be arithmetic type *Pointer arithmetic covered in “Pointer Arithmetic”</td>
<td>Operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</td>
<td>int, value 0 or 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary &amp; ^</td>
<td>Operands must be integer type</td>
<td>Operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</td>
<td>Common type from usual arithmetic conversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary &amp;&amp;</td>
<td>Operands must be arithmetic type or pointer</td>
<td>Operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</td>
<td>int, value 0 or 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional ?</td>
<td>2nd and 3rd operands must be arithmetic type or pointer</td>
<td>Second and third operands undergo usual arithmetic conversions</td>
<td>Common type from usual arithmetic conversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Type of right operand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Auditing Tip: Type Conversions

Even those who have studied conversions extensively might still be surprised at the way a compiler renders certain expressions into assembly. When you see code that strikes you as suspicious or potentially ambiguous, never hesitate to write a simple test program or study the generated assembly to verify your intuition.

If you do generate assembly to verify or explore the conversions discussed in this chapter, be aware that C compilers can optimize out certain conversions or use architectural tricks that might make the assembly appear incorrect or inconsistent. At a conceptual level,
compilers are behaving as the C standard describes, and they ultimately generate code that follows the rules. However, the assembly might look inconsistent because of optimizations or even incorrect, as it might manipulate portions of registers that should be unused.

### Type Conversion Vulnerabilities

Now that you have a solid grasp of C’s type conversions, you can explore some of the exceptional circumstances they can create. Implicit type conversions can catch programmers off-guard in several situations. This section focuses on simple conversions between signed and unsigned types, sign extension, truncation, and the usual arithmetic conversions, focusing on comparisons.

#### Signed/Unsigned Conversions

Most security issues related to type conversions are the result of simple conversions between signed and unsigned integers. This discussion is limited to conversions that occur as a result of assignment, function calls, or typecasts.

For a quick recap of the simple conversion rules, when a signed variable is converted to an unsigned variable of the same size, the bit pattern is left alone, and the value changes correspondingly. The same thing occurs when an unsigned variable is converted to a signed variable. Technically, the unsigned-to-signed conversion is implementation defined, but in two's complement implementations, usually the bit pattern is left alone.

The most important situation in which this conversion becomes relevant is during function calls, as shown in this example:

```c
int copy(char *dst, char *src, unsigned int len)
{
    while (len--)
        *dst++ = *src++;
}
```

The third argument is an unsigned int that represents the length of the memory section to copy. If you call this function and pass a signed int as the third argument, it’s converted to an unsigned integer. For example, say you do this:

```c
int f = -1;
copy(mydst, mysrc, f);
```
The copy() function sees an extremely large positive len and most likely copies until it causes a segmentation fault. Most libc routines that take a size parameter have an argument of type size_t, which is an unsigned integer type that’s the same width as pointer. This is why you must be careful never to let a negative length field make its way to a libc routine, such as snprintf(), strncpy(), memcpy(), read(), orstrncat().

This situation occurs fairly often, particularly when signed integers are used for length values and the programmer doesn’t consider the potential for a value less than 0. In this case, all values less than 0 have their value changed to a high positive number when they are converted to an unsigned type. Malicious users can often specify negative integers through various program interfaces and undermine an application’s logic. This type of bug happens commonly when a maximum length check is performed on a user-supplied integer, but no check is made to see whether the integer is negative, as in Listing 6-7.

Listing 6-7
Signed Comparison Vulnerability Example

```c
int read_user_data(int sockfd)
{
    int length, sockfd, n;
    char buffer[1024];

    length = get_user_length(sockfd);

    if(length > 1024){
        error("illegal input, not enough room in buffer\n");
        return -1;
    }

    if(read(sockfd, buffer, length) < 0){
        error("read: %m");
        return -1;
    }

    return 0;
}
```

In Listing 6-7, assume that the get_user_length() function reads a 32-bit integer from the network. If the length the user supplies is negative, the length check can be evaded, and the application can be compromised. A negative length is converted to a size_t type for the call to read(), which as you know, turns into a large unsigned value. A code reviewer should always consider the implications of negative values in signed types and see whether unexpected results can be produced that could lead to security exposures. In this case, a buffer overflow can be triggered because of the erroneous length check; consequently, the oversight is quite serious.
Auditing Tip: Signed/Unsigned Conversions
You want to look for situations in which a function takes a size_t or unsigned int length parameter, and the programmer passes in a signed integer that can be influenced by users. Good functions to look for include read(), recvfrom(), memcpy(), memset(), bcopy(), snprintf(), strncat(), strncpy(), and malloc(). If users can coerce the program into passing in a negative value, the function interprets it as a large value, which could lead to an exploitable condition.

Also, look for places where length parameters are read from the network directly or are specified by users via some input mechanism. If the length is interpreted as a signed variable in parts of the code, you should evaluate the impact of a user supplying a negative value.

As you review functions in an application, it’s a good idea to note the data types of each function’s arguments in your function audit log. This way, every time you audit a subsequent call to that function, you can simply compare the types and examine the type conversion tables in this chapter’s “Type Conversions” section to predict exactly what’s going to happen and the implications of that conversion. You learn more about analyzing functions and keeping logs of function prototypes and behavior in Chapter 7, “Program Building Blocks.”

Sign Extension
Sign extension occurs when a smaller signed integer type is converted to a larger type, and the machine propagates the sign bit of the smaller type through the unused bits of the larger type. The intent of sign extension is that the conversion is value-preserving when going from a smaller signed type to a larger signed type.

As you know, sign extension can occur in several ways. First, if a simple conversion is made from a small signed type to a larger type, with a typecast, assignment, or function call, sign extension occurs. You also know that sign extension occurs if a signed type smaller than an integer is promoted via the integer promotions. Sign extension could also occur as a result of the usual arithmetic conversions applied after integer promotions because a signed integer type could be promoted to a larger type, such as long long.

Sign extension is a natural part of the language, and it’s necessary for value-preserving promotions of integers. So why is it mentioned as a security issue? There are two reasons:
In certain cases, sign extension is a value-changing conversion that has an unexpected result.

Programmers consistently forget that the char and short types they use are signed!

To examine the first reason, if you recall from the conversion section, one of the more interesting findings was that sign extension is performed if a smaller signed type is converted into a larger unsigned type. Say a programmer does something like this:

```c
char len;

len=get_len_field();
snprintf(dst, len, "%s", src);
```

This code has disaster written all over it. If the result of `get_len_field()` is such that `len` has a value less than 0, that negative value is passed as the length argument to `snprintf()`. Say the programmer tries to fix this error and does the following:

```c
char len;

len=get_len_field();
snprintf(dst, (unsigned int)len, "%s", src);
```

This solution sort of makes sense. An unsigned integer can’t be negative, right? Unfortunately, sign extension occurs during the conversion from char to unsigned int, so the attempt to get rid of characters less than 0 backfired. If `len` happens to be below 0, `(unsigned int)len` ends up with a large value.

This example might seem somewhat arbitrary, but it’s similar to an actual bug the authors recently discovered in a client’s code. The moral of the story is that you should always remember sign extension is applied when converting from a smaller signed type to a larger unsigned type.

Now for the second reason—programmers consistently forget that the char and short types they use are signed. This statement rings quite true, especially in network code that deals with signed integer lengths or code that processes binary or text data one character at a time. Take a look at a real-world vulnerability in the DNS packet-parsing code of lopht’s antisniff tool (http://packetstormsecurity.org/sniffers/antisniff/). It’s an excellent bug for demonstrating some vulnerabilities that have been discussed. A buffer overflow was first discovered in the software involving the improper use of `strncat()`, and after that vulnerability was patched, researchers from TESO discovered that it was still vulnerable because of a sign-extension issue. The fix for the sign-extension issue wasn’t correct, and yet another
vulnerability was published. The following examples take you through the timeline of this vulnerability.

Listing 6-8 contains the slightly edited vulnerable code from version 1 of the antisniff research release, in the raw_watchdns.c file in the watch_dns_ptr() function.

**Listing 6-8**

*Antisniff v1.0 Vulnerability*

```c
char *indx;
int count;
char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;

while (count){
  (char *)indx++;
  strncat(nameStr, (char *)indx, count);
  indx += count;
  count = (char)*indx;
  strncat(nameStr, ".",
    sizeof(nameStr) - strlen(nameStr));
}
nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';
```

Before you can understand this code, you need a bit of background. The purpose of the watch_dns_ptr() function is to extract the domain name from the packet and copy it into the nameStr string. The DNS domain names in DNS packets sort of resemble Pascal strings. Each label in the domain name is prefixed by a byte containing its length. The domain name ends when you reach a label of size 0. (The DNS compression scheme isn’t relevant to this vulnerability.) Figure 6-8 shows what a DNS domain name looks like in a packet. There are three labels—test, jim, and com—and a 0-length label specifying the end of the name.

**Figure 6-8**  Sample DNS domain name

```
  4 t e s t 3 j i m 3 c o m 0
```

test.jim.com
The code starts by reading the first length byte from the packet and storing it in the integer `count`. This length byte is a signed character stored in an integer, so you should be able to put any value you like between -128 and 127 in `count`. Keep this in mind for later.

The `while()` loop keeps reading in labels and calling `strncat()` on them to the `nameStr` string. The first vulnerability that was published is no length check in this loop. If you just provide a long enough domain name in the packet, it could write past the bounds of `nameStr[]`. Listing 6-9 shows how this issue was fixed in version 1.1 of the research version.

Listing 6-9

Antisniff v1.1 Vulnerability

```c
char *indx;
int count;
char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;
while (count){
    if (strlen(nameStr) + count < ( MAX_LEN - 1) ){
        (char *)indx++;
        strncat(nameStr, (char *)indx, count);
        indx += count;
        count = (char)*indx;
        strncat(nameStr, ".", sizeof(nameStr) - strlen(nameStr));
    } else {
        fprintf(stderr, "Alert! Someone is attempting "
                "to send LONG DNS packets\n");
        count = 0;
    }
}
nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';
```

The code is basically the same, but length checks have been added to try to prevent the buffer from being overflowed. At the top of the loop, the program checks to make sure there’s enough space in the buffer for `count` bytes before it does the string concatenation. Now examine this code with sign-extension vulnerabilities in mind. You know that `count` can be any value between -128 and 127, so what happens if you give a negative value for `count`? Look at the length check:

```c
if (strlen(nameStr) + count < ( MAX_LEN - 1) ){
```
You know that strlen(nameStr) is going to return a size_t, which is effectively an unsigned int on a 32-bit system, and you know that count is an integer below 0. Say you’ve been through the loop once, and strlen(nameStr) is 5, and count is -1. For the addition, count is converted to an unsigned integer, and you have (5 + 4,294,967,295). This addition can easily cause a numeric overflow so that you end up with a small value, such as 4; 4 is less than (MAX_LEN - 1), which is 256. So far, so good. Next, you see that count (which you set to -1), is passed in as the length argument to strncat(). The strncat() function takes a size_t, so it interprets that as 4,294,967,295. Therefore, you win again because you can essentially append as much information as you want to the nameStr string.

Listing 6-10 shows how this vulnerability was fixed in version 1.1.1 of the research release.

**Listing 6-10**
*Antisniff v1.1.1 Vulnerability*

```c
char *indx;
int count;
char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;

while (count){
    /* typecast the strlen so we aren't dependent on
    the call to be properly setting to unsigned. */
    if ((unsigned int)strlen(nameStr) +
        (unsigned int)count < ( MAX_LEN - 1 )){
        (char *)indx++;
        strncat(nameStr, (char *)indx, count);
        indx += count;
        count = (char)*indx;
        strncat(nameStr, ".",
               sizeof(nameStr) - strlen(nameStr));
    } else {
        printf(stderr, "Alert! Someone is attempting ">
                "to send LONG DNS packets\n");
        count = 0;
    }
}

nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';
```

This solution is basically the same code, except some typecasts have been added to the length check. Take a closer look:
if ((unsigned int)strlen(nameStr) +
( unsigned int)count < ( MAX_LEN - 1 ) ){

The result of strlen() is typecast to an unsigned int, which is superfluous because it’s already a size_t. Then count is typecast to an unsigned int. This is also superfluous, as it’s normally converted to an unsigned integer type by the addition operator. In essence, nothing has changed. You can still send a negative label length and bypass the length check! Listing 6-11 shows how this problem was fixed in version 1.1.2.

Listing 6-11
Antisniff v1.1.2 Vulnerability

unsigned char *indx;
unsigned int count;
unsigned char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;
while (count){
    if (strlen(nameStr) + count < ( MAX_LEN - 1 ) ){
        indx++;
        strncat(nameStr, indx, count);
        indx += count;
        count = *indx;
        strncat(nameStr, ".",
                      sizeof(nameStr) - strlen(nameStr));
    } else {
        fprintf(stderr, "Alert! Someone is attempting "
                      "to send LONG DNS packets\n");
        count = 0;
    }
}
nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';

The developers have changed count, nameStr, and indx to be unsigned and changed back to the previous version’s length check. So the sign extension you were taking advantage of now appears to be gone because the character pointer, indx, is now an unsigned type. However, take a closer look at this line:

count = (char)*indx;

This code line dereferences indx, which is an unsigned char pointer. This gives you an unsigned character, which is then explicitly converted into a signed char. You know the bit pattern won’t change, so you’re back to something with a range of
-128 to 127. It's assigned to an unsigned int, but you know that converting from a smaller signed type to a larger unsigned type causes sign extension. So, because of the typecast to (char), you still can get a maliciously large count into the loop, but only for the first label. Now look at that length check with this in mind:

```c
if (strlen(nameStr) + count < ( MAX_LEN - 1 )){
    //

    Unfortunately, strlen(nameStr) is 0 when you enter the loop for the first time. So the rather large value of count won't be less than (MAX_LEN - 1), and you get caught and kicked out of the loop. Close, but no cigar. Amusingly, if you do get kicked out on your first trip into the loop, the program does the following:

    nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';

    Because strlen(nameStr) is 0, that means it writes a 0 at 1 byte behind the buffer, at nameStr[-1]. Now that you've seen the evolution of the fix from the vantage point of 20-20 hindsight, take a look at Listing 6-12, which is an example based on a short integer data type.

Listing 6-12
Sign Extension Vulnerability Example
unsigned short read_length(int sockfd)
{
    unsigned short len;

    if(full_read(sockfd, (void *)&len, 2) != 2) //
        die("could not read length!\n");

    return ntohs(len);
}
int read_packet(int sockfd)
{
    struct header hdr;
    short length;
    char *buffer;

    length = read_length(sockfd);

    if(length > 1024){
        error("read_packet: length too large: %d\n", length);
        return -1;
    }

    buffer = (char *)malloc(length+1);
}
if((n = read(sockfd, buffer, length) < 0){
    error("read: %m");
    free(buffer);
    return -1;
}

buffer[n] = '\0';
return 0;
}

Several concepts you’ve explored in this chapter are in effect here. First, the result of the read_length() function, an unsigned short int, is converted into a signed short int and stored in length. In the following length check, both sides of the comparison are promoted to integers. If length is a negative number, it passes the check that tests whether it’s greater than 1024. The next line adds 1 to length and passes it as the first argument to malloc(). The length parameter is again sign-extended because it’s promoted to an integer for the addition. Therefore, if the specified length is 0xFFFF, it’s sign-extended to 0xFFFFFFFF. The addition of this value plus 1 wraps around to 0, and malloc(0) potentially returns a small chunk of memory. Finally, the call to read() causes the third argument, the length parameter, to be converted directly from a signed short int to a size_t. Sign extension occurs because it’s a case of a smaller signed type being converted to a larger unsigned type. Therefore, the call to read allows you to read a large number of bytes into the buffer, resulting in a potential buffer overflow.

Another quintessential example of a place where programmers forget whether small types are signed occurs with use of the ctype libc functions. Consider the toupper() function, which has the following prototype:

int toupper(int c);

The toupper() function works on most libc implementations by searching for the correct answer in a lookup table. Several libcs don’t handle a negative argument correctly and index behind the table in memory. The following definition of toupper() isn’t uncommon:

int toupper(int c)
{
    return _toupper_tab[c];
}

Say you do something like this:

void upperize(char *str)
while (*str)
{
    *str = toupper(*str);
    str++;
}

If you have a libc implementation that doesn’t have a robust toupper() function, you could end up making some strange changes to your string. If one of the characters is -1, it gets converted to an integer with the value -1, and the toupper() function indexes behind its table in memory.

Take a look at a final real-world example of programmers not considering sign extension. Listing 6-13 is a Sendmail vulnerability that security researcher Michael Zalewski discovered (www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-12.html). It’s from Sendmail version 8.12.3 in the prescan() function, which is primarily responsible for parsing e-mail addresses into tokens (from sendmail/parseaddr.c). The code has been edited for brevity.

Listing 6-13
Prescan Sign Extension Vulnerability in Sendmail

register char *p;
register char *q;
register int c;
...
p = addr;

for (;;)
{
    /* store away any old lookahead character */
    if (c != NOCHAR && !bslashmode)
    {
        /* see if there is room */
        if (q >= &pvpbuf[pvpbsize - 5])
        {
            usrerr("553 5.1.1 Address too long");
            if (strlen(addr) > MAXNAME)
            {
                addr[MAXNAME] = '\0';
            return NULL:
            if (delimptr != NULL)
                *delimptr = p;
            CurEnv->e_to = saveto;
            return NULL;
        }
    }
}
The `NOCHAR` constant is defined as -1 and is meant to signify certain error conditions when characters are being processed. The `p` variable is processing a user-supplied address and exits the loop shown when a complete token has been read. There’s a length check in the loop; however, it’s examined only when two conditions are true: when `c` is not `NOCHAR` (that is, `c != -1`) and `bslashmode` is false. The problem is this line:

```
c = *p++;
```

Because of the sign extension of the character that `p` points to, users can specify the char `0xFF` and have it extended to `0xFFFFFFFF`, which is `NOCHAR`. If users supply a repeating pattern of `0x2F` (backslash character) followed by `0xFF`, the loop can run continuously without ever performing the length check at the top. This causes backslashes to be written continually into the destination buffer without checking whether enough.
room is left. Therefore, because of the character being sign-extended when stored in
the variable c, an unexpected code path is triggered that results in a buffer overflow.

This vulnerability also reinforces another principle stated at the beginning of
this chapter. Implicit actions performed by the compiler are subtle, and when
reviewing source code, you need to examine the implications of type conversions
and anticipate how the program will deal with unexpected values (in this case, the
NOCHAR value, which users can specify because of the sign extension).

Sign extension seems as though it should be ubiquitous and mostly harmless in C
code. However, programmers rarely intend for their smaller data types to be sign-
extended when they are converted, and the presence of sign extension often indicates
a bug. Sign extension is somewhat difficult to locate in C, but it shows up well in
assembly code as the movsx instruction. Try to practice searching through assembly
for sign-extension conversions and then relating them back to the source code, which
is a useful technique.

As a brief demonstration, compare Listings 6-14 and 6-15.

**Listing 6-14**

Sign-Extension Example

```c
unsigned int l;
char c=5;
l=c;
```

**Listing 6-15**

Zero-Extension Example

```c
unsigned int l;
unsigned char c=5;
l=c;
```

Assuming the implementation calls for signed characters, you know that sign
extension will occur in Listing 6-14 but not in Listing 6-15. Compare the generated
assembly code, reproduced in Table 6-8.

**Table 6-8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sign Extension Versus Zero Extension in Assembly Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Listing 6-14: Sign Extension</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov [ebp+var_5], 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movsx eax, [ebp+var_5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov [ebp+var_4], eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
You can see that in the sign-extension example, the `movsx` instruction is used. In the zero-extension example, the compiler first clears the register with `xor eax, eax` and then moves the character byte into that register.

**Auditing Tip: Sign Extension**

When looking for vulnerabilities related to sign extensions, you should focus on code that handles signed character values or pointers or signed short integer values or pointers. Typically, you can find them in string-handling code and network code that decodes packets with length elements. In general, you want to look for code that takes a character or short integer and uses it in a context that causes it to be converted to an integer. Remember that if you see a signed character or signed short converted to an unsigned integer, sign extension still occurs.

As mentioned previously, one effective way to find sign-extension vulnerabilities is to search the assembly code of the application binary for the `movsx` instruction. This technique can often help you cut through multiple layers of typedefs, macros, and type conversions when searching for potentially vulnerable locations in code.

**Truncation**

**Truncation** occurs when a larger type is converted into a smaller type. Note that the usual arithmetic conversions and the integral promotions never really call for a large type to be converted to a smaller type. Therefore, truncation can occur only as the result of an assignment, a typecast, or a function call involving a prototype. Here’s a simple example of truncation:

```c
int g = 0x12345678;
short int h;

h = g;
```

When `g` is assigned to `h`, the top 16 bits of the value are truncated, and `h` has a value of `0x5678`. So if this data loss occurs in a situation the programmer didn’t expect, it could certainly lead to security failures. Listing 6-16 is loosely based on a historic vulnerability in Network File System (NFS) that involves integer truncation.
Listing 6-16

Truncation Vulnerability Example in NFS

```c
void assume_privs(unsigned short uid)
{
    seteuid(uid);
    setuid(uid);
}
```

```c
int become_user(int uid)
{
    if (uid == 0)
        die("root isnt allowed");
    assume_privs(uid);
}
```

To be fair, this vulnerability is mostly known of anecdotally, and its existence hasn’t been verified through source code. NFS forbids users from mounting a disk remotely with root privileges. Eventually, attackers figured out that they could specify a UID of 65536, which would pass the security checks that prevent root access. However, this UID would get assigned to an unsigned short integer and be truncated to a value of 0. Therefore, attackers could assume root’s identity of UID 0 and bypass the protection.

Take a look at one more synthetic vulnerability in Listing 6-17 before looking at a real-world truncation issue.

Listing 6-17

Truncation Vulnerability Example

```c
unsigned short int f;
char mybuf[1024];
char *userstr=getuserstr();

f=strlen(userstr);
if (f > sizeof(mybuf) - 5)
    die("string too long!");
strcpy(mybuf, userstr);
```

The result of the `strlen()` function, a `size_t`, is converted to an unsigned short. If a string is 66,000 characters long, truncation would occur and `f` would have the value 464. Therefore, the length check protecting `strcpy()` would be circumvented, and a buffer overflow would occur.

A show-stopping bug in most SSH daemons was caused by integer truncation. Ironically, the vulnerable code was in a function designed to address another security hole, the SSH insertion attack identified by CORE-SDI. Details on that attack are available at www1.corest.com/files/files/11/CRC32.pdf.
The essence of the attack is that attackers can use a clever known plain-text attack against the block cipher to insert small amounts of data of their choosing into the SSH stream. Normally, this attack would be prevented by message integrity checks, but SSH used CRC32, and the researchers at CORE-SDI figured out how to circumvent it in the context of the SSH protocol.

The responsibility of the function containing the truncation vulnerability is to determine whether an insertion attack is occurring. One property of these insertion attacks is a long sequence of similar bytes at the end of the packet, with the purpose of manipulating the CRC32 value so that it’s correct. The defense that was engineered was to search for repeated blocks in the packet, and then do the CRC32 calculation up to the point of repeat to determine whether any manipulation was occurring. This method was easy for small packets, but it could have a performance impact on large sets of data. So, presumably to address the performance impact, a hashing scheme was used.

The function you’re about to look at has two separate code paths. If the packet is below a certain size, it performs a direct analysis of the data. If it’s above that size, it uses a hash table to make the analysis more efficient. It isn’t necessary to understand the function to appreciate the vulnerability. If you’re curious, however, you’ll see that the simpler case for the smaller packets has roughly the algorithm described in Listing 6-18.

**Listing 6-18**

*Detect_attack Small Packet Algorithm in SSH*

```plaintext
for c = each 8 byte block of the packet
  if c is equal to the initialization vector block
    check c for the attack.
    If the check succeeds, return DETECTED.
    If the check fails, you aren't under attack so return OK.
  for d = each 8 byte block of the packet before c
    If d is equal to c, check c for the attack.
    If the check succeeds, return DETECTED.
    If the check fails, break out of the d loop.
next d
next c
```

The code goes through each 8-byte block of the packet, and if it sees an identical block in the packet before the current one, it does a check to see whether an attack is underway.

The hash-table-based path through the code is a little more complex. It has the same general algorithm, but instead of comparing a bunch of 8-byte blocks with each other, it takes a 32 bit hash of each block and compares them. The hash table is indexed by the 32-bit hash of the 8-byte block, modulo the hash table size, and the bucket contains the position of the block that last hashed to that bucket.
The truncation problem happened in the construction and management of the hash table. Listing 6-19 contains the beginning of the code.

Listing 6-19

Detect_attack Truncation Vulnerability in SSH

/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
int
detect_attack(unsigned char *buf, u_int32_t len,
               unsigned char *IV)
{
    static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
    static u_int16_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
    register u_int32_t i, j;
    u_int32_t l;
    register unsigned char *c;
    unsigned char *d;
    if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
        len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
        fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
    }

    First, the code checks whether the packet is overly long or isn’t a multiple of 8 bytes. SSH_MAXBLOCKS is 32,768 and BLOCKSIZE is 8, so the packet can be as large as 262,144 bytes. In the following code, n starts out as HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE, which is 8,192 / 2, or 4,096, and its purpose is to hold the number of entries in the hash table:

    for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
    {
        if (h == NULL) {
            debug("Installing crc compensation ":
                "attack detector.");
            n = l;
            h = (u_int16_t *) xmalloc(n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
        } else {


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if (l > n) {
    n = l;
    h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
}
}

If h is NULL, that means it’s your first time through this function and you need to allocate space for a new hash table. If you remember, l is the value calculated as the right size for the hash table, and n contains the number of entries in the hash table. If h isn’t NULL, the hash table has already been allocated. However, if the hash table isn’t currently big enough to agree with the newly calculated l, you go ahead and reallocate it.

You’ve looked at enough code so far to see the problem: n is an unsigned short int. If you send a packet that’s big enough, l, an unsigned int, could end up with a value larger than 65,535, and when the assignment of l to n occurs, truncation could result. For example, assume you send a packet that’s 262,144 bytes. It passes the first check, and then in the loop, l changes like so:

Iteration 1: l = 4096  l <  49152  l<<=4
Iteration 2: l = 16384  l <  49152  l<<=4
Iteration 3: l = 65536  l >=  49152

When l, with a value of 65,536, is assigned to n, the top 16 bits are truncated, and n ends up with a value of 0. On several modern OSs, a malloc() of 0 results in a valid pointer to a small object being returned, and the rest of the function’s behavior is extremely suspect.

The next part of the function is the code that does the direct analysis, and because it doesn’t use the hash table, it isn’t of immediate interest:

if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
    for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
        if (IV && (!CMP(c, IV))) {
            if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
                return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
            else
                break;
        }
    for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
        if (!CMP(c, d)) {
            if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
                return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
        }
    }
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
    break;
}
}
return (DEATTACK_OK);

Next is the code that performs the hash-based detection routine. In the following code, keep in mind that \( n \) is going to be 0 and \( h \) is going to point to a small but valid object in the heap. With these values, it’s possible to do some interesting things to the process’s memory:

```c
memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);

if (IV)
    h[HASH(IV) & (n - 1)] = HASH_IV;

for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
    for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
         i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
        if (h[i] == HASH_IV) {
            if (!CMP(c, IV)) {
                if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
                    return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
                else
                    break;
            } else if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
                if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
                    return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
                else
                    break;
            }
        } else if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
            if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
                return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
            else
                break;
        }
    }
    h[i] = j;
}
If you don’t see an immediate way to attack this loop, don’t worry. (You are in good company, and also some critical macro definitions are missing.) This bug is extremely subtle, and the exploits for it are complex and clever. In fact, this vulnerability is unique from many perspectives. It reinforces the notion that secure programming is difficult, and everyone can make mistakes, as CORE-SDI is easily one of the world’s most technically competent security companies. It also demonstrates that sometimes a simple black box test can uncover bugs that would be hard to find with a source audit; the discoverer, Michael Zalewski, located this vulnerability in a stunningly straightforward fashion (ssh ·1 long_user_name). Finally, it highlights a notable case in which writing an exploit can be more difficult than finding its root vulnerability.

Auditing Tip: Truncation

Truncation-related vulnerabilities are typically found where integer values are assigned to smaller data types, such as short integers or characters. To find truncation issues, look for locations where these shorter data types are used to track length values or to hold the result of a calculation. A good place to look for potential variables is in structure definitions, especially in network-oriented code.

Programmers often use a short or character data type just because the expected range of values for a variable maps to that data type nicely. Using these data types can often lead to unanticipated truncations, however.

Comparisons

You’ve already seen examples of signed comparisons against negative numbers in length checks and how they can lead to security exposures. Another potentially hazardous situation is comparing two integers that have different types. As you’ve learned, when a comparison is made, the compiler first performs integer promotions on the operands and then follows the usual arithmetic conversions on the operands so that a comparison can be made on compatible types. Because these promotions and conversions might result in value changes (because of sign change), the comparison might not be operating exactly as the programmer intended. Attackers can take advantage of these conversions to circumvent security checks and often compromise an application.

To see how comparisons can go wrong, take a look at Listing 6-20. This code reads a short integer from the network, which specifies the length of an incoming packet. The first half of the length check compares (length – sizeof(short))
0 to make sure the specified length isn't less than sizeof(short). If it is, it could wrap around to a large integer when sizeof(short) is subtracted from it later in the read() statement.

**Listing 6-20**

*Comparison Vulnerability Example*

```c
#define MAX_SIZE 1024

int read_packet(int sockfd)
{
    short length;
    char buf[MAX_SIZE];

    length = network_get_short(sockfd);

    if(length - sizeof(short) <= 0 || length > MAX_SIZE){
        error("bad length supplied\n");
        return -1;
    }

    if(read(sockfd, buf, length - sizeof(short)) < 0){
        error("read: %m\n");
        return -1;
    }

    return 0;
}
```

The first check is actually incorrect. Note that the result type of the sizeof operator is a size_t, which is an unsigned integer type. So for the subtraction of (length - sizeof(short)), length is first promoted to a signed int as part of the integer promotions, and then converted to an unsigned integer type as part of the usual arithmetic conversions. The resulting type of the subtraction operation is an unsigned integer type. Consequently, the result of the subtraction can never be less than 0, and the check is effectively inoperative. Providing a value of 1 for length evades the very condition that the length check in the first half of the if statement is trying to protect against and triggers an integer underflow in the call to read().

More than one value can be supplied to evade both checks and trigger a buffer overflow. If length is a negative number, such as 0xFFFE, the first check still passes because the result type of the subtraction is always unsigned. The second check also passes (length > MAX_SIZE) because length is promoted to a signed int for the comparison and retains its negative value, which is less than MAX_SIZE (1024). This result demonstrates that the length variable is treated as unsigned in one case and signed in another case because of the other operands used in the comparison.
When dealing with data types smaller than int, integer promotions cause narrow values to become signed integers. This is a value-preserving promotion and not much of a problem in itself. However, sometimes comparisons can be promoted to a signed type unintentionally. Listing 6-21 illustrates this problem.

Listing 6-21
Signed Comparison Vulnerability

```c
int read_data(int sockfd) {
    char buf[1024];
    unsigned short max = sizeof(buf);
    short length;

    length = get_network_short(sockfd);

    if(length > max){
        error("bad length: %d\n", length);
        return -1;
    }

    if(read(sockfd, buf, length) < 0){
        error("read: %m");
        return -1;
    }

    ... process data ...

    return 0;
}
```

Listing 6-21 illustrates why you must be aware of the resulting data type used in a comparison. Both the max and length variables are short integers and, therefore, go through integer conversions; both get promoted to signed integers. This means any negative value supplied in length evades the length check against max. Because of data type conversions performed in a comparison, not only can sanity checks be evaded, but the entire comparison could be rendered useless because it’s checking for an impossible condition. Consider Listing 6-22.

Listing 6-22
Unsigned Comparison Vulnerability

```c
int get_int(char *data) {
    unsigned int n = atoi(data);
    if(n < 0 || n > 1024)
        return -1;
```
Listing 6-22 checks the variable n to make sure it falls within the range of 0 to 1024. Because the variable n is unsigned, however, the check for less than 0 is impossible. An unsigned integer can never be less than 0 because every value that can be represented is positive. The potential vulnerability is somewhat subtle; if attackers provide an invalid integer as argv[1], get_int() returns a -1, which is converted to an unsigned long when assigned to n. Therefore, it would become a large value and end up causing memset() to crash the program.

Compilers can detect conditions that will never be true and issue a warning if certain flags are passed to it. See what happens when the preceding code is compiled with GCC:

[root@doppelganger root]# gcc -Wall -o example example.c
[root@doppelganger root]# gcc -W -o example example.c
example.c: In function 'get_int':
exmple.c:10: warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false
example.c: In function 'main':
exmple.c:25: warning: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false
[root@doppelganger root]#
Notice that the -Wall flag doesn’t warn about this type of error as most developers would expect. To generate a warning for this type of bug, the -W flag must be used. If the code if(n < 0) is changed to if(n <= 0), a warning isn’t generated because the condition is no longer impossible. Now take a look at a real-world example of a similar mistake. Listing 6-23 is taken from the PHP Apache module (4.3.4) when reading POST data.

Listing 6-23
Signed Comparison Example in PHP

```c
/* {{{ sapi_apache_read_post */
static int sapi_apache_read_post(char *buffer,
uint count_bytes TSRMLS_DC)
{
    uint total_read_bytes=0, read_bytes;
    request_rec *r = (request_rec *) SG(server_context);
    void (*handler)(int);
    /* This handles the situation where the browser sends a
    * Expect: 100-continue header and needs to receive
    * confirmation from the server on whether or not it
    * can send the rest of the request. RFC 2616
    */
    if (!SG(read_post_bytes) && !ap_should_client_block(r)) {
        return total_read_bytes;
    }
    handler = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
    while (total_read_bytes<count_bytes) {
        /* start timeout timer */
        hard_timeout("Read POST information", r);
        read_bytes = get_client_block(r,
            buffer + total_read_bytes,
            count_bytes - total_read_bytes);
        reset_timeout(r);
        if (read_bytes<=0) {
            break;
        }
        total_read_bytes += read_bytes;
    }
    signal(SIGPIPE, handler);
    return total_read_bytes;
}
```

Type Conversion Vulnerabilities
The return value from `get_client_block()` is stored in the `read_bytes` variable and then compared to make sure a negative number wasn’t returned. Because `read_bytes` is unsigned, this check doesn’t detect errors from `get_client_block()` as intended. As it turns out, this bug isn’t immediately exploitable in this function. Can you see why? The loop controlling the loop also has an unsigned comparison, so if `total_read_bytes` is decremented under 0, it underflows and, therefore, takes a value larger than `count_bytes`, thus exiting the loop.

**Auditing Tip**

Reviewing comparisons is essential to auditing C code. Pay particular attention to comparisons that protect allocation, array indexing, and copy operations. The best way to examine these comparisons is to go line by line and carefully study each relevant expression.

In general, you should keep track of each variable and its underlying data type. If you can trace the input to a function back to a source you’re familiar with, you should have a good idea of the possible values each input variable can have.

Proceed through each potentially interesting calculation or comparison, and keep track of potential values of the variables at different points in the function evaluation. You can use a process similar to the one outlined in the previous section on locating integer boundary condition issues.

When you evaluate a comparison, be sure to watch for unsigned integer values that cause their peer operands to be promoted to unsigned integers. `sizeof` and `strlen()` are classic examples of operands that cause this promotion.

Remember to keep an eye out for unsigned variables used in comparisons, like the following:

```c
if (uvar < 0) ...  
if (uvar <= 0) ...  
```

The first form typically causes the compiler to emit a warning, but the second form doesn’t. If you see this pattern, it’s a good indication something is probably wrong with that section of the code. You should do a careful line-by-line analysis of the surrounding functionality.
Operators

Operators can produce unanticipated results. As you have seen, unsanitized operands used in simple arithmetic operations can potentially open security holes in applications. These exposures are generally the result of crossing over boundary conditions that affect the meaning of the result. In addition, each operator has associated type promotions that are performed on each of its operands implicitly which could produce some unexpected results. Because producing unexpected results is the essence of vulnerability discovery, it’s important to know how these results might be produced and what exceptional conditions could occur. The following sections highlight these exceptional conditions and explain some common misuses of operators that could lead to potential vulnerabilities.

The sizeof Operator

The first operator worth mentioning is sizeof. It’s used regularly for buffer allocations, size comparisons, and size parameters to length-oriented functions. The sizeof operator is susceptible to misuse in certain circumstances that could lead to subtle vulnerabilities in otherwise solid-looking code.

One of the most common mistakes with sizeof is accidentally using it on a pointer instead of its target. Listing 6-24 shows an example of this error.

Listing 6-24
Sizeof Misuse Vulnerability Example
char *read_username(int sockfd)
{
    char *buffer, *style, userstring[1024];
    int i;
    buffer = (char *)malloc(1024);
    if(!buffer){
        error("buffer allocation failed: %m");
        return NULL;
    }
    if(read(sockfd, userstring, sizeof(userstring)-1) <= 0){
        free(buffer);
        error("read failure: %m");
        return NULL;
    }
    userstring[sizeof(userstring)-1] = '\0';
    style = strchr(userstring, ':');
}
if(style)
  *style++ = '\0';

sprintf(buffer, "username=%.32s", userstring);
if(style)
  snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer)-strlen(buffer)-1,
    ", style=%s\n", style);

return buffer;

In this code, some user data is read in from the network and copied into the allocated buffer. However, sizeof is used incorrectly on buffer. The intention is for sizeof(buffer) to return 1024, but because it’s used on a character pointer type, it returns only 4! This results in an integer underflow condition in the size parameter to snprintf() when a style value is present; consequently, an arbitrary amount of data can be written to the memory pointed to by the buffer variable. This error is quite easy to make and often isn’t obvious when reading code, so pay careful attention to the types of variables passed to the sizeof operator. They occur most frequently in length arguments, as in the preceding example, but they can also occur occasionally when calculating lengths for allocating space. The reason this type of bug is somewhat rare is that the misallocation would likely cause the program to crash and, therefore, get caught before release in many applications (unless it’s in a rarely traversed code path).

sizeof() also plays an integral role in signed and unsigned comparison bugs (explored in the “Comparison” section previously in this chapter) and structure padding issues (explored in “Structure Padding” later in this chapter).

Auditing Tip: sizeof
Be on the lookout for uses of sizeof in which developers take the size of a pointer to a buffer when they intend to take the size of the buffer. This often happens because of editing mistakes, when a buffer is moved from being within a function to being passed into a function.

Again, look for sizeof in expressions that cause operands to be converted to unsigned values.

Unexpected Results
You have explored two primary idiosyncrasies of arithmetic operators: boundary conditions related to the storage of integer types and issues caused by conversions that occur when arithmetic operators are used in expressions. A few other nuances
of C can lead to unanticipated behaviors, specifically nuances related to underlying machine primitives being aware of signed-ness. If a result is expected to fall within a specific range, attackers can sometimes violate those expectations.

Interestingly enough, on twos complement machines, there are only a few operators in C in which the signed-ness of operands can affect the result of the operation. The most important operators in this group are comparisons. In addition to comparisons, only three other C operators have a result that’s sensitive to whether operands are signed: right shift (\(\gg\)), division (/), and modulus (%). These operators can produce unexpected negative results when they’re used with signed operands because of their underlying machine-level operations being sign-aware. As a code reviewer, you should be on the lookout for misuse of these operators because they can produce results that fall outside the range of expected values and catch developers off-guard.

The right shift operator (\(\gg\)) is often used in applications in place of the division operator (when dividing by powers of 2). Problems can happen when using this operator with a signed integer as the left operand. When right-shifting a negative value, the sign of the value is preserved by the underlying machine performing a sign-extending arithmetic shift. This sign-preserving right shift is shown in Listing 6-25.

**Listing 6-25**

*Sign-Preserving Right Shift*

```c
signed char c = 0x80;
c >>= 4;
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value before right shift</th>
<th>Value after right shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000 0000</td>
<td>1111 1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Listing 6-26 shows how this code might produce an unexpected result that leads to a vulnerability. It’s close to an actual vulnerability found recently in client code.

**Listing 6-26**

*Right Shift Vulnerability Example*

```c
int print_high_word(int number)
{
    char buf[sizeof("65535")];

    sprintf(buf, "%u", number >> 16);

    return 0;
}
```

This function is designed to print a 16-bit unsigned integer (the high 16 bits of the `number` argument). Because `number` is signed, the right shift sign-extends `number` by 16 bits if it’s negative. Therefore, the `%u` specifier to `sprintf()` has the capability
of printing a number much larger than sizeof("65535"), the amount of space allocated for the destination buffer, so the result is a buffer overflow. Vulnerable right shifts are good examples of bugs that are difficult to locate in source code yet readily visible in assembly code. In Intel assembly code, a signed, or arithmetic, right shift is performed with the sar mnemonic. A logical, or unsigned, right shift is performed with the shr mnemonic. Therefore, analyzing the assembly code can help you determine whether a right shift is potentially vulnerable to sign extension. Table 6-9 shows signed and unsigned right-shift operations in the assembly code.

Table 6-9
Signed Versus Unsigned Right-Shift Operations in Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signed Right-Shift Operations</th>
<th>Unsigned Right-Shift Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mov eax, [ebp+8]</td>
<td>mov eax, [ebp+8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sar eax, 16</td>
<td>shr eax, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>push eax</td>
<td>push eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>push offset string</td>
<td>push offset string</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lea eax, [ebp+var_8]</td>
<td>lea eax, [ebp+var_8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>push eax</td>
<td>push eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>call sprintf</td>
<td>call sprintf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Division (/) is another operator that can produce unexpected results because of sign awareness. Whenever one of the operands is negative, the resulting quotient is also negative. Often, applications don’t account for the possibility of negative results when performing division on integers. Listing 6-27 shows how using negative operands could create a vulnerability with division.

Listing 6-27
Division Vulnerability Example
int read_data(int sockfd) {
    int bitlength;
    char *buffer;

    bitlength = network_get_int(length);

    buffer = (char *)malloc(bitlength / 8 + 1);

    if (buffer == NULL)
        die("no memory");

    if (read(sockfd, buffer, bitlength / 8) < 0) {
        error("read error: %m");
    }
Listing 6-27 takes a bitlength parameter from the network and allocates memory based on it. The bitlength is divided by 8 to obtain the number of bytes needed for the data that's subsequently read from the socket. One is added to the result, presumably to store extra bits in if the supplied bitlength isn't a multiple of 8. If the division can be made to return -1, the addition of 1 produces 0, resulting in a small amount of memory being allocated by malloc(). Then the third argument to read() would be -1, which would be converted to a size_t and interpreted as a large positive value.

Similarly, the modulus operator (%) can produce negative results when dealing with a negative dividend operand. Code auditors should be on the lookout for modulus operations that don't properly sanitize their dividend operands because they could produce negative results that might create a security exposure. Modulus operators are often used when dealing with fixed-sized arrays (such as hash tables), so a negative result could immediately index before the beginning of the array, as shown in Listing 6-28.

Listing 6-28
Modulus Vulnerability Example

```c
#define SESSION_SIZE 1024

struct session {
    struct session *next;
    int session_id;
};

struct header {
    int session_id;
    ...
};

struct session *sessions[SESSION_SIZE];

struct session *session_new(int session_id) {
    struct session *new1, *tmp;

    new1 = malloc(sizeof(struct session));
    if(!new1)
        die("malloc: %m");

    new1->session_id = session_id;
```
new1->next = NULL;

if(!sessions[session_id%(SESSION_SIZE-1)])
{
    sessions[session_id%(SESSION_SIZE-1)] = new1;
    return new1;
}

for(tmp = sessions[session_id%(SESSION_SIZE-1)]; tmp->next;
    tmp = tmp->next);

tmp->next = new1;
return new1;

int read_packet(int sockfd)
{
    struct session *session;
    struct header hdr;

    if(full_read(sockfd, (void *)&hdr, sizeof(hdr)) !=
    sizeof(hdr))
    {
        error("read: %m");
        return -1;
    }

    if((session = session_find(hdr.session_id)) == NULL)
    {
        session = session_new(hdr.sessionid);
        return 0;
    }

    ... validate packet with session ...

    return 0;
}

As you can see, a header is read from the network, and session information is
retrieved from a hash table based on the header’s session identifier field. The ses-
sions are stored in the sessions hash table for later retrieval by the program. If the
session identifier is negative, the result of the modulus operator is negative, and
out-of-bounds elements of the sessions array are indexed and possibly written to,
which would probably be an exploitable condition.

As with the right-shift operator, unsigned and signed divide and modulus
operations can be distinguished easily in Intel assembly code. The mnemonic for
the unsigned division instruction is div and its signed counterpart is idiv. Table
6-10 shows the difference between signed and unsigned divide operations. Note that compilers often use right-shift operations rather than division when the divisor is a constant.

Table 6-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signed Divide Operations</th>
<th>Unsigned Divide Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mov eax, [ebp+8]</td>
<td>mov eax, [ebp+8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov ecx, [ebp+c]</td>
<td>mov ecx, [ebp+c]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdq</td>
<td>cdq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idiv ecx</td>
<td>div ecx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ret</td>
<td>ret</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Auditing Tip: Unexpected Results
Whenever you encounter a right shift, be sure to check whether the left operand is signed. If so, there might be a slight potential for a vulnerability. Similarly, look for modulus and division operations that operate with signed operands. If users can specify negative values, they might be able to elicit unexpected results.

Pointer Arithmetic

Pointers are usually the first major hurdle that beginning C programmers encounter, as they can prove quite difficult to understand. The rules involving pointer arithmetic, dereferencing and indirection, pass-by-value semantics, pointer operator precedence, and pseudo-equivalence with arrays can be challenging to learn. The following sections focus on a few aspects of pointer arithmetic that might catch developers by surprise and lead to possible security exposures.

Pointer Overview
You know that a pointer is essentially a location in memory—an address—so it’s a data type that’s necessarily implementation dependent. You could have strikingly different pointer representations on different architectures, and pointers could be implemented in different fashions even on the 32-bit Intel architecture. For example, you could have 16-bit code, or even a compiler that transparently supported custom virtual memory schemes involving segments. So assume this discussion uses the common architecture of GCC or vc++ compilers for userland code on Intel machines.
You know that pointers probably have to be unsigned integers because valid virtual memory addresses can range from 0x0 to 0xffffffff. That said, it seems slightly
odd when you subtract two pointers. Wouldn’t a pointer need to somehow represent negative values as well? It turns out that the result of the subtraction isn’t a pointer at all; instead, it’s a signed integer type known as a \texttt{ptrdiff_t}.

Pointers can be freely converted into integers and into pointers of other types with the use of casts. However, the compiler makes no guarantee that the resulting pointer or integer is correctly aligned or points to a valid object. Therefore, pointers are one of the more implementation-dependent portions of the C language.

\textbf{Pointer Arithmetic Overview}

When you do arithmetic with a pointer, what occurs? Here’s a simple example of adding 1 to a pointer:

\begin{verbatim}
short *j;
j=(short *)0x1234;
j=j+1;
\end{verbatim}

This code has a pointer to a short named \texttt{j}. It’s initialized to an arbitrary fixed address, 0x1234. This is bad C code, but it serves to get the point across. As mentioned previously, you can treat pointers and integers interchangeably as long you use casts, but the results depend on the implementation. You might assume that after you add 1 to \texttt{j}, \texttt{j} is equal to 0x1235. However, as you probably know, this isn’t what happens. \texttt{j} is actually 0x1236.

When C does arithmetic involving a pointer, it does the operation relative to the size of the pointer’s target. So when you add 1 to a pointer to an object, the result is a pointer to the next object of that size in memory. In this example, the object is a short integer, which takes up 2 bytes (on the 32-bit Intel architecture), so the short following 0x1234 in memory is at location 0x1236. If you subtract 1, the result is the address of the short before the one at 0x1234, which is 0x1232. If you add 5, you get the address 0x123e, which is the fifth short past the one at 0x1234.

Another way to think of it is that a pointer to an object is treated as an array composed of one element of that object. So \texttt{j}, a pointer to a short, is treated like the array \texttt{short j[1]}, which contains one short. Therefore, \texttt{j + 2} would be equivalent to \texttt{&j[2]}. Table 6-11 shows this concept.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Pointer Arithmetic and Memory}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Pointer Expression & Array Expression & Address \\
\hline
\texttt{j - 2} & \texttt{&j[-2]} & 0x1230 \\
 & & 0x1231 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
Now look at the details of the important pointer arithmetic operators, covered in the following sections.

**Addition**
The rules for pointer addition are slightly more restrictive than you might expect. You can add an integer type to a pointer type or a pointer type to an integer type, but you can’t add a pointer type to a pointer type. This makes sense when you consider what pointer addition actually does; the compiler wouldn’t know which pointer to use as the base type and which to use as an index. For example, look at the following operation:

```c
unsigned short *j;
unsigned long *k;
x = j+k;
```

This operation would be invalid because the compiler wouldn’t know how to convert j or k into an index for the pointer arithmetic. You could certainly cast j or k into an integer, but the result would be unexpected, and it’s unlikely someone would do this intentionally.

One interesting rule of C is that the subscript operator falls under the category of pointer addition. The C standard states that the subscript operator is equivalent to an expression involving addition in the following way:

\[ E_1[E_2] \text{ is equivalent to } (*((E_1)+(E_2))) \]
With this in mind, look at the following example:

```c
char b[10];

b[4] = 'a';
```

The expression `b[4]` refers to the fifth object in the `b` character array. According to the rule, here’s the equivalent way of writing it:

```c
(*((b)+(4))) = 'a';
```

You know from your earlier analysis that `b + 4`, with `b` of type pointer to char, is the same as saying `&b[4]`; therefore, the expression would be like saying `(*(b+4))` or `b[4]`.

Finally, note that the resulting type of the addition between an integer and a pointer is the type of the pointer.

**Subtraction**

Subtraction has similar rules to addition, except subtracting one pointer from another is permissible. When you subtract a pointer from a pointer of the same type, you’re asking for the difference in the subscripts of the two elements. In this case, the resulting type isn’t a pointer but a `ptrdiff_t`, which is a signed integer type. The C standard indicates it should be defined in the `stddef.h` header file.

**Comparison**

Comparison between pointers works as you might expect. They consider the relative locations of the two pointers in the virtual address space. The resulting type is the same as with other comparisons: an integer type containing a 1 or 0.

**Conditional Operator**

The conditional operator (`?`) can have pointers as its last two operands, and it has to reconcile their types much as it does when used with arithmetic operands. It does this by applying all qualifiers either pointer type has to the resulting type.

**Vulnerabilities**

Few vulnerabilities involving pointer arithmetic have been widely publicized, at least in the sense being described here. Plenty of vulnerabilities that involve manipulation of character pointers essentially boil down to miscounting buffer sizes, and although they technically qualify as pointer arithmetic errors, they aren’t as subtle as pointer vulnerabilities can get. The more pernicious form of problems are those in which developers mistakenly perform arithmetic on pointers without realizing...
that their integer operands are being scaled by the size of the pointer's target. Consider the following code:

```c
int buf[1024];
int *b=buf;

while (havedata() & b < buf + sizeof(buf))
{
    *b++=parseint(getdata());
}
```

The intent of `b < buf + sizeof(buf)` is to prevent `b` from advancing past `buf[1023]`. However, it actually prevents `b` from advancing past `buf[4092]`. Therefore, this code is potentially vulnerable to a fairly straightforward buffer overflow.

Listing 6-29 allocates a buffer and then copies the first path component from the argument string into the buffer. There's a length check protecting the `wcscat` function from overflowing the allocated buffer, but it's constructed incorrectly. Because the strings are wide characters, the pointer subtraction done to check the size of the input `(sep - string)` returns the difference of the two pointers in wide characters—that is, the difference between the two pointers in bytes divided by 2. Therefore, this length check succeeds as long as `(sep - string)` contains less than `(MAXCHARS * 2)` wide characters, which could be twice as much space as the allocated buffer can hold.

**Listing 6-29**

*Pointer Arithmetic Vulnerability Example*

```c
wchar_t *copy_data(wchar_t *string)
{
    wchar *sep, *new;
    int size = MAXCHARS * sizeof(wchar);
    new = (wchar *)xmalloc(size);
    *new = '\0';
    if(*string != '/'){
        wcsncpy(new, '/', size);
        size -= sizeof(wchar_t);
    }
    sep = wstrchr(string, '/');
    if(!sep)
        sep = string + wcslen(string);
    ```
Auditing Tip

Pointer arithmetic bugs can be hard to spot. Whenever an arithmetic operation is performed that involves pointers, look up the type of those pointers and then check whether the operation agrees with the implicit arithmetic taking place. In Listing 6-29, has `sizeof()` been used incorrectly with a pointer to a type that’s not a byte? Has a similar operation happened in which the developer assumed the pointer type won’t affect how the operation is performed?

Other C Nuances

The following sections touch on features and dark corners of the C language where security-relevant mistakes could be made. Not many real-world examples of these vulnerabilities are available, yet you should still be aware of the potential risks. Some examples might seem contrived, but try to imagine them as hidden beneath layers of macros and interdependent functions, and they might seem more realistic.

Order of Evaluation

For most operators, C doesn’t guarantee the order of evaluation of operands or the order of assignments from expression “side effects.” For example, consider this code:

```c
printf("%d\n", i++, i++);
```

There’s no guarantee in which order the two increments are performed, and you’ll find that the output varies based on the compiler and the architecture on which you compile the program. The only operators for which order of evaluation is guaranteed are `&&`, `||`, `? :`, and `. Note that the comma doesn’t refer to the arguments of a function; their evaluation order is implementation defined. So in something as simple as the following code, there’s no guarantee that `a()` is called before `b()`:

```c
if(sep - string >= (size - sizeof(wchar_t))
{
    free(new);
    die("too much data");
}
*sep = '\0';
wcscat(new, string);
return new;
}
x = a() + b();

Ambiguous side effects are slightly different from ambiguous order of evaluation, but they have similar consequences. A side effect is an expression that causes the modification of a variable—an assignment or increment operator, such as ++. The order of evaluation of side effects isn't defined within the same expression, so something like the following is implementation defined and, therefore, could cause problems:

```
a[i] = i++;```

How could these problems have a security impact? In Listing 6-30, the developer uses the getstr() call to get the user string and pass string from some external source. However, if the system is recompiled and the order of evaluation for the getstr() function changes, the code could end up logging the password instead of the username. Admittedly, it would be a low-risk issue caught during testing.

**Listing 6-30**

*Order of Evaluation Logic Vulnerability*

```c
int check_password(char *user, char *pass)
{
    if (strcmp(getpass(user), pass))
    {
        logprintf("bad password for user %s\n", user);
        return -1;
    }
    return 0;
}
...
if (check_password(getstr(), getstr())
    exit(1);```

Listing 6-31 has a copy_packet() function that reads a packet from the network. It uses the GET32() macro to pull an integer from the packet and advance the pointer. There's a provision for optional padding in the protocol, and the presence of the padding size field is indicated by a flag in the packet header. So if FLAG_PADDING is set, the order of evaluation of the GET32() macros for calculating the datasync could possibly be reversed. If the padding option is in a fairly unused part of the protocol, an error of this nature could go undetected in production use.

**Listing 6-31**

*Order of Evaluation Macro Vulnerability*

```
define GET32(x) (*((unsigned int *)(x))++)
```

```
u_char *copy_packet(u_char *packet)```
Structure Padding

One somewhat obscure feature of C structures is that structure members don't have to be laid out contiguously in memory. The order of members is guaranteed to follow the order programmers specify, but structure padding can be used between members to facilitate alignment and performance needs. Here's an example of a simple structure:

```c
struct bob
{
    int a;
    unsigned short b;
    unsigned char c;
};
```

What do you think `sizeof(bob)` is? A reasonable guess is 7; that's `sizeof(a) + sizeof(b) + sizeof(c)`, which is 4 + 2 + 1. However, most compilers return 8 because they insert structure padding! This behavior is somewhat obscure now, but it will definitely become a well-known phenomenon as more 64-bit code is introduced because it has the potential to affect this code more acutely. How could it have a security consequence? Consider Listing 6-32.

**Listing 6-32**

*Structure Padding in a Network Protocol*

```c
struct netdata
{
    unsigned int query_id;
    unsigned short header_flags;
};
```
unsigned int sequence_number;

int packet_check_replay(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
    struct netdata *n = (struct netdata *)buf;
    if ((ntohl(n->sequence_number) <= g_last_sequence_number)
        return PARSE_REPLAYATTACK;
    // packet is safe - process
    return PARSE_SAFE;
}

On a 32-bit big-endian system, the netdata structure is likely to be laid out as shown in Figure 6-9. You have an unsigned int, an unsigned short, 2 bytes of padding, and an unsigned int for a total structure size of 12 bytes. Figure 6-10 shows the traffic going over the network, in network byte order. If developers don’t anticipate the padding being inserted in the structure, they could be misinterpreting the network protocol. This error could cause the server to accept a replay attack.

The possibility of making this kind of mistake increases with 64-bit architectures. If a structure contains a pointer or long value, the layout of the structure in memory will most likely change. Any 64-bit value, such as a pointer or long int, will take up twice as much space as on a 32-bit system and have to be placed on a 64-bit alignment boundary.
The contents of the padding bits depend on whatever happens to be in memory when the structure is allocated. These bits could be different, which could lead to logic errors involving memory comparisons, as shown in Listing 6-33.

**Listing 6-33**

*Example of Structure Padding Double Free*

```c
struct sh
{
    void *base;
    unsigned char code;
    void *descptr;
};

void free_sechdrs(struct sh *a, struct sh *b)
{
    if (!memcmp(a, b, sizeof(a)))
    {
        /* they are equivalent */
        free(a->descptr);
        free(a->base);
        free(a);
        return;
    }

    free(a->descptr);
    free(a->base);
    free(a);
    free(b->descptr);
    free(b->base);
    free(b);
    return;
}
```

If the structure padding is different in the two structures, it could cause a double-free error to occur. Take a look at Listing 6-34.

**Listing 6-34**

*Example of Bad Counting with Structure Padding*

```c
struct hdr
{
    int flags;
    short len;
};

struct hdropt
{
    char opt1;
}
```
char optlen;
char descl;
};

struct msghdr
{
  struct hdr h;
  struct hdropt o;
};

struct msghdr *form_hdr(struct hdr *h, struct hdropt *o)
{
  struct msghdr *m=xmalloc(sizeof *h + sizeof *o);
  memset(m, 0, sizeof(struct msghdr));
...

  The size of hdropt would likely be 3 because there are no padding requirements
for alignment. The size of hdr would likely be 8 and the size of msghdr would likely
be 12 to align the two structures. Therefore, memset would write 1 byte past the allo-
cated data with a \0.

**Precedence**

When you review code written by experienced developers, you often see complex
expressions that seem to be precariously void of parentheses. An interesting vulner-
ability would be a situation in which a precedence mistake is made but occurs in
such a way that it doesn't totally disrupt the program.

The first potential problem is the precedence of the bitwise & and | operators,
especially when you mix them with comparison and equality operators, as shown in
this example:

```c
if ( len & 0x80000000 != 0)
  die("bad len!");

if (len < 1024)
  memcpy(dst, src, len);
```

The programmers are trying to see whether len is negative by checking the
highest bit. Their intent is something like this:

```c
if ( (len & 0x80000000) != 0)
  die("bad len!");
```
What’s actually rendered into assembly code, however, is this:

```c
if ( len & (0x80000000 != 0))
    die("bad len!");
```

This code would evaluate to `len & 1`. If `len`’s least significant bit isn’t set, that test would pass, and users could specify a negative argument to `memcpy()`.

There are also potential precedence problems involving assignment, but they aren’t likely to surface in production code because of compiler warnings. For example, look at the following code:

```c
if (len = getlen() > 30)
    snprintf(dst, len - 30, "%s", src)
```

The authors intended the following:

```c
if ((len = getlen()) > 30)
    snprintf(dst, len - 30, "%s", src)
```

However, they got the following:

```c
if (len = (getlen() > 30))
    snprintf(dst, len - 30, "%s", src)
```

`len` is going to be 1 or 0 coming out of the `if` statement. If it’s 1, the second argument to `snprintf()` is -29, which is essentially an unlimited string.

Here’s one more potential precedence error:

```c
int a = b + c >> 3;
```

The authors intended the following:

```c
int a = b + (c >> 3);
```

As you can imagine, they got the following:

```c
int a = (b + c) >> 3;
```

**Macros/Preprocessor**

C’s preprocessor could also be a source of security problems. Most people are familiar with the problems in a macro like this:

```c
#define SQUARE(x) x*x
```
If you use it as follows:

\[ y = \text{SQUARE}(z + t); \]

It would evaluate to the following:

\[ y = z + t \cdot z + t; \]

That result is obviously wrong. The recommended fix is to put parentheses around the macro and the arguments so that you have the following:

\[
\text{#define SQUARE}(x) ((x)*(x))
\]

You can still get into trouble with macros constructed in this way when you consider order of evaluation and side-effect problems. For example, if you use the following:

\[ y = \text{SQUARE}(j++); \]

It would evaluate to

\[ y = ((j++)*(j++)); \]

That result is implementation defined. Similarly, if you use the following:

\[ y = \text{SQUARE}(	ext{getint}()); \]

It would evaluate to

\[ y = ((\text{getint}())*(\text{getint}())); \]

This result is probably not what the author intended. Macros could certainly introduce security issues if they’re used in way outside mainstream use, so pay attention when you’re auditing code that makes heavy use of them. When in doubt, expand them by hand or look at the output of the preprocessor pass.

**Typos**

Programmers can make many simple typographic errors that might not affect program compilation or disrupt a program’s runtime processes, but these typos could lead to security-relevant problems. These errors are somewhat rare in production code, but occasionally they crop up. It can be entertaining to try to spot typos in code. Possible typographic mistakes have been presented as a series of challenges. Try to spot the mistake before reading the analysis.
Challenge 1

```c
while (*src && left)
{
    *dst++=*src++;

    if (left = 0)
        die("badlen");

    left--;
}
```

The statement if (left = 0) should read if (left == 0).

In the correct version of the code, if left is 0, the loop detects a buffer overflow attempt and aborts. In the incorrect version, the if statement assigns 0 to left, and the result of that assignment is the value 0. The statement if (0) isn’t true, so the next thing that occurs is the left--; statement. Because left is 0, left-- becomes a negative 1 or a large positive number, depending on left’s type. Either way, left isn’t 0, so the while loop continues, and the check doesn’t prevent a buffer overflow.

Challenge 2

```c
int f;

f=get_security_flags(username);
if (f = FLAG_AUTHENTICATED)
{
    return LOGIN_OK;
}
return LOGIN_FAILED;
```

The statement if (f = FLAG_AUTHENTICATED) should read as follows:

```c
if (f == FLAG_AUTHENTICATED)
```

In the correct version of the code, if users’ security flags indicate they’re authenticated, the function returns LOGIN_OK. Otherwise, it returns LOGIN_FAILED.

In the incorrect version, the if statement assigns whatever FLAG_AUTHENTICATED happens to be to f. The if statement always succeeds because FLAG_AUTHENTICATED is some nonzero value. Therefore, the function returns LOGIN_OK for every user.
**Challenge 3**

```c
for (i==5; src[i] && i<10; i++)
{
    dst[i-5]=src[i];
}
```

The statement `for (i==5; src[i] && i<10; i++)` should read as follows:

```c
for (i=5; src[i] && i<10; i++)
```

In the correct version of the code, the `for` loop copies 4 bytes, starting reading from `src[5]` and starting writing to `dst[0]`. In the incorrect version, the expression `i==5` evaluates to true or false but doesn’t affect the contents of `i`. Therefore, if `i` is some value less than 10, it could cause the `for` loop to write and read outside the bounds of the `dst` and `src` buffers.

**Challenge 4**

```c
if (get_string(src) &&
    check_for_overflow(src) & copy_string(dst,src))
    printf("string safely copied\n");
```

The `if` statement should read like so:

```c
if (get_string(src) &&
    check_for_overflow(src) && copy_string(dst,src))
```

In the correct version of the code, the program gets a string into the `src` buffer and checks the `src` buffer for an overflow. If there isn’t an overflow, it copies the string to the `dst` buffer and prints “string safely copied.”

In the incorrect version, the `&` operator doesn’t have the same characteristics as the `&&` operator. Even if there isn’t an issue caused by the difference between logical and bitwise AND operations in this situation, there’s still the critical problem of short-circuit evaluation and guaranteed order of execution. Because it’s a bitwise AND operation, both operand expressions are evaluated, and the order in which they are evaluated isn’t necessarily known. Therefore, `copy_string()` is called even if `check_for_overflow()` fails, and it might be called before `check_for_overflow()` is called.

**Challenge 5**

```c
if (len > 0 && len <= sizeof(dst));
    memcpy(dst, src, len);
```
The if statement should read like so:

```c
if (len > 0 && len <= sizeof(dst))
```

In the correct version of the code, the program performs a `memcpy()` only if the length is within a certain set of bounds, therefore preventing a buffer overflow attack. In the incorrect version, the extra semicolon at the end of the if statement denotes an empty statement, which means `memcpy()` always runs, regardless of the result of length checks.

**Challenge 6**

```c
char buf[040];

snprintf(buf, 40, "%s", userinput);
```

The statement `char buf[040];` should read `char buf[40];`.

In the correct version of the code, the program sets aside 40 bytes for the buffer it uses to copy the user input into. In the incorrect version, the program sets aside 32 bytes. When an integer constant is preceded by 0 in C, it instructs the compiler that the constant is in octal. Therefore, the buffer length is interpreted as 040 octal, or 32 decimal, and `snprintf()` could write past the end of the stack buffer.

**Challenge 7**

```c
if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(dst)) /* check the length */
    die("bad length!");

/* length ok */

memcpy(dst, src, len);
```

The if statement should read like so:

```c
if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(dst)) /* check the length */
```

In the correct version of the code, the program checks the length before it carries out `memcpy()` and calls `abort()` if the length is out of the appropriate range. In the incorrect version, the lack of an end to the comment means `memcpy()` becomes the target statement for the if statement. So `memcpy()` occurs only if the length checks fail.
Challenge 8

if (len > 0 && len <= sizeof(dst))
    copiedflag = 1;
    memcpy(dst, src, len);

if (!copiedflag)
    die("didn't copy");

The first if statement should read like so:
if (len > 0 && len <= sizeof(dst))
{
    copiedflag = 1;
    memcpy(dst, src, len);
}

In the correct version, the program checks the length before it carries out memcpy(). If the length is out of the appropriate range, the program sets a flag that causes an abort.

In the incorrect version, the lack of a compound statement following the if statement means memcpy() is always performed. The indentation is intended to trick the reader's eyes.

Challenge 9

if (!strncmp(src, "magicword", 9))
    // report_magic(1);

if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(dst))
    assert("bad length");

/* length ok */
memcpy(dst, src, len);

The report_magic(1) statement should read like so:
    // report_magic(1);
In the correct version, the program checks the length before it performs `memcpy()`. If the length is out of the appropriate range, the program sets a flag that causes an abort.

In the incorrect version, the lack of a compound statement following the `magicword if` statement means the length check is performed only if the `magicword` comparison is true. Therefore, `memcpy()` is likely always performed.

**Challenge 10**

```c
l = msg_hdr.msg_len;
frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
...
if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max)
{
    al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
           SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
    goto f_err;
}
if ( frag_len + s->init_num >
    (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
    al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
           SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
    goto f_err;
}
if ( frag_len &
    !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len +
                       DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
{
    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
            ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
    goto err;
}
```
if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
{
    s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type;
    s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type;
    s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l;
    /* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */
}

/* XDTLS: resurrect this when restart is in place */
s->state=stn;

/* next state (stn) */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

if (frag_len > 0)
{
    i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
        &p[s->init_num],
        frag_len,0);
    /* XDTLS: fix this—message fragments cannot
        span multiple packets */
    if (i <= 0)
    {
        s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
        *ok = 0;
        return i;
    }
}
else
    i = 0;

Did you spot the bug? There is a mistake in one of the length checks where the developers use a bitwise AND operator (&) instead of a logical AND operator (&&). Specifically, the statement should read:
if ( frag_len &&
    !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len +
         DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))

This simple mistake could lead to memory corruption if the BUF_MEM_grow_clean() function were to fail. This function returns 0 upon failure, which will be set to 1 by the logical not operator. Then, a bitwise AND operation with frag_len will occur. So, in the case of failure, the malformed statement is really doing the following:

if(frag_len & 1)
{
    SSLerr(...);
}

Summary

This chapter has covered nuances of the C programming language that can lead to subtle and complex vulnerabilities. This background should enable you to identify problems that can occur with operator handling, type conversions, arithmetic operations, and common C typos. However, the complex nature of this topic does not lend itself to complete understanding in just one pass. Therefore, refer back to this material as needed when conducting application assessments. After all, even the best code auditor can easily miss subtle errors that could result in severe vulnerabilities.